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 Thesis Summary 
This thesis follows two independent lines of investigation on social 
psychological predictors of collective action, focusing on solidarity-based action 
among bystander groups in the first part, and violent forms of collective action in 
the second part. 
In Studies 1-3, I examine predictors of collective action among third 
parties in solidarity with a disadvantaged group by extending a recent model 
which proposes two pathways to collective action, one emotion-based and the 
other efficacy-based (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). I show that 
moral outrage and feelings of empathy with a disadvantaged group play an 
important role in predicting solidarity-based collective action tendencies, while 
sympathy seems to be an unreliable predictor. I also provide evidence that the 
perceived efficacy of collective action at consolidating the identity of the 
protesting movement can influence collective action tendencies directly but also 
indirectly by feeding into perceptions of the action’s political efficacy.  
In Studies 4-7, I examine whether the pursuit of violent forms of 
collective action is subject to considerations regarding the efficacy of both violent 
and nonviolent forms of action, and the interaction between these two. I show that 
violence support and violent action tendencies are generally positively predicted 
by violence efficacy but not consistently negatively predicted by nonviolence 
efficacy, as nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy appear to interact in some 
contexts (Studies 4-6). Importantly, my studies reveal that people are more 
supportive of violent action the more efficacious it seems, even if nonviolent 
action is also a promising strategy. Further, when violent action seems to have 
low efficacy, people may still support its pursuit if they deem nonviolence to 
have low efficacy as well.  
Overall, the findings of this thesis contribute to current scholarly efforts at 
identifying novel predictors of collective action as well as predictors of different 
forms of collective action. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
Collective action can be defined as any action that aims to improve 
the conditions, status, power or influence of an entire group rather than that 
of one or a few individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor, & 
Moghaddam, 1990b; van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). It can take various forms 
including nonviolent actions such as signing petitions, participating in 
peaceful demonstrations, or violent actions such as riots, armed resistance, 
and terrorist attacks. A recent example of the important consequences 
collective action can have is the ongoing wave of popular uprisings against 
long-standing Arab political regimes, which started in Tunisia in December 
2010 and then spread to the rest of the Arab world, with massive political 
repercussions across the region and beyond. Europe, meanwhile, has also 
seen its share of mass popular action in the last two years following the 
global economic crisis, with workers and students staging protests and 
strikes against governmental budget cuts all across the UK and Europe, with 
violence erupting on various occasions and signs of yet more to come. 
Unsurprisingly, collective action is considered one of the fundamental 
engines of social change given its potential to reshape social, economic and 
political power hierarchies, and to impact social norms, peace and security 
in intergroup relations. Researching when and why people participate in 
collective action is therefore of great theoretical and practical importance for 
social scientists, practitioners and policy-makers alike.  
This thesis aims to expand existing work on two social 
psychological predictors of collective action: efficacy perceptions and 
emotions. In one line of investigation, I look at predictors of solidarity-
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based collective action among bystander groups, exploring a range of 
emotions as well as different types of efficacy as predictors. In another line 
of investigation I delve into the efficacy of different collective action tactics 
and their interplay in predicting particular courses of action. In this chapter, 
I provide the theoretical background to my work. I begin with an overview 
of the traditional antecedents of collective action, after which I turn to 
current trends in collective action research which relate to my work, ending 
with an overview of the thesis. 
Classical Antecedents of Collective Action 
Social psychological research has typically focused on three main 
antecedents of collective action, namely perceived injustice and 
accompanying emotions, efficacy perceptions, and identity motives. In the 
next sections I discuss each of these in turn. 
Perceived and Felt Injustice 
Various social psychological theories view collective action as the 
result of individuals feeling aggrieved on a collective level about a current 
state of affairs. It was traditionally assumed that people take collective 
action to remedy objective inequalities with other groups, measured for 
example by wealth and health (e.g. Blumer, 1939; Davies, 1962; Gurr, 
1968; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Olson, 1968). Theorists subsequently 
challenged this notion by noting that collective action can stem from 
subjective feelings of deprivation. For example, Stouffer, Suchman, 
DeVinney, Star, and Williams (1949) found that African Americans in the 
Southern military camps of the United States, where racial discrimination 
was pervasive, exhibited as favourable or more favourable responses 
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regarding their personal adjustment in the army compared to those in the 
Northern camps, who experienced less discrimination. It turned out that 
African American soldiers in the south perceived considerable advantages 
over African American civilians in that area, while the advantages over 
African American civilians in the north were much less notable. A series of 
similar unexpected findings led Stouffer and his colleagues to introduce the 
concept of relative deprivation which subsequently led to the development 
of Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT, e.g. Crosby, 1976; Folger, 1986; 
Runciman, 1966; Walker & Smith, 2002).  
According to RDT, perceptions of personal relative deprivation, 
referred to as egoistic deprivation, result from the social comparison of 
one’s personal conditions with the conditions of particular others who are 
taken as a reference point. Similarly, comparing the situation of one’s social 
group as a whole with the situation of another social group can lead to 
group-based perceptions of relative deprivation, referred to as fraternal 
deprivation (Runciman, 1966). Collective action is thought to be more likely 
to result from feelings of fraternal deprivation than from egoistic 
deprivation (Runciman, 1966), given the conceptual fit between intergroup 
comparisons and the intergroup nature of collective action (Postmes, 
Branscombe, Spears, & Young, 1999). Meta-analytic findings support this 
idea (Smith & Ortiz, 2002). For example, Walker and Mann (1987) found 
that fraternal relative deprivation among unemployed Australian workers, 
measured as the perceived gap between ingroup and outgroup attainment, 
positively predicted the workers’ orientation to social protest, and did so 
better than egoistic relative deprivation, measured as the perceived gap 
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between personal expectations and attainment. The social psychological 
literature on fairness judgment has also subsequently emphasized the 
importance of viewing one’s group as being unjustly treated (procedural 
injustice) rather than being merely unequal to another group (distributive 
justice) (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997) as a motive for taking 
collective action (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). 
Social identity theory (SIT, Tajfel; 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) 
provides another framework for understanding collective action which also 
highlights the centrality of legitimacy concerns. SIT proposes that people 
generally seek to belong to groups that provide them with positive social 
identities. Social identity was originally defined as “that part of an 
individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his (sic) 
membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p.251). 
Given the motivation to belong to positively valued groups, membership in 
a low-status or disadvantaged group presents a problem. Various identity 
management strategies are available to low-status group members to resolve 
this problem, one of which is taking collective action to improve the status 
of their group. According to SIT, the choice of identity management 
strategy depends on the context, namely on three social-structural 
characteristics. The first is the permeability of intergroup boundaries, that is, 
whether a member of the low-status group can join the high-status group 
and become a member of it. Permeable boundaries allow such movement 
whereas impermeable boundaries prevent it. The second is the legitimacy of 
the ingroup’s status, that is, whether the low status is deserved. The third is 
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the stability of the ingroup’s position, that is, whether the low status is 
perceived as changeable (unstable) or unchangeable (stable). According to 
SIT, collective action arises when low-status group members perceive 
intergroup boundaries to be impermeable, when they view their group’s 
disadvantaged position compared to an advantaged outgroup as being 
illegitimate or undeserved, and when they view the status hierarchy as 
unstable (Ellemers, 1993; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999). 
Legitimacy concerns (and stability, which we elaborate later) thus play an 
important role in determining people’s decisions to take collective action. 
Theoretical developments building on RDT and SIT have 
emphasized the emotional basis of perceptions of injustice as an important 
player in collective action. RDT stresses that feelings of group-based 
deprivation such as anger and resentment, are more important in predicting 
collective action than mere cognitive perceptions of deprivation (e.g. Tyler 
& Smith, 1998), as shown in a meta-analysis by Smith and Ortiz (2002). 
The stress on emotional responses to perceived injustice as important 
drivers of group-based action can also be found in the more recent 
Intergroup Emotion Theory (IET; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; E.R. 
Smith, 1993). This approach is based on appraisal theories of emotion (e.g. 
Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989), which view emotion as a complex 
syndrome composed of cognitions, subjective feelings and behavioural 
tendencies. IET proposes that in situations where individuals categorize 
themselves as members of a social group (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987), group-related events are viewed as more self-relevant and 
produce group-based emotions with specific action tendencies (Smith, 
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1993). For example, an outgroup appraised as suffering unfairly should 
generate feelings of sympathy which should lead to tendencies to help that 
group. A person’s experience of group-level emotions can be inferred from 
four criteria: these emotions are different from the same person’s individual-
level emotions, they are a function of the person’s degree of identification 
with the relevant group, they are socially shared within a group, and they 
play a role in regulating intragroup and intergroup attitudes and behaviour 
(see Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007, for empirical evidence).   
According to IET, appraising an outgroup as treating the ingroup 
unjustly or unfairly produces feelings of group-based anger against this 
outgroup and a motivation to move against them in order to redress the 
perceived injustice. Empirical findings show that anger indeed mediates 
between group-based appraisals of injustice and confrontational action 
tendencies such as collective action (Tausch, Becker, Spears et al., 2011). 
For example, van Zomeren and colleagues (2004) conducted two 
experiments with Dutch university students who were told that their 
university was planning to increase tuition fees in response to recently 
imposed cuts by the government. The authors manipulated procedural 
fairness by informing students that the university would either give them or 
deny them any voice in the decision. They found that students were more 
motivated to engage in collective action to oppose the proposal when they 
were denied voice, and this effect was mediated by increases in group-based 
anger at the proposal. 
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Efficacy 
Approaches focusing primarily on grievances as an explanation for 
collective action were criticized in the seventies (e.g. see Walker & Smith, 
2002, on criticism of RDT), based on the observation that grievances are 
pervasive in society, yet people do not always take collective action to 
address them. Hence, Resource Mobilization Theory argued that relative 
deprivation should lead to collective action only when individuals are able 
to mobilize sufficient resources to challenge injustice (McCarthy & Zald, 
1977). The theory assumes that individuals are rational actors who weigh 
the costs and benefits of participating in social movements. Research in this 
tradition concentrated mainly on how social movement organisations 
acquire and mobilize resources (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 
2008).  
Criticizing the objective presence or absence of resources as a sole 
focus of enquiry, Klandermans (1984) argued that individuals’ subjective 
perceptions are important motives for engaging in collective action. He 
proposed various motives for social movement participation based on an 
integration of Olson’s (1968) theory of collective action and expectancy-
value theories of motivation (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Most relevant here is the collective motive, 
measured as a subjective value-expectancy product. The value component 
represents the extent to which people value the goals that the collective 
action seeks to achieve. The expectancy component represents people’s 
expectation regarding the effectiveness of the collective action in achieving 
these goals (e.g. if enough people can be mobilized to achieve these goals). 
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The collective motive has been found to positively predict collective action 
participation in various contexts (Flood, 1993; Klandermans, 1984, 1986; 
Stürmer & Simon, 2004).  
Various other theoretical accounts of collective action also view the 
perceived likelihood that collective action will succeed in achieving social 
change as an important explanation of participation. In SIT (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979), as previously mentioned, the perceived changeability of the 
social order, termed stability, is seen as an important socio-structural 
variable that influences members of disadvantaged groups’ willingness to 
take collective action. According to SIT, people must view their 
disadvantage as part of an unstable social order rather than a stable one, in 
order to engage in collective action. In more recent developments of RDT, 
Mummendey et al. (1999) introduced the concept of group efficacy, or the 
belief that the group is capable of resolving their grievances through unified 
effort, as an important positive predictor of collective action (see also 
Reicher, 1996; 2001). Group efficacy draws on Bandura’s (1997) concept of 
collective efficacy, defined as “a group’s shared belief in its conjoint 
capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to 
produce given levels of attainments” (p. 477). Empirical findings support 
the idea that perceived group efficacy positively predicts collective action 
(van Zomeren et al., 2004; see meta-analysis by van Zomeren, Postmes, & 
Spears, 2008; but see also Tausch et al., 2011). 
Instrumentality concerns have been addressed using various 
concepts. Wright (2001) views stability and group efficacy as two 
components of one factor which he terms collective control. According to 
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him, people engage in collective action only if they believe that the 
intergroup context is responsive to action (unstable) and that the group has 
the resources or abilities necessary to effect change (high group efficacy). 
Azzi (1998) posits three types of efficacy beliefs which influence 
individuals’ readiness to endorse collective action. The first is collective 
efficacy, determined by a) the perceived likelihood that collective action 
will bring about at least some of the outcomes desired by the group, b) the 
perceived willingness of other group members to participate in collective 
action, and c) perceiving that the group possesses the resources necessary to 
overcome potential counterattacks by the outgroup, such as wealth, arms, 
resilience. The second type of efficacy beliefs is individual self-efficacy, 
which is the belief that one can make it on their own, exit the disadvantaged 
ingroup and assimilate into the advantaged group (akin to permeability in 
SIT). The third type is participatory self-efficacy, which is the belief that 
one’s own participation in collective action would make a difference.  
In sum, while efficacy has been operationalised in various ways and 
on different levels (e.g. self, group, strategy), it is consistently seen to be an 
important explanation of collective action. 
Identity 
Stürmer and Simon (2004) have argued that Klandermans’s (1997) 
cost-benefit approach to collective action overlooks how individuals’ 
decisions to participate in collective action are influenced by their group 
membership, that is, the extent to which they view themselves as members 
of a group and act in accordance with that group membership. They 
proposed that social identification with one’s group, that is, the strength of 
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pre-existing identification with the group concerned with the collective 
struggle, constitutes an additional pathway to collective action over and 
above the cost-benefit pathway. Their approach draws on SIT (Tafjel, 1978; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which proposes that when members of a 
disadvantaged group believe that the low status is illegitimate, that 
intergroup boundaries are impermeable, and that the low status is unstable, 
they are more likely to collectively challenge the status quo through 
collective action because they come to identify with their group more 
strongly (Ellemers, 1993). It has thus been argued that social identity serves 
to mobilize people for social change (Drury & Reicher, 1999; 2000; 2005). 
Stürmer and Simon (2004) suggest a number of reasons why social 
identity should lead to collective action participation. Collective identity 
links group members’ self-esteem to their ingroup status; it fosters a sense 
of collective strength and ingroup cohesion, and facilitates intergroup 
differentiation and social influence from ingroup members (see Brown & 
Gaertner, 2001 for a review). When social movements are based on pre-
existing social categories (e.g. women, ethnic minorities), identification 
with such categories makes it easier to become part of the mobilization 
potential (Klandermans, 1997) and increases the chance that mobilization 
attempts by ingroup members would succeed. Further, social identification 
makes it more likely that the cost and benefits of collective action 
participation would be calculated at the group level rather than the 
individual level. 
Importantly, collective identity is thought to be most likely to fuel 
collective action when it becomes politicized (Simon & Klandermans, 
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2001), that is, when it develops into an activist identity, which is 
accompanied by an internalization of the goals and standards of the social 
movement. Politicized identification thus influences participation by 
instilling an inner obligation to participate (Kelly, 1993). Consistent with 
this view, there is now substantial evidence that identification with a group, 
but more particularly identification with a social movement (politicized 
identification), positively predicts collective action on behalf of that group 
(Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; see Stürmer & Simon, 2004 for a review) and 
that this effect is mediated by an inner obligation to participate. A recent 
meta-analysis also showed that identification is a positive and unique 
predictor of collective action over and above perceived injustice and 
efficacy, and that politicized identification is a better predictor of collective 
action than non-politicized identification (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 
2008). 
Integrative Models 
Various integrative models of collective action have been proposed 
combining two or more of the predictors outlined in the previous section. As 
previously mentioned, Stürmer and Simon (2004) proposed a dual-pathway 
model of collective action. One pathway draws on Klandermans’s (1984) 
collective, normative and reward motives and represents the calculation of 
the costs and benefits of participation. The second pathway draws on the 
social identity approach and represents identification processes, where 
participants are driven to collective action based on their internalisation of 
group-specific behavioural standards. The social identity model of collective 
action (SIMCA, van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; see also van 
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Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, in press) suggests that collective action is 
predicted by all three classical antecedents, namely injustice and resulting 
emotions, efficacy and social identification, particularly politicized 
identification. Further, SIMCA posits that social identity forms the 
psychological basis for collective action and bridges the injustice and 
efficacy paths to action. That is, social identification predicts collective 
action indirectly via injustice and efficacy, as well as directly. Given that 
one line of investigation in this thesis focuses on efficacy and emotions, of 
particular interest is the dual pathway model of collective action by van 
Zomeren and colleagues (2004), which forms the basis of some of my 
studies. This is an integrative model which views emotion and efficacy as 
distinct but complementary pathways to collective action. The model 
conceptualises anger, resulting from experiences of procedural injustice and 
opinion support from other group members, and group efficacy, resulting 
from instrumental social support, as two independent predictors of 
collective action tendencies (see Figure 1). The emotion-based pathway is 
conceptualised as emotion-focused coping with collective disadvantage, 
whereas the efficacy pathway is conceptualised as problem-focused coping 
(Lazarus, 1991). This model has received support in various contexts 
(Sweetman, Spears, & Livingstone, 2011;Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren 
et al., 2004; van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008). 
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Figure 1. A simplified version of the dual pathway model of 
collective action proposed by van Zomeren et al. (2004). 
 
Current Trends or Issues in Collective Action Research 
The last decade has witnessed a resurgence of interest in the social 
psychology of collective action. Van Zomeren and Iyer (2009), and Wright 
(2009) have recently reviewed some of the significant research advances in 
this area and highlighted conceptual issues that may be important for the 
next generation of collective action research. Drawing on their work, in the 
following sections I give an overview of those issues which are relevant to 
my thesis to help situate my work within the current research in the field.  
Collective Action by Whom and for Whom? 
In examining antecedents of collective action, social psychologists 
have traditionally focused on action by members of disadvantaged groups. 
But what about those who take collective action in solidarity with 
disadvantaged groups? Researchers have recently started to pay attention to 
collective action taken by advantaged group members on behalf of 
disadvantaged groups (e.g. Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Leach, Snider, 
& Iyer, 2002; Sweetman, Spears, & Livingstone, 2011). For example, 
various studies have demonstrated that group-based emotions such as self-
focused anger, guilt and sympathy can promote actions to compensate or 
help the disadvantaged group (e.g. Iyer et al., 2007; Leach, Iyer & Pedersen, 
Group  
Efficacy 
Perceived  
Injustice 
Group-Based  
Anger 
Collective  
Action  
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2006). Recent theory and research have also begun to study what motivates 
members of bystander groups to sometimes take collective action in 
solidarity with a disadvantaged group (Reicher , Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, 
& Levine, 2006; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašic´, Reynolds, & 
Turner, 2008; Thomas, 2005; Thomas & McGarty, 2009). However, 
empirical data on members of bystander groups is still scarce compared to 
data on collective action by advantaged or disadvantaged group members.  
Wright (2009), however, considers that actions taken on behalf of a 
disadvantaged outgroup, though important to examine in their own right, do 
not fit one of the classical definitions of collective action which stresses the 
importance of acting on behalf of one’s ingroup: “a group member engages 
in collective action any time she or he acts as a representative of the group 
and where the action is directed at improving the conditions of the group as 
a whole” (Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990b, p. 995). McGarty, Bliuc, 
Thomas, and Bongiorno (2009) contend that it is problematic to attribute 
collective action only to particular social categories (e.g. race, gender, 
ethnicity). They point out that collective action is often about relations 
between social categories, but that it is taken by members from various 
social categories and often occurs when there are intense divisions within 
those categories. Hence, they argue that collective action can often be 
attributed to opinion-based groups, which form around shared opinions on 
social or political issues. Wright (2009) concedes that action aimed at 
improving the conditions of a disadvantaged outgroup can be considered 
collective action in the classical sense to the extent that it stems from 
membership in an opinion-based group, given that such groups can include 
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members of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups who advocate better 
conditions for the disadvantaged group.  
Consistent with this, Van Zomeren and Iyer (2009) argue that there 
is little reason to neglect advantaged groups or third parties in the study of 
collective action. They advocate a broader definition of collective action 
that can accommodate action taken in solidarity with a disadvantaged 
outgroup, namely as action taken in order to improve the status, power, 
influence of an entire group rather than a few individuals. In fact, van 
Zomeren and Iyer (2009) specifically call for more research in this realm 
given the importance of drawing other members of society to join collective 
action on behalf of one’s group in order to increase its chances of success. 
My thesis fits neatly within this agenda as one of its main aims is to 
examine emotional and efficacy predictors of collective action by bystander 
group members in solidarity with a disadvantaged group (Chapter 2). 
Operationalising Collective Action 
Collective action has been operationalised in various ways in the 
literature, including attitudes toward collective action, intentions and action 
tendencies to participate in collective action, self-reported past participation 
and actual participation. The present thesis focuses particularly on support 
for collective action and collective action tendencies as dependent variables. 
Some view behavioural measures as the most valuable outcome variables 
and thus consider studies using other outcome variables as weaknesses. Van 
Zomeren and Iyer (2009) have recently remarked, however, that the 
diversity of measures in the field is actually a strength. They argue that 
studying processes at least one step removed from actual behaviour is 
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valuable because these processes might influence behaviour at a later point 
in time. Drawing on Klandermans’s (1997) four-step model of collective 
action participation, van Zomeren and Iyer note that studying attitudinal 
support for collective action helps us understand when people become part 
of the mobilization potential of a social movement, that is, when they 
become sympathetic supporters of the movement, which is the first step in 
Klandermans’ model. Investigating intentions and action tendencies to 
participate in collective action help us understand the second and third steps 
in the model, which consist of becoming targets of mobilization attempts 
and developing the motivation to participate, respectively. Finally, 
examining actual participation helps to understand the fourth step, which is 
overcoming barriers to participation (e.g. time, money and other 
responsibilities). Hence, research on all these different steps is essential for 
helping us understand individuals’ pathways to collective action. 
Collective Action Tactics 
Collective action encompasses a broad variety of actions, ranging 
from individuals acting alone to mass protest, including consciousness 
raising, lobbying, voting, petitioning, going on strike, participating in riots, 
engaging in armed resistance and even terrorist attacks (see Wright, 2009). 
The literature indicates various ways of classifying different forms of 
political action, but these classifications are not free of controversy 
(Sabucedo & Arce, 1991).  
One common classification is that provided by Wright et al. (1990b), 
who distinguish between normative collective actions (i.e. actions 
conforming to the norms of the existing political system, such as peaceful 
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protest or voting) and non-normative actions (i.e. actions that violates the 
norms of the system, such as violent actions). Other classifications 
differentiate between within-system and out-of-system political actions 
(Sabucedo & Arce, 1991); activism versus radicalism (Moskalenko & 
McCauley, 2009), and constitutional versus extra-constitutional actions 
(Hayes & McAllister, 2005).  
One can also distinguish between violent action, which entails 
physical damage to property or life, and nonviolent action, commonly 
defined by Sharp (2005) as “a general technique of protest, resistance, and 
intervention without physical violence… Such action may be conducted by 
(a) acts of omission – that is, the participants refuse to perform acts they 
usually perform, or are expected by custom to perform, or are required by 
law or regulation to perform; (b) acts of commission – that is, the 
participants perform acts that they usually do not perform, are not expected 
by custom to perform, or are forbidden by law or regulation from 
performing; or (c) a combination of both.” (p. 547).  
Sharp (2005) distinguishes between three types of nonviolent tactics. 
The first is nonviolent protest and persuasion, consisting of verbal, written 
or symbolic acts of protest challenging the status quo, or attempts to 
persuade others to support the movement (e.g. petitions, distributing 
literature, singing songs, street theatre, vigils, and creating new Web sites). 
The second is noncooperation, where people deny their obedience and 
cooperation to an opponent or opponents’ pillar of support. This can include 
social (e.g. suspension of social activities), economic (e.g. boycott, strikes) 
or political (e.g. resignation, refusal to participate in government institutions 
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or programs) noncooperation. The third type of nonviolent tactic is 
nonviolent intervention which directly disrupts the opponents’ ability to 
function, such as in acts of civil disobedience, sit-ins, or the creation of 
parallel institutions. Nonviolent actions have also been classified as methods 
of concentration (where people act in dense physical proximity to each 
other, such as in protests), and methods of dispersion (where people act in 
decentralised and diffuse ways, such as boycotts and stay-at-home strikes) 
(Schock, 2005).  
Importantly, most social psychological research has so far examined 
only one specific form of collective action (e.g. protest) or included various 
self-reported actions in one measure. Further, most actions that are 
examined are typically nonviolent and little attention has been given to the 
study of violent actions. However, as Wright (2009) has recently noted, “it 
seems fairly obvious that there should be differences in the antecedents 
leading one to sign a petition versus burn a flag at a protest, or to attend a 
rally versus set a bomb.” (p. 873). Accordingly, Wright calls upon collective 
action researchers to develop frameworks that can capture the distinctions 
among different forms of collective action. In line with this, one of the aims 
of this thesis is to examine how violent forms of collective action are 
predicted by their perceived efficacy and the perceived efficacy of 
nonviolent actions, and the interaction between these two. 
Elaborating on Classical Antecedents and Expanding the Array of 
Antecedents 
Recent advances in collective action research consist partially of 
elaborating on the classical antecedents, that is, injustice and emotions, 
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efficacy, and identity, and exploring a wider array of antecedents (Wright, 
2009).  
Emotions.  The emotions that have gained most attention in the 
literature on predictors of collective action are group-based anger, 
dissatisfaction, frustration and resentment (e.g. van Zomeren et al., 2004; 
see meta-analysis by van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). However, 
expanding the array of emotions relevant to collective action is currently an 
important item on the collective action research agenda. Thomas and 
McGarty (2009), for example, have examined the role of moral outrage in 
international development activism. Miller, Cronin, Garcia, and 
Branscombe (2009) have examined fear as an inhibitor of collective action. 
Drury and Reicher (2009) have explored the role of positive and 
empowering emotions such as exhilaration that may result from 
participation in collective action. Tausch and colleagues (2011) have 
recently examined the role of contempt in predicting normative and non-
normative forms of collective action. Sweetman and colleagues (2011) have 
investigated the role of admiration and other-praising emotions. The recent 
interest in collective action by advantaged or bystander group members has 
also led to more theorizing on the role of prosocial emotions in intergroup 
helping (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). Prosocial emotions are 
especially relevant here given that one of the lines of investigation in this 
thesis focuses on collective action by members of bystander groups. In 
particular, my work is concerned with the roles of moral outrage, sympathy 
and empathy in predicting solidarity-based collective action by bystander 
group members. 
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Other motives.  Hornsey, Blackwood, Louis and colleagues (2006) 
have recently critiqued traditional research on efficacy and collective action, 
arguing that it focuses primarily on the efficacy of collective action at 
influencing outgroups such as governments, but fails to take into account 
other equally important targets of collective action. In particular, Hornsey 
and colleagues point out that the efficacy of collective action can be 
conceptualised in terms of its potential to express certain values, build a 
mass movement and influence public opinion. 
The expressive function of collective action has recently gained 
more attention in the literature. It has been linked to ideological motives, 
defined by some as “wanting to express one’s views” (van Stekelenburg & 
Klandermans, 2007; p. 183; see also van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & van 
Dijk, 2009). Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2007) argue that the 
violation of personal cherished values provides an impetus for collective 
action; people participate in collective action not only to enforce political 
change, but “to gain dignity in their lives through struggle and moral 
expression” (p.183). 
This expressive function of collective action overlaps with another 
proclaimed motive of collective action, which is the desire to affirm the 
collective identity of the challenging group (see Wright, 2009). Both of 
these motives involve the need for expression, but they seem to operate at 
different levels, with the expressive function referring to expression at the 
individual level (i.e. expressing one’s personal values) and the identity 
affirmation function to expression at the collective level (expressing 
collective values). Collective action is thought to provide an opportunity to 
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assert the challenging group’s views and their distinctiveness from the 
offending or oppressive outgroup. Affirming collective identity may thus 
constitute a motive for collective action regardless of whether action itself 
has a discernable impact on the group’s position in the social order (Drury 
& Reicher, 2005; Wright, 2009).  
Relatedly, Taylor and van Dyke (2004) point out that protest actions 
constitute a way for resisting groups to develop an oppositional 
consciousness and collective identity (Klandermans & de Weerd, 1999), 
such that collective action is not only aimed at external targets but is also 
aimed at movement-building (della Porta & Diani, 1999). For example, in 
sociological research, creating solidarity and collective identity have been 
identified as some of the main functions of online activism (McCaughey & 
Ayers, 2003). In a similar vein, Hornsey et al. (2006) argue that people can 
engage in collective action with the short-term goal of inspiring others to 
join or continue the struggle. Collective action can thus be aimed at building 
a movement or “rallying the troops”, akin to the concept of consciousness 
raising by Taylor and McKirnan (1984; see Wright, 2009). Furthermore, 
Hornsey et al. (2006) point out that collective action can aim to influence 
third parties such as the general public or international community to 
support the movements’ goals or to join the movement, in the hope that this 
would help tip the balance of power in favour of the movement’s goals. 
While these motives have begun to gain recognition in the collective 
action literature, empirical data surrounding them is still at its early stages, 
and the relations between them are rarely explored. My work attempts to 
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integrate these efficacy-related motives and to explore their contribution to 
collective action. 
The Present Research 
This thesis attempts to address various gaps in the literature which 
were touched upon in the preceding discussion. 
In Chapter 2, I present the results of three studies that look at some 
of the factors that might prompt members of bystander groups to take 
collective action in solidarity with a disadvantaged group. This work builds 
on the dual pathway model of collective action by van Zomeren and 
colleagues (2004), which focuses on an emotional pathway and an efficacy 
pathway. I expand on this model in two ways. First, I widen the array of 
emotional predictors typically examined in the literature by looking at the 
role of moral outrage, but also at two important prosocial emotions, namely 
sympathy and empathy. Importantly, I compare the contributions of these 
two emotions, following recent theorizing on their differential roles in 
predicting intergroup helping (Thomas et al., 2009b). Second, I elaborate on 
the efficacy pathway to collective action by building on Hornsey et al.’s 
(2006) recent critique. In particular, I look at how collective action is 
predicted by its perceived efficacy at altering the social order (the traditional 
notion of collective action efficacy) but I also complement this by 
introducing an additional predictor, namely the perceived efficacy of 
collective action at consolidating the identity of a social movement. I see 
identity consolidation as encompassing motives such as rallying the troops, 
influencing third parties and expressing collective views.  
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In Chapter 3 I present the results of four studies looking at how the 
endorsement of a particular form of collective action is influenced by 
perceptions of the (political) efficacy of various available tactics. In 
particular, I examine how violent forms of action are predicted by their 
perceived efficacy as well as by the perceived efficacy of nonviolent tactics 
and, importantly, the potential interaction between these two. Here I study 
how members of bystander groups view violent actions of one group against 
the other, but also how disadvantaged group members view violent action 
against a powerful outgroup.  
Finally, Chapter 4 summarizes the results of my research, looks at some 
of its limitations and implications, and points out directions for future research. 
It is worth noting that both empirical chapters are based on multiple-
study articles that were submitted to scientific journals. The introductions 
and some discussion points may show some overlap, but this is done to 
ensure that they can be read independently of each other. Given that this 
research was conducted in collaboration with others, I refer to the work as 
collective rather than personal (e.g. I use the pronoun “we” rather than “I”). 
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CHAPTER 2: Testing an extended dual-pathway model of solidarity-based 
collective action by third parties
1
 
The international anti-apartheid movement is one of the most striking 
examples of the influence that collective action by bystander groups can have on 
the course of intergroup conflicts and struggles for social change. The processes 
implicated in collective action taken by bystander groups in solidarity with 
disadvantaged groups have, however, received limited attention in social 
psychology, despite the high contemporary relevance of such action (see Tarrow, 
2005, for examples). Collective action researchers have traditionally concentrated 
their efforts on explaining what drives disadvantaged group members to fight an 
advantaged outgroup (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008 for a review). 
Recent years, however, have witnessed increased interest in the antecedents of 
collective action by advantaged group members in solidarity with disadvantaged 
group members (e.g. Leach et al., 2002; see van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). In 
parallel, the field has begun to recognize the need to examine bystander groups in 
intergroup conflicts (Simon & Klandermans, 2001), and to theorize (e.g. Subašic 
et al., 2008) and investigate what motivates them to take action in solidarity with 
disadvantaged groups. Nevertheless, empirical data on this topic are still scarce. 
To help address this gap, the present research examines emotional and efficacy-
related predictors of collective action by bystander group members in solidarity 
with a disadvantaged group, which we refer to as solidarity-based collective 
action. In the following sections, we first give an overview of the role of 
emotions and efficacy in collective action, after which we detail the hypotheses of 
the present research. 
                                                 
1
 This chapter is based on Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung (under review). 
  25 
Predictors of Collective Action 
Perceived Injustice and Group-Based Anger 
The perceived injustice or illegitimacy of the social order is viewed 
as an important antecedent of collective action in various social 
psychological theories such as Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979) and Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT; e.g. Runciman, 1966; see 
Walker & Smith, 2002, for a review). Research also shows that emotional 
responses to perceived injustice, such as anger, are more proximal 
predictors of collective action than appraisals of injustice (see Walker & 
Smith, 2002; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008, for reviews). This is 
consistent with Intergroup Emotion Theory (IET, Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 
1993), which, based on appraisal theories of emotion (e.g. Frijda et al., 1989), 
proposes that perceiving one’s group as being unjustly treated generates 
group-based anger, leading to collective action tendencies aimed at 
confronting the offending outgroup. In line with IET, various studies have 
shown that anger mediates the relation between perceived injustice and 
action tendencies aimed at confronting those responsible for it (van 
Zomeren et al., 2004), particularly nonviolent collective action tendencies 
(Tausch et al., 2011).  
Efficacy 
Another line of research views participation in collective action as 
the result of people believing in the efficacy of collective action at achieving 
the desired social change (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997). Efficacy has 
been operationalised in various ways in the collective action literature (see 
Hornsey et al., 2006, for a review). Group efficacy, or the belief that one’s 
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group is capable of collectively solving a problem facing the group, has 
received increasing attention in recent years (e.g. Mummendey et al., 1999; 
van Zomeren et al., 2004). A recent meta-analysis showed that efficacy, 
operationalised as group efficacy or as the efficacy of collective action at 
resolving perceived grievances, is a positive and unique predictor of  collective 
action (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; but also see Tausch et al., 
2011). 
Emotion and Efficacy as Dual Pathways to Collective Action 
Van Zomeren et al. (2004) have attempted to integrate these two 
approaches, proposing that emotion and efficacy considerations form two 
separate but complementary pathways to collective action. Their model has 
received empirical support in a number of contexts (van Zomeren et al., 
2004; van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008; Tausch et al., 2011). Sweetman 
et al. (2011) demonstrated that the model can explain collective action 
tendencies among both members of disadvantaged groups as well as 
advantaged groups taking action in solidarity with disadvantaged groups. 
The Present Research 
The present work uses the dual pathway model of collective action 
to explain solidarity-based collective action with disadvantaged groups 
struggling against another party, such as a government or a social system 
perceived as responsible for their disadvantage. We extend this model in 
two ways. First, we examine two potentially influential emotional predictors 
of intergroup helping, sympathy and empathy, alongside anger (which is 
more appropriately termed moral outrage in this context as we explain 
later). Recent theorizing on intergroup helping suggests that sympathy and 
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empathy should play different roles in promoting solidarity-based collective 
action (Thomas et al., 2009), but empirical data on their respective unique 
contributions is still lacking. Second, we build on recent work on the role of 
efficacy beliefs (Hornsey et al., 2006), which has highlighted the importance 
of examining the perceived efficacy of collective action at achieving a 
number of goals, such as building a movement and influencing third parties. 
We distinguish between two types of efficacy, namely political efficacy and 
identity consolidation efficacy, and we examine their separate contributions 
to the prediction of collective action. We discuss each of these extensions in 
turn. 
Moral Outrage, Sympathy and Empathy as Predictors of Collective 
Action 
A key objective of our work is to provide an initial test of the unique 
predictive power of three different prosocial emotions (moral outrage, 
sympathy and empathy) in the context of solidarity-based collective action. 
Our predictions are guided by Thomas et al.’s (2009) discussion of the 
potential of these emotions for motivating advantaged groups to help 
disadvantaged groups. They distinguish two types of prosocial emotions: 
those that motivate actions aimed at producing social cohesion with the 
disadvantaged group but that ultimately preserve the status quo (Wright & 
Lubensky, 2008), such as top-down paternalistic assistance (Nadler & 
Halabi, 2006), and emotions that motivate actions aimed at addressing the 
source of the disadvantage to achieve genuine social change, such as 
collective action. Thomas et al. identify the emotions which are most likely 
to motivate social change strategies using criteria derived from the social 
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identity model of intergroup helping proposed by Reicher, Cassidy, 
Wolpert, Hopkins and Levine (2006). Reicher et al. propose that bystanders 
are more motivated to help a disadvantaged group when they view them as 
part of a common ingroup rather than a separate outgroup (the category 
inclusion criterion), when helping them is seen as a core aspect of ingroup 
identity, and when they perceive that their group interests will be harmed if 
they do not intervene to help. Accordingly, Thomas et al. propose that, to 
motivate action aimed at achieving social change, it is important to induce 
emotions in the helper group which satisfy these three criteria. For example, 
the helper group must experience emotions which can be shared with the 
helped group in order to satisfy the category inclusion criterion. 
The anger experienced by a group regarding an unjust disadvantage 
suffered by an outgroup, but blamed on a third party such as a government 
or a perceived system of inequality, is referred to as moral outrage (Leach et 
al., 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Thomas et al., 2009). We shall 
henceforth use this term rather than group-based anger. Thomas et al. (2009) 
view moral outrage as particularly likely to motivate collective action 
because it satisfies all three criteria of intergroup helping (e.g. it unites the 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups against the offending outgroup). 
Consistent with this view, moral outrage has been found to be a positive 
predictor of intentions to engage in political action on behalf of 
disadvantaged groups (Montada & Schneider, 1989; Pagano and Huo, 2007; 
Thomas, 2005; Thomas & McGarty, 2009; Sweetman et al., 2011). Hence, 
we expect moral outrage in response to unjust governmental policies toward 
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an outgroup to positively predict solidarity-based collective action 
(Hypothesis 1).  
Distinguishing between sympathy and empathy is difficult as the two 
are often used interchangeably (see Thomas et al., 2009 for a review), 
despite clear conceptual and empirical differences between them (e.g. 
Wispé, 1986; Gruen & Mendelsohn, 1986). Note that we focus here on 
situational sympathy and empathy rather than their dispositional 
counterparts. It is generally agreed that empathy is a multidimensional 
construct which has both cognitive and affective components (see Reniers, 
Corcoran, Drake, Shryane, & Völlm, 2011; Davis, 2004, for reviews). The 
present research focuses on the affective component of empathy, that is, an 
emotional response to a disadvantaged group’s situation which entails 
experiencing and sharing the same emotions the disadvantaged group is 
perceived to feel (see Duan & Hill, 1996; Eisenberg, 2000). We refer to 
sympathy, on the other hand, as an emotional response to the disadvantaged 
group’s suffering which does not involve reproducing their emotions but is 
rather a response of compassion and concern for them (Eisenberg, 2000; 
Gruen & Mendelsohn, 1986). Sympathy thus involves feeling sorry for the 
disadvantaged group. While sympathy is a discrete emotion, empathy can 
involve experiencing various emotions (Lazarus, 1991). Our distinction of 
sympathy and empathy at the group level mirrors that made by Gruen and 
Mendelsohn (1986) at the interpersonal level and by Thomas et al. (2009) at 
the group level.  
Empirical evidence supports the distinction between sympathy and 
empathy. For example, Gruen and Mendelsohn (1986) showed that at the 
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interpersonal level, sympathy and empathy are predicted by different 
processes. At the group level, Finlay and Stephan (2000) found sympathy 
and empathy to have different effects. They found that White American 
participants evaluated Whites and African Americans similarly in 
experimental conditions where they read about discrimination against 
African Americans or received instructions to take the perspective of 
victims of discrimination, whereas they evaluated the two groups differently 
in the control conditions. Importantly, this effect was mediated by the 
experience of parallel emotions with the victims (feelings of empathy) 
rather than reactive emotions such as sympathy (see Davis, 2004 for a 
similar distinction). The authors thus stressed the importance of studying the 
distinct effects of sympathy and empathy in intergroup contexts.  
To our knowledge, no research in the context of intergroup relations 
has simultaneously explored the unique effects of sympathy and empathy on 
intergroup helping. Research on prosocial intergroup behaviour has focused 
on sympathy (e.g. Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Montada & Schneider, 1989; 
Thomas, 2005). When empathy has been examined (e.g. Pagano & Huo, 
2007), it was not distinguished from sympathy, and its unique effect could 
thus not be assessed. 
One important characteristic of sympathy is that it is other-focused. 
That is, sympathy toward a disadvantaged group is thought to arise among 
advantaged group members when they perceive a group to be illegitimately 
disadvantaged and when they focus their attention on the plight of the 
disadvantaged rather than their own group’s advantage (Leach et al., 2002; 
Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004). Experimental 
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evidence supports this view (Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008). However, 
precisely because sympathy is an emotion that is other-focused and that is 
felt by the advantaged (or bystander) group for the disadvantaged, Thomas 
et al. (2009) argue that it maintains group boundaries and thus violates the 
category inclusion criterion for intergroup helping (Reicher et al., 2006). 
Accordingly, Thomas et al. (2009) deduce that while sympathy may 
motivate helping behaviour toward the disadvantaged group, the type of 
helping it generates may be more likely to maintain the status quo and less 
likely to be aimed at achieving social change. Similarly, Pagano and Huo 
(2007) have argued that sympathy promotes a desire to relieve the suffering 
of victims, and thus should be likely to motivate humanitarian assistance to 
a disadvantaged group, rather than prompt action against their offenders (a 
social change strategy).  
Contrary to sympathy, however, Thomas et al. (2009) argue that 
empathy, by definition, involves a feeling of interchangeability with the 
disadvantaged group, and a potential recategorization into a common 
superordinate group (Turner et al., 1987; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, 
Bachman, & Rust, 1993). As such, empathy fits the category inclusion 
criterion of intergroup helping (Reicher et al., 2006), and should be more 
likely to promote genuine social change attempts (Morrison, 1999), such as 
collective action.  
Evidence regarding the role of sympathy in prompting solidarity-
based collective action is mixed. Sympathy has been shown to positively 
predict such action in some studies (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Thomas, 2005) but 
not in others (de Rivera, Gerstmann, & Maisels, 2002; Schmitt, Behner, 
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Montada, Müller, & Müller-Fohrbrodt, 2000). Thomas (2005) found 
sympathy to be a positive but weaker predictor of volunteerism intentions in 
the context of international development, compared to other predictors such 
as guilt. In an American sample, Pagano and Huo (2007) found that 
sympathy for the suffering of the Iraqi people positively predicted support 
for humanitarian assistance, and for helping Iraqis reform their political 
system to prevent future tyranny (a social change strategy), but it was a 
weaker predictor of support for preventative action compared to other 
emotions. Importantly, however, this research did not distinguish sympathy 
from feelings of empathy, making it impossible to disentangle their unique 
contributions.  
The present research thus aims to test the unique contributions of 
sympathy and empathy to the prediction of solidarity-based collective 
action. Given the inconsistent evidence regarding the role of sympathy, we 
refrain from making a prediction as to its contribution to solidarity-based 
action. In line with Thomas et al.’s (2009) argument, however, we propose 
that empathy should positively and uniquely predict collective action 
tendencies (Hypothesis 2), and that it should be a stronger predictor of 
collective action than sympathy (Hypothesis 3).  
Further, based on appraisal theories of emotion (Frijda et al., 1989) 
and research on moral outrage (e.g. Leach et al., 2002) and sympathy (Harth 
et al., 2008; Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Leach et al., 2002), we expect the perceived 
injustice of governmental policies toward the disadvantaged group to 
positively predict both moral outrage (Hypothesis 4) and sympathy 
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(Hypothesis 5), and thereby to have a positive indirect effect on collective 
action tendencies.  
Political Efficacy and Identity Consolidation Efficacy as Predictors of 
Collective Action 
Research on the efficacy pathway in the dual pathway model of 
collective action (Sweetman et al., 2011; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren 
et al., 2004; van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008) has so far only examined 
perceived group efficacy, which is the general efficacy of the group at 
achieving social change. In line with recent research (Hornsey et al., 2006), 
we argue that it is important to take into account the efficacy of collective 
action at achieving different goals from that of altering the social order. 
Hornsey et al. (2006) have recently critiqued existing research on efficacy 
for focusing exclusively on the potential of collective action to alter the 
status quo by influencing outgroups responsible for perceived grievances, 
which we term political efficacy. The authors contended that various other 
audiences could be potential targets of collective action. Accordingly, they 
proposed three important criteria by which to judge the efficacy of 
collective action: (1) The efficacy to influence third parties like the general 
public and to recruit them to the group’s cause (Simon & Klandermans, 
2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; Subašic et al., 2008); (2) The efficacy to 
build an oppositional movement, that is, strengthen solidarity within the 
group of collective actors, in the hope of exerting change in the long-run 
(Kinder, 1998; see also Klandermans, 1984); (3) The efficacy of collective 
action to express an individual’s values (e.g. Tice, 1992). Hornsey et al. 
tested their ideas by surveying protesters in an anti-globalisation rally in 
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Australia. Importantly, the perceived political efficacy of the rally did not 
predict intentions to participate in similar future protests, while the three 
other types of efficacy did, although this was moderated by membership in 
an activist organisation. 
Building on this work, we propose that the perceived efficacy of 
collective action can be usefully differentiated into two types. The first is 
identity consolidation efficacy, defined as the efficacy of collective action at 
expressing, asserting and strengthening the identity of a social movement, 
and the second is political efficacy, which is the efficacy of collective action 
at achieving social change (the classical definition of collective action 
efficacy). This distinction is derived from recent work by Klein, Spears and 
Reicher (2007), who introduced the notion of social identity performance, 
defined as the public expression of norms conventionally associated with a 
given social group’s identity. Klein et al. propose that all instances of social 
identity performance, such as collective action, serve to fulfil an identity 
consolidation function or an identity mobilization function, or both. The 
identity consolidation function is about affirming, confirming or 
strengthening the identity of a group against that of other groups. On the 
other hand, the identity mobilisation function is about persuading ingroup or 
outgroup audiences to adopt specific behaviours relating to the improvement 
of a group’s position in the social power hierarchy. Based on this theoretical 
framework, we derive two corresponding types of collective action efficacy: 
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identity consolidation efficacy, and political efficacy, which maps roughly 
onto identity mobilization
2
.   
Importantly, the typology we propose is entirely consistent with 
Hornsey et al. (2006). In our view, influencing public opinion, building a 
movement and expressing (collective) values, which form the basis of 
Hornsey et al.’s proposed three types of efficacy, essentially all reflect 
identity consolidation goals in Klein et al.’s terms. Accordingly, we 
operationalise identity consolidation efficacy as the efficacy of collective 
action at influencing public opinion, building a mass movement and 
expressing what the movement stands for, but also, in the context of 
solidarity-based action, showing support for the disadvantaged party. 
Most importantly, we propose that identity consolidation efficacy 
can motivate collective action through two routes, an indirect one via 
political efficacy, and a direct one. The indirect route is based on the idea 
that consolidating the identity of a movement can be a means through which 
a movement eventually acquires the power to achieve social change. Klein 
et al. (2007) indeed stress that identity consolidation creates the basis for 
effective social action, group coordination, group organisation and group 
power (e.g. Haslam, 2001; Reicher, Haslam & Hopkins, 2005; Turner, 
                                                 
2
 Note that we do not term political efficacy “identity mobilization efficacy” for two 
reasons, first because political efficacy is an already-established concept and second, 
because Klein et al. propose that identity mobilization can be targeted at the outgroup 
responsible for perceived grievances (e.g. to demobilize them) but it can also target the 
ingroup (e.g. mobilizing them for political action). Given that political efficacy refers to 
attempts at demobilizing outgroups, rather than mobilizing ingroups, we prefer to avoid the 
potentially broader term of identity mobilization efficacy. One could argue that attempting 
to influence third parties or mobilize ingroup members for collective action is the realm of 
identity mobilization rather than identity consolidation. However, increasing support for 
what the group stands for by influencing public opinion is a way to strengthen a 
movement’s identity. As such, we believe it is more accurately placed under identity 
consolidation efficacy rather than political efficacy. 
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2005). Accordingly, identity consolidation efficacy should positively and 
indirectly predict collective action tendencies via political efficacy 
(Hypothesis 6). 
In addition, identity consolidation may be a goal in is own right. 
Hornsey et al. (2006) argue that individuals may participate in collective 
action in order to express their opinion on a particular issue without 
necessarily expecting to alter the social order (see Hornsey, Majkut, Terry, 
& McKimmie, 2003; see also van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). This argument 
is based on the idea that attitudes operate as markers of group membership 
and can fulfil an expressive function (e.g., Katz, 1960). The expression of 
voice alone may even have a cathartic function in the context of a perceived 
injustice (Folger, 1977; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988) 
and serve to affirm one’s identity as a movement supporter (see Simon, 
Trötschel, & Dähne, 2008). Following this rationale, we also expect identity 
consolidation efficacy to predict collective action tendencies positively and 
directly (Hypothesis 7), and thus independently of political efficacy. 
Overview of Studies 
We tested our hypotheses in three field surveys. In Study 1 we 
examined intentions to attend future protests for the Palestinian cause 
among international protesters in Britain demonstrating for justice in 
Palestine. We tested a model where moral outrage and sympathy positively 
predict collective action tendencies and are, in turn, positively predicted by 
perceived injustice. Perceived injustice was also a direct predictor of 
collective action tendencies in our model. In the efficacy pathway, identity 
consolidation efficacy positively predicts collective action tendencies both 
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indirectly via political efficacy as well as directly. Studies 2 and 3 surveyed 
different samples of Hong Kong citizens on their intentions to attend the 
annual June 4
th
 vigil commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, and 
extended Study 1 by adding empathy to the emotion-based pathway. 
Study 1 
We first tested our hypotheses among a sample of protesters 
recruited at the National Demonstration for Palestine in London, Britain, in 
May 2008, which is organised annually by various British activist groups. 
Some of the main aims of the demonstration were to call for an end to the 
Israeli occupation and the Israeli siege on Gaza which had started the year 
before. The demonstration also opposed Britain’s provision of military, 
economic and political support to Israel (Palestine: the Case for Justice, 
2007). Our outcome variable was participants’ intentions to attend future 
protests for justice in Palestine. 
Method 
Participants.  A team of five recruiters approached protesters during 
the demonstration. A total of 242 protesters filled out the survey. Fifteen 
participants had substantial amounts of missing data (>20%) and were 
therefore deleted, following recommendations by Tabachnick & Fidell 
(2007). The final sample consisted of 227 participants (114 women, 111 
men, 2 missing; age: M = 41.00 years; SD = 16.61) and was quite diverse. 
Most participants (N = 162) were British. The rest were international and 
included nine non-Palestinian Arabs and six Palestinians. Most participants 
(N = 105) indicated that they had no religion, while the rest held various 
religious denominations, including 47 Muslims, 48 Christians, and 4 Jews.  
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Measures.  Unless stated otherwise, all items were measured using a 
six-point verbal rating scale with the labels: “not at all” (coded as 1), 
“slightly” (2), “somewhat” (3), “moderately” (4), “very much” (5) and 
“extremely” (6). 
Perceived injustice.  Participants separately evaluated how “unjust” 
they thought Israel and Britain’s approaches to the Palestinian issue were 
(Pearson’s r = .72). 
Moral outrage.  Participants were asked to indicate separately the 
extent to which they felt “angry” when thinking of Israel and Britain’s 
approaches to the Palestinian issue in general (Pearson’s r = .57).  
Sympathy.  Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they felt “sympathy” when thinking of the Palestinians’ suffering. 
Efficacy.  Efficacy beliefs were measured using 10 items adapted 
from Hornsey et al. (2006). Given that the distinction between political 
efficacy and identity consolidation efficacy had not been made before, we 
performed an exploratory principal factor analysis (EFA) using oblique 
rotation on all efficacy items (KMO = .89; Bartlett’s test of sphericity:  χ2 
(36) = 1166.92, p < .001; Determinant =.005). This yielded two factors with 
Eigen values greater than 1, which together accounted for 62.45% of the 
variance.  
Items assessing perceptions of the demonstration’s political efficacy 
(how effective the demonstration would be at helping to achieve justice in 
Palestine, helping to end the siege on Gaza, and helping to change the 
British as well as the Israeli governments’ respective approaches to the 
Palestinian issue) loaded primarily on the first factor (loadings > .62), while 
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items assessing identity consolidation efficacy (how effective the 
demonstration would be at increasing support in British public opinion for 
justice in Palestine, strengthening the solidarity among the supporters of 
justice in Palestine, helping to build a mass movement in Britain for justice 
in Palestine, showing resistance to the injustices committed against 
Palestinians and showing the Palestinians support amongst British people 
for their cause) loaded on the second factor (loadings > -.69). One item (the 
perceived efficacy of the rally in increasing support in British public opinion 
for justice in Palestine) cross-loaded on both factors, and was thus dropped
3
. 
The other items were then averaged to yield composites of the 
demonstration’s perceived identity consolidation (α = .88) and political (α = 
.85) efficacies. 
Collective action tendencies.  Participants indicated how many of 
the next ten protests scheduled for the support of justice in Palestine they 
would be willing to attend, assuming these were accessible to them. They 
answered using an eleven-point scale ranging from 0 to 10. 
Results and Discussion 
Missing value analysis and data screening.  Variables with 
missing values had less than 10% missing data points. Following 
Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2007) recommendations, we imputed the missing 
values using the expectation maximization method (EM). None of the 
imputed values were out of range.  
                                                 
3
 This cross-loading may suggest that the British public was viewed as a third party to be 
recruited to the cause, but also partly categorized along with the British and Israeli 
governments, that is, as a group that may not be a neutral third party to the Israeli 
Palestinian conflict but as an accomplice. 
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Data screening revealed that sympathy was severely negatively 
skewed. To reduce the impact of non-normality on the analysis, we thus 
reflected and reversed this variable, which improved its distribution. Details 
of all variables of interest and zero-order correlations are shown in Table 1. 
Analytic strategy.  To examine our model, we conducted a path 
analysis with AMOS (version 7) using the raw data as input and maximum-
likelihood estimation. The overall fit of our model was assessed using the 
chi-square test, the comparative fit index (CFI), the root mean square of 
approximation (RMSEA) for which we report an estimate and a 90% 
confidence interval, and the standardized root mean square residual 
(SRMR). General guidelines for an adequate model fit include a non-
significant chi-square test (but significant values are common and 
acceptable in large samples), a χ2/df ratio < 3, a CFI ≥ .95, a RMSEA ≤ .06-
.08 (p-close > .05-.10), and a SRMR ≤ .08 (see Hu & Bentler, 1999). To 
assess the significance of indirect effects, we followed the bootstrapping 
procedure and estimated indirect effects using bias-corrected (BC) 95% 
confidence intervals, based on 5000 bootstrap samples (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). We used the same analytic strategy in all 
studies. 
Path analysis.  We specified a model where, in the emotional 
pathway, perceived injustice positively predicts collective action tendencies 
indirectly via moral outrage and sympathy, as well as directly, as perceived 
injustice may influence collective action through emotions that are beyond 
the focus of the present research.  
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Table 1 
Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 1) 
 Scale M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Perceived Injustice
 
1-6 5.38 1.00 - .20** .25*** .03 -.05 .23** 
2. Moral Outrage
 
1-6 5.24 .91  - .40*** .21** .07 .35*** 
3. Sympathy
a 
1-6 5.71 .63   - .15* -.001 .35*** 
4. Identity Consolidation Efficacy 1-6 4.14 .99    - .53*** .33*** 
5. Political Efficacy 1-6 2.36 .95     - .26*** 
6. Collective Action Tendencies 0-10 6.11 3.11      - 
a
 Correlations are based on the transformed variable  
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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For the efficacy pathway, we expected identity consolidation 
efficacy to positively predict collective action tendencies indirectly via 
political efficacy, as well as directly. We allowed moral outrage and 
sympathy to covary in line with previous research (Iyer & Ryan, 2009). We 
did not allow political efficacy to covary with perceived injustice, moral 
outrage or sympathy, because the efficacy pathway and the emotion-based 
pathway to collective action have been conceptualised as independent in the 
dual pathway model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2004). Meta-
analytic evidence in line with the social identity model of collective action 
(SIMCA, van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) also indicates these two 
paths are independent. On the other hand, we allowed identity consolidation 
efficacy to covary with perceived injustice, moral outrage and sympathy. 
This is because identity-consolidation efficacy is a type of efficacy that is 
conceptually based in identity processes, and thus likely to be linked with 
antecedents of collective action such as (politicized) identification (Stürmer 
& Simon, 2004; see also McGarty et al., 2009) or perceived social support 
(van Zomeren et al., 2004). These fall outside the scope of the present 
research but have been shown to influence or covary with perceived 
injustice and resulting emotions like anger (van Zomeren, Postmes, & 
Spears, 2008; Stürmer & Simon, 2009). 
Our model, displayed in Figure 2, showed excellent fit, χ2 (3) = 2.77, 
p = .43, χ2/df = .92, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00 [.00; 0.11], p-close = .64, 
SRMR =.03. As predicted, perceived injustice positively predicted both 
moral outrage, β = .20, p = .002, and sympathy, β = .25, p< .001. In turn, 
moral outrage positively predicted collective action tendencies, β = .19,  
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p =.002, as did sympathy, β = .21, p <.001. Bootstrapping showed, as 
expected, that perceived injustice had a significant positive indirect effect on 
collective action tendencies (via moral outrage and sympathy), point 
estimate = .09 [.04; .17]. Perceived injustice was also positively and directly 
predictive of collective action tendencies, β = .14, p = .02. 
Further, as hypothesized, identity consolidation efficacy positively 
predicted political efficacy, β = .52, p < .001, which, in turn, positively 
predicted collective action tendencies, β = .17, p = .01. A mediation test 
showed that identity consolidation efficacy had a significant indirect effect 
on collective action tendencies via political efficacy, point estimate = .09 
[.02; .16]. As expected, identity consolidation efficacy was also positively 
and directly predictive of collective action tendencies, β = .16, p = .02. 
To summarize, Study 1 provided initial support for our hypotheses. 
Replicating previous research (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Thomas, 2005), both 
moral outrage and sympathy positively predicted collective action 
tendencies and were, in turn, positively predicted by perceived injustice. 
Perceived injustice had a positive indirect effect on collective action 
tendencies (via moral outrage and sympathy), as well as a direct effect. 
Importantly, this study also provided preliminary evidence that it is possible 
to distinguish between identity consolidation efficacy and political efficacy, 
and that this distinction has explanatory value. Identity consolidation 
efficacy positively predicted collective action tendencies, both indirectly via 
political efficacy but also directly, as we expected. Hence, perceiving the 
demonstration as an opportunity to express and strengthen the identity of the 
protest movement was associated with greater willingness to attend
  44 
 
Figure 2. Results of path analysis for Study 1. Single-headed arrows refer to hypothesized paths. Grey double-headed arrows refer to correlations 
between variables. Solid lines indicate significant effects or correlations, whereas dashed lines indicate non-significant ones. Path coefficients and 
correlation coefficients are standardized estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated, * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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future protests for the same cause, partly because this meant that the 
demonstration was then seen as an opportunity to help redress the perceived 
injustice, but also, independently of that reason. That is, identity 
consolidation also had value in and of itself. 
Study 2 
This study examined our hypotheses in a different political context, 
and extended the focus of our enquiry by examining the contribution of 
empathy to the prediction of collective action tendencies. We surveyed a 
sample of pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong on their willingness to 
attend the June 4
th
 vigil, an annual local tribute to commemorate the victims 
of the Tiananmen massacre (also known as the June 4
th
 event). This refers to 
the military crackdown by Chinese authorities on pro-democracy protesters 
in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, on June 4
th
 1989, where a number of 
protesters were killed, injured or arrested (Human Rights Watch News, 
Tiananmen’s legacy, 2009). Unlike in Hong Kong, all public discussion of 
June 1989 in mainland China has been silenced since the massacre, and 
those who participated in the protests or who challenge the government’s 
version of the events continue to be persecuted (Human Rights Watch 
News, Tiananmen’s legacy, 2009). Importantly, commemorations of the 
June 4
th
 event are only allowed in Macau and Hong Kong, as both are 
special administrative regions that enjoy more democratic freedom than 
mainland China.  
We recruited our participants during an annual demonstration to 
commemorate the June 4
th
 event, which takes place on May 31
st
 and is 
typically attended by a few thousand highly politicized pro-democracy 
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activists. Both the vigil and the demonstration are organised by a large pro-
democracy advocacy group, the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic 
Democratic Movements in China (commonly known as “the Alliance”).  
We collected our data in 2009 which marked the 20
th
 anniversary of 
the Tiananmen protests. The measures we used in our study were thus 
informed by this context. The main slogans of the commemorations were: 
“remember June 4th, inherit the goals of those who came before us, pass the 
torch on and relay the message of democracy to those who come after us” 
(“Upcoming activities 2009”, n.d.). Another major focus of commemoration 
activities that year centred around supporting the family members of the 
victims of the June 4
th
 event, the Tiananmen Mothers (Human Rights in 
China, Solidarity with the Tiananmen Mothers, n.d.), who continue to be 
victimised by the Chinese government (Human Rights Watch News, 
Tiananmen’s legacy, 2009).  
Method 
Procedure.  The questionnaire was delivered in Chinese (translated 
from English by a bilingual speaker). A team of four recruiters approached 
protesters during the rally. 
Participants.  A total of 132 protesters (all Hong Kong residents) 
participated in the study. Three participants had substantial amounts of 
missing data (> 35%) so these cases were deleted.  The final sample 
consisted of 129 participants (47 women, 82 men; age: M = 37.96 years; SD 
=15.36).  
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Measures. 
Perceived injustice.  Participants indicated on a seven-point Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) whether they thought the 
Chinese government’s current position on the June 4th event was 
“illegitimate”, and “unjust” (Pearson’s r = .70).  
All emotion items were measured using a seven-point scale (1 = not 
strongly at all; 7 = very strongly). 
Moral outrage.  Participants were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they felt “angry” and “irritated” when thinking about the stance of the 
Chinese government on the June 4
th
 event (Pearson’s r = .46).  
Sympathy.  Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they felt “sympathetic” when thinking about those affected by the June 4th 
event. 
Empathy.  Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they felt “empathic” when thinking about those affected by the June 4th 
event. 
Efficacy.  Efficacy beliefs were measured using nine items adapted 
from Hornsey et al. (2006). All items were measured using a seven-point 
scale (1 = not effective at all; 7 = extremely effective). Because we used a 
somewhat different set of items from the one used in Study 1, and the items 
were delivered in a different language, we again performed an EFA to 
explore the structure of our measure, using oblique rotation on all efficacy 
items (KMO = .85; Bartlett’s test of sphericity:  χ2 (36) = 618.69, p < .001; 
Determinant = .007). This analysis yielded two factors with Eigen values 
greater than 1, which together accounted for 57.73% of the variance.  
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Items assessing the vigil’s political efficacy (how effective the June 
4
th
 vigil would be at helping to change the Chinese government’s stance on 
the June 4
th
 event, helping to lift the suppression imposed by the Chinese 
authorities on the Tiananmen Mothers, and helping to advance democracy in 
China) loaded primarily on the first factor (loadings > .68), while items 
assessing the vigil’s identity consolidation efficacy (how effective the June 
4
th
 vigil would be at showing opposition to the Chinese government’s stance 
on the June 4
th
 event, voicing public discontent with the government’s 
stance, showing the Tiananmen Mothers support amongst the public for 
their cause, increasing public opinion support for the “reverse the Chinese 
government stance on June 4
th” campaign, strengthening the solidarity 
among the supporters of that campaign, and helping to build a mass 
movement in support of that campaign) loaded on another factor (loadings > 
.58). The items were averaged to yield composites of the vigil’s perceived 
identity consolidation (α = .88) and political (α = .79) efficacies. 
Collective action tendencies.  Participants indicated how willing 
they would be to join the annual June 4
th
 Candlelight vigil (in future years) 
in order to support the “reverse the Chinese government stance on June 4th” 
campaign. They answered using a seven-point scale (1 = very unwilling; 7 = 
very willing). 
Results and Discussion 
Missing value analysis and data screening.  Variables with 
missing values had less than 5% missing data points. We imputed the 
missing values using the EM method (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Imputed 
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values which were out of range on the scales we used were adjusted to the 
nearest acceptable score point.  
Data screening revealed that one participant was a severe outlier on 
the dependent variable. This participant was therefore excluded from our 
analyses and the final sample thus consisted of 128 participants. Details of 
all variables of interest and zero-order correlations are shown in Table 2. 
Path analysis.  The hypothesized model was as for Study 1, except 
that we included empathy as an additional predictor of collective action 
tendencies. This study therefore allowed us to test the hypothesis that 
empathy would positively predict collective action tendencies, and that it 
would be a stronger predictor of collective action than sympathy. We 
allowed empathy to covary with both sympathy and moral outrage, as 
emotional reactions to perceived injustice would be expected to correlate. 
Additionally, we allowed empathy to covary with identity consolidation 
efficacy, because they are likely to be linked to common antecedents of 
collective action such as (politicized) identification, which was, however, 
beyond the scope of the present research. Empathy is indeed thought to 
involve identification processes, namely a recategorization of the helper 
group with the victim group under a common superordinate category, such 
as an opinion-based group (Thomas et al., 2009). In the absence of previous 
theorizing on the causal link between perceived injustice and empathy, we 
treated these variables as covariates, as it is possible to imagine that 
perceived injustice would lead to empathy, but also that the extent to which 
one empathizes with a group of people would lead to a perception of greater 
injustice against them.
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Table 2 
Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 2) 
 Scale M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Perceived Injustice
 
1-7 6.57 .65 - .33*** .26** .13 .42*** .18* .36*** 
2. Moral outrage
 
1-7 5.89 1.23  - .59*** .35*** .42*** .25** .29** 
3. Sympathy
 
1-7 6.47 .85   - .50*** .46*** .22* .31*** 
4. Empathy 1-7 5.88 1.18    - .27** .24** .30** 
5. Identity Consolidation Efficacy 1-7 6.10 .80     - .43*** .36*** 
6. Political Efficacy 1-7 4.97 1.23      - .21* 
7. Collective Action Tendencies 1-7 6.28 1.04       - 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Our model, displayed in Figure 3, showed excellent fit, χ2 (4) = 3.52, p = 
.47, χ2/df = .88, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00 [.00; 0.13], p-close = .62, SRMR 
= .03. As expected, perceived injustice positively predicted both moral 
outrage, β = .40, p < .001, and sympathy, β = .26, p < .01. In turn, moral 
outrage positively predicted collective action tendencies, β = .20, p = .04. 
Sympathy did not, however, emerge as a significant predictor, β = .03, p = 
.74, ns. Bootstrapping showed that the indirect effect of perceived injustice 
on collective action tendencies (via moral outrage and sympathy) was 
significant, point estimate = .09 [.01; .21]. Perceived injustice, however, was 
also positively and directly predictive of collective action tendencies, β = 
.18, p = .003. Importantly, and as expected, empathy positively predicted 
collective action tendencies, β = .23, p = .007.  
To check systematically whether empathy was a stronger predictor 
of collective action tendencies than sympathy, we specified a model where 
the paths from empathy and sympathy to collective action tendencies were 
constrained to be equal, and compared it to an unconstrained model. The 
chi-square difference test (Steiger, Shapiro, & Browne, 1985) revealed that 
the models were not significantly different, Δ χ2 (1) = .96, ns, thus providing 
no evidence that empathy is a better predictor of collective action tendencies 
than sympathy.  
As expected, identity consolidation efficacy positively predicted 
political efficacy, β = .44, p < .001. Contrary to expectations, however, 
political efficacy did not predict collective action tendencies, β = -.03, p = 
.74, ns, and the indirect effect of identity consolidation efficacy on 
collective action tendencies via political efficacy was not significant,  
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 Figure 3. Results of path analysis for Study 2. Single-headed arrows refer to hypothesized paths. Grey double-headed arrows refer to correlations 
between variables. Solid lines indicate significant effects or correlations, whereas dashed lines indicate non-significant ones. Path coefficients and 
correlation coefficients are standardized estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated, 
+ 
p < .10, * p < .05; ** p< .01; *** p < .001.
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point estimate = -.01 [-.11; .05]. However, in line with our predictions, 
identity consolidation efficacy was positively predictive of collective action 
tendencies, β = .19, p = .05. 
In summary, Study 2 provided mixed support for our hypotheses. 
With regard to the emotion-based pathway, only moral outrage and empathy 
emerged as significant positive predictors, whereas sympathy, unlike in 
Study 1, did not. This is consistent with Thomas et al.’s (2009) argument 
that sympathy may not be a reliable predictor of intergroup helping aimed at 
social change. The pattern of results is also in line with the hypothesis 
derived from Thomas et al. (2009), stating that empathy is a better predictor 
of collective action tendencies than sympathy. As expected, perceived 
injustice positively predicted collective action tendencies both directly as 
well as indirectly (via moral outrage and sympathy together).  
As for the efficacy pathway, Study 2 suggested again that it is useful 
to distinguish between identity consolidation efficacy and political efficacy, 
this time in a different political context. Interestingly, however, and contrary 
to our expectations, identity consolidation efficacy did not have an indirect 
effect on collective action tendencies via political efficacy, mainly because 
political efficacy did not predict collective action tendencies. This may be 
due to high levels of politicized identification among our participants, as 
previous research (van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008) indicates that 
efficacy concerns are less crucial for motivating collective action among 
highly politicized participants. Importantly, however, Study 2 demonstrated 
again the value of examining identity consolidation efficacy, because, in 
line with our hypothesis, identity consolidation efficacy positively and 
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directly predicted collective action tendencies. Hence, in deciding whether 
or not to attend the June 4
th
 vigil in the future, our sample of Hong Kong 
pro-democracy activists seemed to be focusing on the identity consolidation 
efficacy of the vigil, rather than its political efficacy. 
So far, both Studies 1 and 2 have examined our model among 
activists in different contexts. In Study 3, we tested our hypotheses in a 
community sample in Hong Kong.   
Study 3 
Study 3 was conducted in parallel with Study 2 and also examined 
predictors of tendencies to attend the June 4
th
 vigil, but this time in a 
community sample of Hong Kong residents, namely internet users. To get a 
measure of collective action that is more proximal to actual participation, 
we examined tendencies to attend the upcoming June 4
th
 vigil that year 
rather than in future years. Conducting our study online rather than during a 
protest allowed us to include a larger number of items for our measures. 
Method 
Procedure.  The study was administered as an online survey in 
Chinese (translated from English by a bilingual speaker) in the days 
preceding the June 4
th
 vigil in 2009. We recruited participants through an 
advertisement via Facebook which targeted adult Hong Kong users. 
Respondents were given the opportunity to enter into a prize draw at the end 
of the survey.  
Participants.  A total of 390 respondents completed the survey (234 
women, 154 men, 2 missing; age: M = 29.03 years; SD = 9.53).  
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Measures.  
Participants first read details of the suppression of the Tiananmen 
Square protesters. They then read that the Chinese government has not 
apologized for the killings, refuses to carry out a public inquiry, and 
interferes with the public mourning of the victims. After providing 
background information, they completed measures of our constructs of 
interest and were then debriefed.  
Perceived injustice.  We measured perceived injustice with the same 
two items used in Study 2, along with two additional reverse-coded items: 
participants indicated on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = 
strongly agree) whether they thought the Chinese government’s current 
position on the June 4
th
 event was “fair”, and “moral” (α = .91).  
All emotion items were measured using a seven-point scale (1 = not 
strongly at all; 7 = very strongly). 
Moral outrage.  Participants were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they felt “angry”, “irritated” and “furious” when thinking about the 
stance of the Chinese government on the June 4
th
 event. These items were 
combined into a composite score (α = .92).  
Sympathy.  Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they felt “sympathetic” and “compassionate” when thinking about those 
affected by the June 4
th
 event (Pearson’s r = .84). 
Empathy.  This was measured as in Study 2. 
Efficacy.  Efficacy was measured using 14 items adapted from 
Hornsey et al. (2006). All items were measured using a seven-point scale 
(1= not effective at all; 7 = extremely effective). Because we used a larger set 
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of items than in Study 2, we again performed an EFA with oblique rotation 
to explore the structure of our measure (KMO = .94; Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity:  χ2 (105) = 8651.17, p < .001; Determinant = .012). This analysis 
yielded two factors with Eigen values greater than 1, which together 
accounted for 78.71% of the variance. Items assessing the vigil’s political 
efficacy (same three items used in Study 2 in addition to how effective 
participants thought the June 4
th
 vigil would be at helping to bring justice to 
the Tiananmen victims) loaded primarily on the first factor (loadings > .73), 
while items assessing the vigil’s identity consolidation efficacy (same six 
items used in Study 2, in addition to four items asking participants how 
effective they thought the June 4
th
 vigil would be at showing sympathy for 
the Tiananmen mothers, raising awareness about the June 4
th
 event 
especially among younger generations, influencing other people to join the 
“reverse the Chinese government stance on June 4th” campaign, helping to 
build a mass movement in support of that campaign, and uniting supporters 
of the campaign) loaded on another factor (loadings > .66). The items were 
averaged to yield composites of the vigil’s perceived identity consolidation 
(α = .88) and political (α = .79) efficacies. 
Collective action tendencies.  Participants indicated how likely or 
unlikely they were to take part in the upcoming June 4
th
 Candlelight vigil 
that year. They answered using a seven-point scale (1 = not likely at all; 7 = 
very likely). 
Results and Discussion 
Missing value analysis.  Variables with missing values had less than 
5% missing data points. We imputed the missing values using the EM 
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method (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) and adjusted out of range values to the 
nearest acceptable score point. Details of all variables of interest and zero-
order correlations are shown in Table 3. 
Path analysis.  We tested the same model hypothesized in Study 2. The 
model, displayed in Figure 4, showed adequate fit, χ2 (4) = 13.45, p = .01, 
χ2/df = 3.362, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .08 [.04; 0.13], p-close = .13, SRMR 
=.03. As expected, perceived injustice positively predicted both moral 
outrage, β = .64, p < .001, and sympathy, β = .46, p<.001. In turn, moral 
outrage positively predicted collective action tendencies, β = .29, p = .04. 
Again, sympathy did not emerge as a significant predictor of collective 
action tendencies, β = .07, p = .18, ns. Bootstrapping showed that the 
indirect effect of perceived injustice on collective action tendencies (via 
moral outrage and sympathy) was significant, point estimate = .22 [.13; .32]. 
Perceived injustice was, however, also directly and positively predictive of 
collective action tendencies, β = .18, p < .001. Importantly, as expected, 
empathy emerged again as a significant predictor of collective action 
tendencies, β = .14, p = .008.  
To check systematically whether empathy was a stronger predictor 
of collective action tendencies than sympathy, we specified a model where 
the paths from empathy and sympathy to collective action tendencies were 
constrained to be equal, and compared it to an unconstrained model (Steiger 
et al., 1985). The chi-square difference test revealed that the models were 
not significantly different, Δ χ2 (1) = .26, ns, again providing no evidence to 
suggest that empathy is a better predictor of collective action tendencies 
than sympathy.
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Table 3 
Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 3) 
 Scale M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Perceived Injustice
 
1-7 5.74 1.45 - .64*** .46*** .42*** .55*** .36*** .61*** 
2. Moral Outrage
 
1-7 5.44 1.89  - .65*** .64*** .69*** .45*** .77*** 
3. Sympathy
 
1-7 5.63 1.43   - .69*** .57*** .42*** .77*** 
4. Empathy 1-7 4.74 1.72    - .50*** .43*** .59*** 
5. Identity Consolidation Efficacy 1-7 4.89 1.43     - .66*** .72*** 
6. Political Efficacy 1-7 3.99 1.84      - .54*** 
7. Collective Action Tendencies 1-7 5.14 2.10       - 
*** p< .001 
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Figure 4. Results of path analysis for Study 3. Single-headed arrows refer to hypothesized paths. Grey double-headed arrows refer to correlations 
between variables. Solid lines indicate significant effects or correlations, whereas dashed lines indicate non-significant ones. Path coefficients and 
correlation coefficients are standardized estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated, 
+ 
p < .10, * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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As expected, identity consolidation efficacy positively predicted 
political efficacy, β = .66, p < .001, which, in turn, positively predicted 
collective action tendencies, β = .12, p = .008. The indirect effect of identity 
consolidation efficacy on collective action tendencies via political efficacy 
was significant, point estimate = .08 [.02; .15]. Identity consolidation also 
positively and directly predicted collective action tendencies, although this 
link only approached conventional levels of statistical significance, β = .10, 
p = .09. 
To summarize, results pertaining to the emotion-based pathway 
replicated those in Study 2. Again, only moral outrage and empathy 
emerged as significant positive predictors, while sympathy did not. 
Perceived injustice positively predicted collective action tendencies both 
directly as well as indirectly via moral outrage and sympathy together. With 
regard to the efficacy pathway, Study 3 provided further empirical support 
for the distinction between identity consolidation efficacy and political 
efficacy, this time in a community sample. Importantly, identity 
consolidation efficacy did have a positive indirect effect on collective action 
tendencies via political efficacy, in line with our predictions. Further, 
identity consolidation efficacy also positively and directly predicted 
collective action tendencies, although the direct link only approached 
conventional levels of significance. Hence, perceiving the June 4
th
 vigil as 
an opportunity to express and strengthen the identity of the protest 
movement was associated with greater willingness to attend the annual vigil 
in the future, partly because this meant that the vigil was also seen as an 
opportunity to achieve desired political ends. However there was also some 
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evidence, albeit weak, suggesting that identity consolidation may have value 
in and of itself. 
General Discussion 
The aim of this research was to extend van Zomeren et al.’s (2004) 
dual pathway model of collective action in the context of solidarity-based 
collective action. The model posits group-based anger in response to 
perceived injustice and group efficacy as independent pathways to collective 
action. We extended this model by examining the predictive power of two 
other prosocial emotions alongside anger (moral outrage), namely sympathy 
and empathy. Further, we distinguished between two different types of 
efficacy, identity consolidation efficacy and political efficacy, and explored 
their relations with collective action tendencies. We now evaluate our 
findings and discuss some limitations and the theoretical and practical 
implications of our results. 
The Role of Emotions in Predicting Solidarity-Based Collective Action  
In line with previous research (Thomas et al., 2009), we expected 
moral outrage and empathy, but not necessarily sympathy, to positively 
predict solidarity-based collective action tendencies. We also expected 
empathy to be a stronger predictor than sympathy. 
Across three studies, we found that moral outrage positively predicts 
tendencies to engage in solidarity-based collective action, among pro-
Palestinian activists in Britain (Study 1), among pro-democracy protesters in 
Hong Kong (Study 2) and among a sample of Hong Kong internet users 
(Study 3) in the context of joining the June 4
th
 vigil in solidarity with the 
victims of the Tiananmen massacre. Our findings extend earlier research on 
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the dual pathway model by showing that, consistent with Thomas et al.’s 
(2009) argument, third parties to a conflict seem more motivated to 
participate in attempts to establish social justice the angrier they feel 
towards the perpetrators (see also Thomas & McGarty, 2009). 
Findings regarding the role of sympathy were mixed. In Study 1, 
sympathy for Palestinians emerged as a positive predictor of protest 
tendencies in solidarity with the Palestinian cause, thus replicating some 
previous findings (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Thomas, 2005). Conversely, in 
Studies 2 and 3 which examined tendencies to join the June 4
th
 vigil, 
sympathy with the victims of the Tiananmen massacre did not emerge as a 
significant predictor of protest tendencies. The absence of a significant link 
between sympathy and solidarity-based action is consistent with other 
findings in the literature (e.g. Montada & Schneider, 1989; Schmitt et al., 
2000) and with arguments by Thomas et al. (2009) and Pagano and Huo 
(2007) that sympathy may not be a reliable predictor of intergroup helping 
aimed at social change. Instead, sympathy may be likely to motivate actions 
aimed at providing humanitarian assistance. Future research should thus 
investigate potential moderators of the link between sympathy and 
solidarity-based action.  
Turning to empathy, as hypothesized, we found it to be a significant 
positive predictor of intentions to attend the June 4
th
 vigil in both Studies 2 
and 3. This finding provides initial support for Thomas et al.’s (2009) 
proposition that empathy towards a disadvantaged group can motivate 
intergroup helping that is aimed at achieving social change. Hence, the 
sensation that one feels similar emotions as one perceives the disadvantaged 
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group to feel seems to be important for developing a motivation to take 
action in solidarity with that group. Thomas et al. suggest this is because 
empathy potentially involves a process of recategorisation with the 
disadvantaged group under a common superordinate ingroup identity. 
Future research should aim to uncover the process through which empathy 
impacts on solidarity-based collective action.  
We hypothesized that empathy should be a stronger predictor of 
solidarity-based collective action than sympathy, in line with Thomas et 
al.’s argument (2009) that unlike empathy, sympathy maintains boundaries 
between the disadvantaged group and the sympathizing group. Given that 
empathy was a significant positive predictor in Studies 2 and 3, while 
sympathy was not, there is some evidence to suggest that empathy is more 
influential in driving solidarity-based collective action. That being said, 
systematic tests comparing the two separate paths did not reveal significant 
differences in their strengths. Hence, we cannot firmly conclude that 
empathy is a stronger predictor than sympathy and further evidence is 
needed to establish that. Nevertheless, our results provide important initial 
evidence suggesting the distinction between sympathy and empathy should 
not be overlooked as the two did have unique effects.  
As hypothesized, both moral outrage and sympathy were positively 
predicted by perceptions of injustice. Perceived injustice was also positively 
and indirectly linked to solidarity-based collective action tendencies via 
these emotions, in line with IET (Mackie et al., 2000). Further, as expected, 
perceived injustice was also positively and directly predictive of solidarity-
based collective action tendencies, potentially suggesting that additional 
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emotions may mediate the influence of perceived injustice on solidarity-
based collective action tendencies.  
One might argue that an alternative model, where empathy has an 
indirect effect on solidarity-based collective action via sympathy, is also 
plausible. While empathy has often been conceptualised as an antecedent of 
emotions such as sympathy and compassion (e.g. Batson, 1991), researchers 
who adopt this model typically focus on the cognitive component of 
empathy (e.g. perspective-taking). Previous research that has considered 
both feelings of empathy and sympathy tends to conceptualise these as 
parallel processes (e.g. Davis, 2004; Finlay & Stephan, 2000). Nevertheless, 
assuming such a model is plausible, its fit would actually be equivalent to 
the fit of our model and it can therefore not be distinguished empirically in 
the present research. However, sympathy did not emerge as a significant 
predictor of collective action in Studies 2 and 3, which rules out the 
possibility that it mediates the link between empathy and solidarity-based 
collective action in the present studies. 
Political Efficacy and Identity Consolidation Efficacy as Predictors of 
Collective Action 
Another key objective of the present research was to develop the 
efficacy pathway in the dual pathway model of collective action (van 
Zomeren et al., 2004). We distinguished between two types of efficacy: 
political efficacy, defined as the perceived potential of collective action to 
achieve social change, which is the classical definition of efficacy in the 
literature (see Hornsey et al., 2006, for a review); and identity consolidation 
efficacy, defined as the potential of collective action to express, assert and 
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strengthen the identity of a social movement. Consistently across three 
studies we found that these different forms of efficacy are empirically 
distinguishable. We further hypothesized that identity consolidation efficacy 
would positively predict collective action tendencies indirectly via political 
efficacy, as well as directly.  
Consistent with this, identity consolidation efficacy positively and 
indirectly predicted collective action tendencies via political efficacy, 
among pro-Palestinian protesters in Britain asked about their tendencies to 
attend future pro-Palestinian protests (Study 1), as well as among a sample 
of internet users in Hong Kong asked about their tendencies to attend the 
June 4
th
 vigil commemorating the Tiananmen massacre (Study 3). These 
findings suggest that collective action has greater appeal the more effective 
it is perceived to be at consolidating the identity of a social movement, at 
least partially because this leads to greater perceived potential for achieving 
social change. The present research thus offers evidence in support of Klein 
et al.’s (2007) argument that identity consolidation can provide the means 
for identity mobilization and gaining influence as a social movement (see 
also Hornsey et al., 2006; Kinder, 1998; Turner, 2005). Importantly, these 
results show that identity-related considerations are not entirely separate 
from concerns about achieving social change. 
However, we found no evidence of an indirect effect of identity 
consolidation efficacy on collective action via political efficacy in Study 2. 
Political efficacy did not actually predict collective action tendencies in this 
study. As mentioned previously, it is possible that our sample of pro-
democracy protesters were highly identified with the pro-democracy 
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movement such that the political efficacy of the vigil was not the 
determining factor in their decision to participate. Pragmatic concerns and 
perceiving clear gains for one’s self as an individual or as a group member 
are believed to matter more for collective action participation among low 
identifiers with a social group than among high identifiers (e.g. Doosje, 
Spears, & Ellemers, 2002; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Consistent 
with this, in two studies, Van Zomeren, Spears and Leach (2008) found that 
among members of a disadvantaged group, group efficacy positively 
predicted collective action tendencies for those who were weakly identified 
with their group, but not for those who were high identifiers. In light of 
these findings, it is interesting to observe that in Study 2, which was 
conducted with Hong Kong pro-democracy demonstrators, no relationship 
was found between political efficacy and collective action. In Study 3, 
however, which was conducted in the same context as Study 2 but with a 
community sample of Hong Kong internet users, we did find a positive 
relationship between political efficacy and collective action which could 
suggest that participants in this sample had lower levels of politicized 
identification than those in Study 2. Future research should therefore further 
examine the moderating role of politicized identification in our model.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, we found a direct positive link 
between identity consolidation efficacy and solidarity-based action 
tendencies across our three studies, although this link was only marginally 
significant in Studies 2 and 3. Hence, there is some indication that 
tendencies to participate in collective action are positively associated with 
its potential to consolidate the identity of a movement, independently of its 
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potential to bring about social change. The pattern of findings provides 
some initial support for the idea that collective action as an instance of 
social identity performance can serve an identity consolidation function and 
that this can be a goal in its own right (Klein et al., 2007). The results are 
consistent with Simon et al.’s (2008) argument that collective action has an 
identity-affirming function and with Drury and Reicher’s (2009) argument 
that collective action can be appealing to the extent that it allows actors to 
realize the identity of the group. Our results suggest that expressing what a 
movement stands for and helping to strengthen links between its members, 
and to influence others to join it can be gratifying ends in themselves.  
Limitations of the Present Research 
Like most past research, we examined collective action tendencies 
rather than actual participation. Previous research has found that 
behavioural intentions are good proxy predictors of actual behaviour (e.g. de 
Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Moskalensko & McCauley, 2009; Webb & 
Sheeran, 2006). Nevertheless, future research would do well to strengthen 
the present findings by examining actual participation in collective action. 
The current studies also focused on the efficacy of particular forms of 
collective action, namely protests and vigils. It is important that future 
research tests our model using a broader array of normative and non-
normative forms of collective action (Tausch et al., 2011; Wright et al., 
1990b) in order to test the generalisability of our results. Future work must 
also test the contributions of sympathy and empathy to different forms of 
intergroup helping (e.g. social cohesion versus social change-oriented 
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actions) in order to identify the specific action tendencies associated with 
each of these emotional experiences. 
Additionally, our studies were based on cross-sectional data, which 
prevents us from making inferences about the causal relations between our 
variables, and does not rule out the potential influence of third variables. 
That being said, there is solid evidence for the causal role of perceived 
injustice and political efficacy in predicting collective action tendencies 
(van Zomeren et al., 2004; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) as well 
as evidence for the causal role of injustice in predicting emotions (see van 
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008 for a review). Emotions and action 
tendencies are, however, likely to emerge simultaneously according to 
appraisal theories of emotions (e.g. Frijda et al., 1989), suggesting there 
may be little use to a strict causal order here. On the other hand, it is 
imperative that future work establishes the causal role of identity 
consolidation efficacy in predicting collective action tendencies, and the 
mediating role of political efficacy.  
Another potential limitation of our research is that we assessed 
empathy in both of our studies using a single item measure. Our 
consultations with native Chinese speakers indicate, however, that the word 
“empathic” is easily understood in Chinese and captures the intended 
meaning, specifically: “I feel what you are feeling as if it were happening to 
me.” This suggests that our measure does have face validity. Nevertheless, 
in order to increase the reliability of our findings, it would be desirable for 
future work to replicate our results using a more elaborate measure of felt 
empathy. 
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We should stress that the present research does not constitute a 
complete analysis of predictors of solidarity-based collective action. Our 
aim was to extend an established theoretical model of collective action (van 
Zomeren et al., 2004) to examine solidarity-based action, and we therefore 
focused on efficacy and emotion as proximal predictors of such action. 
Other variables are likely to further contribute to solidarity-based action and 
mediate or moderate the relations examined in the present work (see Reicher 
et al., 2006). 
Contributions and Implications of the Present Research 
This work contributes to our understanding of solidarity-based 
action by third parties, which has received little empirical attention. In 
particular, it furthers our understanding of the prosocial emotions implicated 
in such action. While our findings are inconclusive with regard to the role of 
sympathy, they provide initial evidence for the role of felt empathy in 
positively predicting solidarity-based collective action, which has received 
little attention in the literature. Our results also provide additional evidence 
for the important role of moral outrage as a positive predictor of solidarity-
based collective action. 
The present research also helps develop our understanding of the 
role of efficacy considerations in predicting collective action. We provided a 
novel way of conceptualising the different types of efficacy proposed by 
Hornsey et al. (2006) by mapping them onto a recent theoretical framework 
by Klein et al. (2007) which suggests that collective action, as an instance of 
social identity performance, should fulfil two functions, namely identity 
consolidation and/or identity mobilization. Our focus on the role of the 
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perceived efficacy of collective action at consolidating the identity of a 
social movement helps to expand research on the identity-affirmation 
function of collective action (Drury & Reicher, 2009; Simon et al., 2008), 
which constitutes an important item on the current collective action research 
agenda (Wright, 2009). Importantly, our results suggest that collective 
action may not always be predicted solely by its perceived political efficacy, 
but is also sometimes independently predicted by its perceived efficacy at 
consolidating the identity of the movement. Equally important is that 
identity consolidation efficacy predicts collective action sometimes partly 
because it feeds into the perceived political efficacy of such action. That is, 
consolidating the identity of a movement and altering the social order can be 
related rather than totally independent goals. Our research thus sheds light 
on a novel predictor of political efficacy, namely identity consolidation 
efficacy. This is important given that political efficacy has been shown to be 
an important collective action antecedent (e.g. van Zomeren, Postmes, & 
Spears, 2009). Our findings thus suggest that in order to promote solidarity-
based collective action in protracted struggles (e.g. to end Israeli occupation 
or to bring about democracy in China), it may be useful to highlight the role 
of collective action at affirming, expressing and building the identity of a 
movement. This may help raise the perceived political efficacy of such 
action and thus make participation more appealing, but it may also motivate 
collective action independently. 
Conclusion 
The present research builds on the dual pathway model of collective 
action (van Zomeren et al., 2004) to examine social psychological predictors 
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of collective action by third parties in solidarity with a disadvantaged group. 
Our findings highlight the role of empathy, over and above the roles of 
sympathy and moral outrage. Our research also draws attention to the role of 
the perceived efficacy of collective action at consolidating the identity of a 
movement in predicting solidarity-based collective action, over and above 
its perceived political efficacy and sometimes partly via its political 
efficacy. 
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CHAPTER 3: Violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy as predictors of 
violent forms of collective action
4
 
Recent historical events, starting with the September 11
th
 attacks, have 
led to a resurgence of interest in the social-psychological predictors of political 
violence. If we follow a widely used definition of collective action as action that 
aims to improve the status, power or influence of an entire group rather than that 
of one or a few individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright et al., 1990b; van 
Zomeren & Iyer, 2009), politically motivated acts of violence clearly qualify as 
forms of collective action. Although there is a well-established theoretical 
framework for studying the antecedents of collective action in social psychology 
(e.g. van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), it has not yet been widely applied 
to the investigation of politically motivated forms of violence (Wright, 2009). 
Indeed, the majority of social-psychological research on collective action focuses 
on nonviolent rather than violent forms of action. In line with current attempts to 
fill this gap (e.g. Tausch, Becker, Spears et al., 2011), the present research 
examines how efficacy, one of the well-established antecedents of nonviolent 
collective action (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), predicts violent forms 
of collective action. Note that this chapter focuses on the political efficacy of 
violent collective action, rather than its identity consolidation efficacy. We shall 
henceforth refer to this simply as efficacy. 
Tausch et al. (2011) have recently shown that low group efficacy, a sense 
that one’s group is not capable of resolving its grievances through collective 
effort, plays an important role in predicting support for violent forms of collective 
action and violent action tendencies. However, to date there has been no 
                                                 
4
 This chapter is based on Saab, Spears, & Tausch (under review). 
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systematic empirical investigation of how violent forms of collective action are 
influenced by the perceived efficacy of both violent and nonviolent forms of 
action. The objective of our research is therefore to examine how violent 
collective action is predicted by the perceived efficacy of violent and nonviolent 
collective action and, importantly, the potential interaction between the two. This 
interaction is critical because, as we shall see, violent and nonviolent options may 
be viewed as related rather than independent options. 
The Role of Efficacy in Collective Action 
In the context of group-based action, efficacy refers to the perceived 
likelihood that collective action will achieve a desired social change for a group. 
Different social-psychological approaches to collective action such as Relative 
Deprivation Theory (Folger, 1986; Mummendey, et al., 1999; Smith & Kessler, 
2004), Resource Mobilization Theory (Klandermans, 1984), and Social Identity 
Theory (SIT: Tajfel & Turner, 1979) have long stressed the influence of 
pragmatic considerations on the motivation to take collective action. Although 
not all incorporate the efficacy of collective action per se, they all use similar 
notions. SIT, for example, focuses on the concept of (in)stability of intergroup 
relations, or the perceived changeability of the ingroup’s position in the existing 
social order (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). A stable social system is unresponsive to 
attempts by group members to improve the position of their group, whereas an 
unstable social system is more responsive (see Wright, 2001, for a distinction 
between efficacy and stability). Classical SIT suggests that group members who 
view their group’s position as illegitimately disadvantaged are more likely to 
challenge the status quo collectively if they view their disadvantage as unstable 
(Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Other lines of research emphasize the 
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concept of group efficacy (Smith, Cronin, & Kessler, 2008; van Zomeren et al., 
2004), which refers to group members’ belief that they can effectively resolve a 
problem facing their group through collective effort (Bandura, 1995, 1997; 
Mummendey et al., 1999).  
Despite differences across these theories, all of them have traditionally 
stressed that, in order to be motivated to participate in collective action, members 
of a disadvantaged group need to believe that they can improve the conditions of 
their group and resolve their grievances through collective action. Consistent with 
this idea, research has generally found that collective action is predicted by its 
perceived efficacy or by the perceived efficacy of the group at achieving a desired 
social change through collective effort (Hornsey et al., 2006; Kelly & 
Breinlinger, 1995; van Zomeren et al., 2004; see van Zomeren, Postmes, & 
Spears, 2008, for meta-analytic evidence).  
However, a critical look at the quantitative evidence on the link between 
efficacy and collective action shows a rather exclusive focus on the prediction of 
nonviolent forms of collective action (Hornsey et al., 2006; van Zomeren, 
Postmes, & Spears, 2008), despite the obvious social and practical implications of 
research on violent forms of action (Wright, 2009). Importantly, recent research 
suggests that, unlike nonviolent collective action, violent forms of collective 
action may be motivated by the low perceived likelihood that a desired social 
change will be achieved. For example, Tausch et al. (2011) recently conducted 
three field studies examining the link between perceived group efficacy and both 
nonviolent and violent forms of collective action. While group efficacy was 
positively related to nonviolent actions in these studies, replicating previous 
findings in the literature (van Zomeren et al., 2008), the authors demonstrated 
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that violent actions were, in fact, predicted by a sense of low rather than high 
group efficacy. The authors argued that resorting to violence in a desperate 
situation can be highly strategic and  functional, potentially influencing wider 
public opinion, building a movement, and winning third parties to the cause (e.g., 
Hornsey et al., 2006), for example by provoking the opponent into extreme 
counter-action (see Sedgwick, 2004). Violence in a situation offering little hope 
for change may thus destabilize the status quo and facilitate the conditions that 
could lead to social change in the long run (see also Louis & Taylor, 2002; 
Spears, Scheepers, & van Zomeren, 2011).  
Tausch et al.’s (2011) results are consistent with some earlier findings 
suggesting that difficulty in improving a disadvantaged group position is not 
linked to inaction but to disruptive forms of collective action such as violence. 
For example, Ransford (1968) found that the willingness to engage in violence in 
the context of the Watts Riots was positively correlated with feelings of 
powerlessness and lack of control. Similarly, Wright and colleagues (1990b) 
found in an experiment that participants assigned to a low-status or disadvantaged 
group were more likely to opt for disruptive forms of collective action available 
to them when they were denied opportunities to move to an advantaged group. 
They also found that lack of hope for an improvement of their position best 
distinguished participants who chose disruptive forms of collective action from 
those who chose other forms of action (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990a; 
see also Kamans, Spears, Otten, Gordijn, & Livingstone, 2011).  
More recently, a series of experimental studies by Scheepers, Spears, 
Doosje and Manstead (2006; see also Spears et al., 2011) found that, contrary to 
classical predictions of SIT, groups with stable low status were more likely to 
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support a relatively aggressive strategy of derogating the outgroup in rewards and 
ratings, compared to groups with unstable low status, even and especially when 
this discrimination was visible to the outgroup audience. Scheepers et al. (2006) 
and Spears et al. (2011) referred to this as a “nothing to lose” strategy. They 
proposed that this strategy stems from the belief that doing nothing is unlikely to 
change the situation whereas using a confrontational strategy, in comparison, has 
the potential to improve or at least unsettle the situation. 
Importantly, researchers examining the influence of perceived (group) 
efficacy or stability on aggressive or violent forms of group action have thus far 
focused primarily on the perceived general possibility of achieving a desirable 
social change (an exception is Louis, Paasonnen, Hornsey et al., 2011). It is thus 
not clear how violent forms of action are predicted by perceptions of their 
efficacy as well as by the perceived efficacy of other nonviolent forms of 
collective action. Although Tausch et al. (2011) found that violent collective 
action is predicted by a sense of low group efficacy, because this index of 
efficacy was general it does not indicate which specific types of collective action 
need to be perceived as effective or ineffective for violent collective action to 
occur. Tausch et al. have stressed that in order to get a more complete 
understanding of how efficacy considerations predict violent (and nonviolent) 
forms of collective action, it is essential to distinguish between the efficacy of 
violent and nonviolent forms of action. The aim of the present research is 
therefore to address this issue. 
The Present Research 
Our research examines how violent action efficacy and nonviolent action 
efficacy predict violent forms of collective action. Although nonviolent forms of 
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action are equally important, they fall outside the scope of the current paper. We 
now review existing research on how efficacy considerations relate specifically to 
violent forms of collective action and outline our predictions.  
According to the expectancy-value theory of behaviour, the perceived 
expectancy that some behaviour will result in a valued outcome should positively 
predict the intention to engage in that behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). In line 
with this idea, there is considerable empirical evidence that the perceived efficacy 
of nonviolent actions is a positive predictor of nonviolent collective action (e.g. 
van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). To our knowledge, however, research 
on efficacy and collective action has not examined the relation between the 
perceived efficacy of violent forms of collective action and the pursuit of violent 
collective action. If violent collective action is rationally motivated, people 
should be more likely to pursue it the more efficacious they perceive it to be for 
resolving their grievances.  
The perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action, however, is also 
likely to play a role in predicting violent collective action. Researchers have 
theorized that people are more likely to consider political violence when 
nonviolent alternatives are seen as ineffective at addressing grievances (Bloom, 
2004; Crenshaw, 1990; Louis, 2009b; Pruitt & Gahagan, 1974). The rationale 
here is that violent collective action typically presents more risks compared to 
nonviolent collective action and is thus only used as a last resort, when 
nonviolent action is seen as ineffective or insufficient for resolving grievances. 
Indeed violence by definition involves physically harming people or their 
resources, making it morally more questionable than nonviolence, and more 
likely to invite punitive measures, jeopardizing safety, resources as well as social 
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image (e.g. see Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Wright, 2009). Based on the idea 
that people only use violence as a last resort, it is thought that increasing the 
perceived efficacy of nonviolent forms of action helps to prevent people from 
pursuing violent action or to reduce violent action where it is already being used. 
Surprisingly, until recently evidence in support of the hypothesized 
negative influence of nonviolence efficacy on violent action was based solely on 
qualitative studies, such as case studies of violent escalations of social and 
political conflicts (Pruitt & Gahagan, 1974) and interviews with militants 
involved in politically motivated acts of violence (Masters, 2004; Post, Sprinzak, 
& Denny, 2003; Soibelman, 2004). However, Louis et al. (2011) recently 
surveyed a sample of protesters in an anti-globalization rally on their perceptions 
of the efficacy of democratic rallies and their support for violent protest. 
Consistent with the idea that violence is adopted when nonviolent means are 
viewed as ineffective, these authors found the efficacy of nonviolence and 
support for violence to be negatively linked.      
Thus, based on previous research and theory, we expect violent collective 
action to be overall positively predicted by its perceived efficacy, and negatively 
predicted by the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action. Importantly, 
however, the effects of violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy on violent 
collective action have thus far been examined only separately, without taking into 
account the possibility that they may interact. Previous research has neither 
explicitly considered nor systematically investigated this possibility. For 
example, do people refrain from pursuing potentially effective violent forms of 
collective action when they perceive nonviolent action as efficacious? Does the 
perceived inefficacy of nonviolence lead to the pursuit of violent action when 
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such action is unlikely to achieve success? The present research is aimed at 
examining these questions. Given that the literature has focused more on the 
negative link between nonviolence efficacy and violent action, we shall focus on 
how this link may vary as a function of the efficacy of violent action. We 
consider three alternative hypotheses, illustrated in Figure 5. 
Violence Efficacy as a Potential Moderator of the Link between Nonviolence 
Efficacy and Violence? 
The first moderation hypothesis we consider is based on the primacy of 
nonviolence as a guiding principle for the use of violence. We thus term it the 
“primacy of nonviolence” hypothesis (first panel, Figure 5). This interaction 
assumes that people pursue violence only as a last resort  (e.g. Pruitt & Gahagan, 
1974), that is, only when nonviolent alternatives for addressing grievances are 
perceived as ineffective. Hence, when nonviolent action is viewed as potentially 
effective, people would be reluctant to pursue violent action even if violence is 
also likely to be effective. Initial data showing that nonviolence efficacy is a 
negative predictor of support for violence is consistent with this general idea 
(Louis, Paasonnen, Hornsey et al., 2011). Thus, according to the “primacy of 
nonviolence” hypothesis, violence efficacy should moderate the link between 
nonviolence efficacy and violent action, such that the perceived efficacy of 
nonviolent action is more negatively predictive of violent action the greater the 
perceived efficacy of violent action is.  
An alternative moderation hypothesis to consider is based on the idea that 
violence and nonviolence can be complementary rather than mutually exclusive 
strategies. We term this “the gun and the olive branch” hypothesis (panel 2, 
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Figure 5. Illustration of three alternative hypotheses on how the link between the perceived efficacy of nonviolent action and violent collective  
action could vary as a function of the perceived efficacy of violent action.
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Figure 5). This hypothesis assumes that people who believe that nonviolent action 
has high efficacy will pursue violent action only if they believe that violent action 
also has high efficacy. Crucially, this does not mean they will only pursue violent 
action. Instead, they may pursue both violent and nonviolent strategies in parallel 
if both have high efficacy, in order to maximize the chances of achieving the 
desired social change or to reach it more efficiently. Consistent with this, Stephan 
and Chenoweth (2008) noted in a recent analysis of resistance campaigns 
between 1900 and 2006 that various campaigns used both violent and nonviolent 
methods of resistance simultaneously (see also Dudouet, 2008). A well-known 
example of such a strategy is the South African struggle for liberation, where the 
African National Congress (ANC) used violent methods, while nonviolent 
methods were being used in the townships (Schock, 2005). Thus, according to 
“the gun and the olive branch” hypothesis, violence efficacy moderates the link 
between nonviolence efficacy and violent action, such that the perceived efficacy 
of nonviolent action is less negatively predictive of violent action the greater the 
perceived efficacy of violent action is. Put differently, increasing the perceived 
efficacy of nonviolent action is less likely to reduce violent action when violence 
has high efficacy than when it has low efficacy.  
While both moderation hypotheses are conceivable as they both reflect 
existing guiding principles concerning the use of violence, a third alternative 
hypothesis is that violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy have independent 
effects on violent action. We term this the “independent effects” hypothesis 
(panel 3, Figure 5). That is, violence efficacy positively predicts violent action 
independently of the efficacy of nonviolence. Similarly, nonviolence efficacy 
negatively predicts violent action, independently of the efficacy of violence. Note 
  82 
that this would suggest that people see less value in pursuing violence if 
nonviolence has high efficacy than if it has low efficacy, but they will still hold 
on to violence to some extent if they think it will help.  
The “Nothing to Lose” Hypothesis 
An important and related question we seek to address in the present 
research is whether the perceived inefficacy of nonviolence would lead to the 
pursuit of violent action when such violence is unlikely to achieve success. Note 
that this question zooms in on the simple effect of nonviolence efficacy on violent 
action when violence has low efficacy. Importantly, for reasons we will turn to 
shortly, we do expect violent action to be negatively predicted by nonviolence 
efficacy when violence has low efficacy. We term this predicted simple effect the 
“nothing to lose” hypothesis. Note that this hypothesis is automatically implied 
by both “the gun and the olive branch” moderation hypothesis and the 
“independent effects” hypothesis, because these postulate, respectively, that 
nonviolence efficacy is more negatively predictive of violence when violence 
efficacy is low, or equally negatively predictive (see panels 2 and 3, Figure 5). 
We explicitly make the “nothing to lose” prediction, however, because it is not 
automatically implied by the “primacy of nonviolence” moderation hypothesis. 
The “primacy of nonviolence” hypothesis indeed proposes that nonviolence 
efficacy should be less negatively predictive of violence when violence has low 
efficacy (see panel 1, Figure 5), which leaves open the possibility that 
nonviolence efficacy may not predict violence at all when violence has low 
efficacy. More importantly, we also explicitly make the “nothing to lose” 
prediction because as we shall see, finding evidence for this negative simple 
  83 
effect is theoretically important, irrespective of which of our three alternative 
interaction hypotheses is supported.  
That nonviolence efficacy should negatively predict violent action when 
violence has low efficacy might at first seem counterintuitive. After all, according 
to the expectancy-value theory of behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), when 
people think violence is unlikely to resolve their grievances, they should be 
unlikely to pursue it. If nonviolent forms of action are also perceived as 
ineffective, there is little chance, overall, to successfully resolve grievances and 
the situation should be perceived as highly stable. The classical view in the 
literature predicts that people should have little motivation to pursue collective 
action in circumstances offering little scope for change (Bandura, 1997; Smith & 
Kessler, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; 
Wright, 2001). Accordingly, the perceived inefficacy of nonviolent action should 
be unlikely to lead to violent action if violence is perceived to have low efficacy. 
Importantly, however, as mentioned previously, some recent work has 
argued that violent action strategies may sometimes be used in order to unsettle a 
stable social system and bring about the conditions that would facilitate social 
change in the long run (Louis & Taylor, 2002; Scheepers et al., 2006; Sedgwick, 
2004; Spears et al., 2011; Tausch et al., 2011). For example, both Scheepers et al. 
(2006) and Spears et al. (2011) suggested that members of a disadvantaged group 
adopt more extreme forms of group action when the possibility of improving their 
conditions is low, as they have “nothing to lose”. That is, there may be more to 
gain by using an aggressive strategy than by doing nothing.  
The “nothing to lose” argument in its essence bears a close similarity to 
an argument made by Masters (2004). Masters suggested that when group 
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members face an ongoing injustice, and believe that inaction or nonviolence offer 
no chance of improving the status quo, while violent rebellion offers a chance, 
however slim, to improve the situation, they will tend to support violence even if 
it involves considerable risks. He based his argument on the assumption of loss 
aversion from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which predicts that 
when faced with one choice involving a guaranteed loss, and another choice 
involving a likely loss of equal or greater value, people tend to prefer the risky 
option, because it offers at least the possibility, however small, to escape losses 
altogether. Masters (2004) interviewed militants from Northern Ireland and 
Palestine who favoured armed struggle to advance their cause and found some 
qualitative evidence consistent with this argument.  
Accordingly, if violent action has low efficacy, people would pursue it 
only if nonviolent collective action is also perceived to have low efficacy. Hence, 
we expect nonviolence efficacy to negatively predict violent action when 
violence efficacy is low, and, as mentioned above, we term this predicted simple 
effect the “nothing to lose” hypothesis. To clarify, the “nothing to lose” 
hypothesis refers strictly to the simple effect of nonviolence efficacy on violent 
action when violence efficacy is low. Conversely, the “primacy of nonviolence” 
hypothesis, “the gun and the olive branch” hypothesis, and the “independent 
effects” hypothesis constitute three alternative predictions regarding how the 
effect of nonviolence efficacy on violent action when violence efficacy is high 
compares to the negative effect of nonviolence efficacy when violence efficacy is 
low. 
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Overview of Studies 
We present four studies testing our hypotheses by examining how the 
perceived efficacy of violent and nonviolent forms of collective action, and the 
interaction between the two, predict support for, and tendencies to engage in, 
violent forms of collective action.  
As a starting point, Studies 4 and 5 examine the degree to which external 
sympathizers with the Palestinian cause in Britain support armed Palestinian 
resistance, as a function of the perceived efficacy of both violent and nonviolent 
Palestinian resistance against the Israeli occupation. In Studies 6 and 7, we move 
from this third-party perspective to a first-party perspective. Study 6 examines 
attitudinal support for violent forms of action as well as violent action tendencies 
among British university students in the context of the recent protests against the 
increase in university tuition fees. Study 7 uses an experimental scenario where 
we ask participants to imagine living in a country under occupation and measure 
their support for violent collective action and violent collective action tendencies. 
Importantly, Studies 6 and 7 also explore the role of attitudinal support for violent 
action in mediating the effects of violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy on 
violent collective action tendencies. 
Study 4 
Our first study surveyed a sample of international protesters recruited 
during the National demonstration for justice and freedom for Palestine, which 
takes place annually in London, Britain. This study investigated how protesters’ 
support for the use of violence by Palestinians against Israel is predicted by their 
perceptions of the efficacy of violent and nonviolent means in that context, and 
the interaction between the two.  
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Method 
Participants.  A total of 240 protesters participated in the study. We 
excluded 30 participants who had missing data on one or more of the three key 
variables (single item measures). The final sample thus consisted of 210 
participants (108 women, 101 men, 1 unknown; age: M = 40.57 years; SD = 
16.50). The majority of protesters (N = 146) were British and the rest held various 
nationalities, including six Palestinians and fourteen non-Palestinian Arabs. There 
were no Israeli respondents in the sample. Protesters also varied in their religious 
affiliation and included Muslim (N = 45) and Jewish (N = 4) participants.  
Procedure.  Protesters were approached as they waited at the gathering 
point before the march started, and then later at the rally point as they listened to 
speeches. Participants were asked if they would like to complete an anonymous 
survey on their opinions about the demonstration. They were then handed the 
questionnaire and, upon completion were handed a debriefing sheet.  
Materials.   
Unless stated otherwise, all items were measured using six-point verbal 
rating scales with labels ordered as such: “not at all” (coded as 1), “slightly” (2), 
“somewhat” (3), “moderately” (4), “very much” (5), and “extremely” (6). 
Perceived injustice.  Prior to administering the measures of interest in this 
paper, we measured perceived injustice to check that our participants viewed the 
Palestinians’ situation as unjust.  We thus asked them about the extent to which 
they viewed Israel’s approach to the Palestinian issue in general as unjust, as well 
as Britain’s approach, with two items (Pearson’s r = .73).  
Perceived efficacy of nonviolent and violent collective action.  We 
measured the efficacy of each type of action using single items. Participants rated 
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how effective they thought Palestinians’ use of peaceful means with Israel and 
their use of violence against Israel would be at helping Palestinians achieve their 
aims. 
Support for violent collective action.  This was measured using a single 
item. Participants indicated their agreement with the following sentence: “In 
general, I support the decisions of Palestinians to use violence against Israel.” 
Responses were recorded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree”.  
Results and Discussion 
As would be expected in a sample of protesters, participants viewed the 
occupation as highly unjust (M = 5.37; SD = 1.03). A one-sample t-test indicated 
that participants scored significantly above the scale mid-point on perceived 
injustice, t (209) = 26.17, p < .001.  
We regressed support for violence on the perceived efficacy of 
nonviolence, the perceived efficacy of violence and their interaction, using 
ordinary least square (OLS) multiple regression. For all multiple regression 
analyses reported in our four studies, continuous predictors were centred prior to 
our analyses, following recommendations by Aiken & West (1991). We thus 
always report the values of the unstandardised regression coefficients. 
Descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables of interest in this study 
are displayed in Table 4.  
The model explained 49.8% of the variance in support for violence 
(adjusted R-Square). As expected, violence efficacy emerged as a significant  
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Table 4 
Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 4) 
 Scale M SD 1 2 3 
1. Perceived Efficacy of Nonviolence 1 to 6 3.16 1.52 - -.01 -.24** 
2. Perceived Efficacy of Violence 1 to 6 2.88 1.54  - .66*** 
3. Support for Violence 1 to 7 4.57 1.90   - 
** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Figure 6. Simple slopes of support for violent collective action regressed on the 
perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action, at mean, low and high levels of 
the perceived efficacy of violent action (one standard deviation below and above 
the mean, respectively) (Study 4). The interaction is plotted using unstandardised 
coefficients. 
 
positive predictor of support for violence, b =.77, SE = .06, t (206) = 12.39, p < 
.001, and nonviolence efficacy emerged as a significant negative predictor: b = - 
.31, SE = .06, t (206) = -4.98, p < .001. However, there was also a significant 
interaction between the two predictors, b = .11, SE = .04, t (206) = 3.04, p = .003, 
which is plotted in Figure 6. 
Next, we examined simple slopes of nonviolence efficacy at both high and 
low levels of violence efficacy (±1 SD). The analysis revealed that when violence 
efficacy was low, support for violence was negatively and significantly predicted 
by nonviolence efficacy, b = -.47, SE = .09, t (206) = -5.4, p <.001. This supports 
the “nothing to lose” hypothesis. When violence efficacy was high, support for 
violence was negatively predicted by nonviolence efficacy, b = -.14, SE = .08, t 
(206) = -1.83, p = .07, but this link only approached conventional levels of 
significance. The interaction was thus in line with “the gun and the olive branch” 
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5
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For the purposes of completeness, we also report the simple slopes of 
violence efficacy in Table 13 (p. 128-129). 
To summarize, the results of Study 4 provided initial correlational 
evidence in support of our main effect hypotheses, but also evidence of an 
interaction effect. As expected, overall, the perceived efficacy of violence 
positively predicted support for violence. Further, overall, the perceived efficacy 
of nonviolence negatively predicted support for violence. Importantly, we also 
found a significant interaction between the perceived efficacy of violence and the 
perceived efficacy of nonviolence, such that nonviolence efficacy was less 
negatively predictive of violence support when violence efficacy was high than 
when it was low, in line with “the gun and the olive branch” hypothesis. That is, 
the greater the perceived efficacy of violence, the less the perceived efficacy of 
nonviolence mattered for deciding whether or not to support violence. Hence, 
participants who judged both violence and nonviolence to have high efficacy still 
supported violence to a relatively high degree, potentially suggesting that 
violence and nonviolence were viewed as complementary strategies to be used 
alongside each other. Importantly, the results also mean that the “nothing to lose” 
hypothesis was met, since participants who perceived violence to have low 
efficacy supported violence to the extent that they viewed nonviolent actions to 
have low efficacy as well. Thus, perceiving violent means of resistance as having 
little chance of success did not prevent participants from supporting violence 
when they perceived peaceful means of resistance to be relatively ineffective.  
Our first study, however, has various limitations. Considering the 
different types of violent resistance used in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
                                                 
5
 An additional set of analyses which excluded Palestinian participants (first-parties) 
yielded very similar results. 
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conflict, our broad operationalisation of violence limits the interpretation of the 
findings, because it lacks specificity with regard to the target of violence, which 
could be interpreted to mean military or civilian targets, as Palestinian militants 
have actually engaged in attacks on both in the course of their resistance to Israeli 
occupation
6
. A similar critique can be made regarding our operationalisation of 
nonviolent means of action (“peaceful means”), which can be understood to refer 
to diplomatic means or popular nonviolent acts of resistance or both, considering, 
again, that Palestinians have used both means. Further, our findings were based 
on correlational data, which does not rule out alternative explanations. In Study 5 
we tried to address these limitations while using the same context. 
Study 5 
In this study we used an experimental procedure, focusing again on 
international onlookers of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but this time using a 
sample of university students. We manipulated the efficacy of violent and 
nonviolent Palestinian resistance to be either high or low and operationalised 
violent collective action as armed attacks by Palestinian militants on Israeli 
military targets and nonviolent collective actions as mass demonstrations, the 
boycott of Israeli products, and civil disobedience. Our dependent variable, 
support for violence, was also operationalised as support for attacks against 
Israeli soldiers.  
Method 
Participants.  Cardiff University students (N = 120; 84 women, 36 men; 
age: M = 21.98 years, SD = 3.79) participated in the experiment in exchange for 
course credit or money and were recruited from various departments across the 
                                                 
6
 Some participants explicitly clarified on the questionnaire sheets that they were referring 
to violence against military targets and not civilian targets. 
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university. Eighty percent were British and the rest held various nationalities. 
There were neither Arabs nor Israelis in our sample. Participants also varied in 
their religious affiliation. Only one was Muslim and three were Jewish. 
Design and procedure.  The experiment was advertised as a study on 
political attitudes. Participants were randomly allocated to one of four conditions, 
in a 2 (efficacy of violent resistance: high or low) x 2 (efficacy of nonviolent 
resistance: high or low) between-participants factorial design. Upon arrival at the 
lab, they were led to separate cubicles and seated in front of a computer. Testing 
sessions never exceeded six participants.  
After completing some socio-demographic questions, all participants 
viewed a five-minute documentary on the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands 
(1967 onwards), providing information on the violations of international law and 
human rights involved. This was done to ensure participants would view the 
occupation as unjust and would therefore have a motive to support collective 
action by Palestinians. Following this, participants viewed a ten-minute 
documentary which contained the manipulation, focusing on the efficacy of 
violent and nonviolent resistance means Palestinians have been using against the 
occupation in recent years. Nonviolent resistance included mass demonstrations, 
the boycott of Israeli products and civil disobedience acts. Violent resistance 
consisted of guerrilla attacks on Israeli military targets. The efficacy of each type 
of resistance was manipulated by varying the alleged opinions of experts who 
argued that nonviolence (or violence) was either likely or unlikely to be effective 
at helping Palestinians end the Israeli occupation. The risks involved in engaging 
in nonviolent resistance (i.e. the predicted intensity of Israel’s retaliation) were 
kept equal across the high and low efficacy conditions and likewise for violent 
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resistance. The order in which the two types of resistance were introduced was 
counterbalanced. The efficacy manipulation lasted for the same duration across 
conditions. Apart from variations pertaining to the manipulation, the script and 
video footage used were identical across conditions. 
Following the manipulation, participants completed manipulation checks 
as well as measures of their perceptions of the injustice of the Israeli occupation. 
We then measured the perceived efficacy of Palestinians’ use of both violent and 
nonviolent resistance, followed by support for violent resistance. We 
counterbalanced the order of manipulation checks and efficacy measures 
pertaining to violent and nonviolent resistance. At the end of the experiment, 
participants were thanked and debriefed.  
Materials. 
Manipulation and control checks. We used a categorical manipulation 
check. Participants were asked to tick one of two boxes indicating whether they 
thought nonviolent resistance would be likely or unlikely to be effective at 
helping Palestinians end Israeli occupation.  
Perceived injustice. To check that participants viewed the occupation as 
unjust, we asked them about the extent to which they viewed the Israeli 
occupation as morally wrong, illegitimate, fair (reverse-coded) and justified 
(reverse-coded) on 8-point visual-analogue scales, with the end points labelled 
“not at all” and “extremely”. The items were averaged to yield an index of 
perceived injustice of Israeli occupation (α = .83). 
Perceived efficacy of nonviolent and violent collective action. We also 
measured the perceived efficacy of each method of resistance separately. 
Participants rated how effective they thought Palestinians’ use of a range of 
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tactics might be at ending the Israeli occupation, using a ten-point scale 
numbered from 0 (“not effective at all”) to 9 (“extremely effective”). Three items 
measured the perceived efficacy of mass demonstrations, the boycott of Israeli 
products and civil disobedience. These were combined into a reliable scale of the 
perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action (α =.86). One item measured 
the perceived efficacy of armed attacks against Israeli soldiers, which is how 
violent resistance was defined in the manipulation.  
Support for violent collective action. Following this, participants rated 
how strongly they supported or opposed Palestinians’ use of armed attacks on 
Israeli soldiers, using a ten-point scale numbered from -5 (“strongly oppose”) to 
+5 (“strongly support”). We omitted the mid-point (0) of this scale to avoid 
potential tendencies by participants to answer at the midpoint given their minimal 
involvement with the issue (Krosnick & Fabrigar, 1997). 
Results and Discussion 
Missing value analysis.  There were some missing values (< 5% per 
variable) in our dataset. These were imputed using the expectation maximization 
method (EM) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Manipulation checks.  A chi-square test comparing ratings of the 
efficacy of nonviolent resistance across the nonviolence efficacy conditions, was 
significant: χ2 (1) = 53.57, p < .001. Participants in the high efficacy condition 
were 26 times more likely than participants in the low efficacy condition to 
respond that nonviolent resistance was likely to be effective. Another chi-square 
test, performed to compare ratings of the efficacy of violent resistance across 
violence efficacy conditions, was also significant: χ2 (1) = 28.13, p < .001. 
Participants in the high efficacy condition were 9.75 times more likely than 
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participants in the low efficacy condition to respond that violent resistance 
against military targets was likely to be effective. Two additional chi-square tests 
confirmed that ratings of nonviolence efficacy were independent of the 
manipulation of violence efficacy, and that ratings of the violence efficacy were 
independent of the manipulation of nonviolence efficacy (neither test was 
significant). Hence, the checks indicate that our manipulations succeeded.  Note, 
however, that the effect sizes suggest that the manipulation of violence efficacy 
was less successful than the manipulation of nonviolence efficacy.  
Perceived injustice. Participants’ scores on the perceived injustice 
measure indicated they viewed the occupation as quite unfair (M = 6.91; SD = 
1.00, minimum score = 4). A one-sample t-test indicated that they scored 
significantly above the mid-point scale: t (119) = 26.51, p <.001. 
Experimental analysis.  The means and standard deviations for support 
for violence as a function of condition are displayed in Table 5. The 2 x 2 
factorial ANOVA on violence support unexpectedly revealed no significant main 
effect of violence efficacy, F (1, 116) < 1, p = .45, ns, nor a significant main 
effect of nonviolence efficacy, F (1, 116) = 1.32, p = .25, ns. The omnibus 
interaction was also not significant: F (1, 116) = 1.80; p = .18, ns, η2 = .02. 
We nevertheless tested the simple effects of nonviolence efficacy. 
Simple effect tests of nonviolence efficacy revealed that when violence 
efficacy was low, nonviolence efficacy did have the predicted effect on 
support for violence, F (1, 116) = 3.11, p = .08, such that participants were 
more supportive of violence when the efficacy of nonviolence was low than 
when it was high, in line with the “nothing to lose” hypothesis. Although 
this effect only approached conventional levels of statistical significance, it 
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Table 5 
Support for Violent Collective Action as a Function of Nonviolence and 
Violence Efficacy (Study 5). 
 Efficacy of violence 
Efficacy of nonviolence Low High 
Low  .20 -.10 
 (2.72) (3.16) 
High -1.10 .00 
 (2.84) (2.67) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. Support for 
violence is on a scale from -5 to 5. 
 
was significant using a one-tailed test (p = .04), which is justified given the 
directionality of our a priori hypothesis. Conversely, when violence efficacy was 
high, the effect of violence efficacy on violence support was not significant: F (1, 
116) <1, ns. Although the pattern of results was in line with “the gun and the 
olive branch hypothesis” the main effect of violence efficacy and the interaction 
were not significant so we cannot draw firm conclusions about this hypothesis. 
We report the results of the simple effect tests of violence efficacy in Table 13 (p. 
128-129).  
Internal analysis.  Given the weakness of our experimental effects on 
support for violence, we followed up with an internal analysis. We thus 
performed a multiple regression analysis using support for violence as a criterion 
variable and using the perceived efficacy of nonviolence, the perceived efficacy 
of violence and their interaction as predictors. Descriptive statistics for all 
variables and a correlation matrix are displayed in Table 6.  
The model explained 19% of the variance in support for violence. As 
expected, the perceived efficacy of violence emerged, overall, as a significant 
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Table 6 
Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 5) 
 Scale M SD 1 2 3 
1. Perceived Efficacy of nonviolence 0 to 9 5.16 1.95 - .21* -.11 
2. Perceived Efficacy of violence 0 to 9 4.62 2.16  - .36*** 
3. Support for violence -5 to 5 -.25 2.86   - 
* p < .05; ** p < .001 
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positive predictor of support for violence: b = .46, SE = .11, t (116) = 4.07, p 
<.001. The relation between the perceived efficacy of nonviolence and violence 
support showed an overall trend in the expected (negative) direction: b = -.21, SE 
= .13, t (116) = -1.65, p =.10 (or p = .05 with a one-tailed test, justified by our a 
priori hypothesis). These effects, however, were qualified by a significant 
interaction, b = .15, SE = .23, t (116) = 2.67, p = .009, which is plotted in Figure 
7. 
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Figure 7. Simple slopes of support for violence collective action regressed on the 
perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action at mean, low and high levels of 
the perceived efficacy of violent collective action (one standard deviation below 
and above the mean, respectively) (Study 5). The interaction is plotted using 
unstandardised coefficients. 
 
Tests of the simple slopes of nonviolence efficacy at high and low levels 
of violence efficacy (±1 SD) revealed, as expected and in line with the 
experimental results, that when the perceived efficacy of violence was low, 
support for violence was negatively and significantly predicted by the perceived 
efficacy of nonviolence, b = -.53, SE = .16, t (116) = -3.41, p < .001 (supporting 
the “nothing to lose” hypothesis). By contrast, when the perceived efficacy of 
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violence was high, there was no evidence of a link between the perceived efficacy 
of nonviolence and support for violence: b = .11, SE = .19, t (116) = .59, p = .56, 
ns. The interaction pattern thus supports “the gun and the olive branch” 
hypothesis. We also performed tests of the simple regression slopes of violence 
efficacy which are reported in Table 13 (p. 128-129). 
To summarize, while the present study addressed some of the limitations 
of Study 4, it provided mixed support for our main effects hypotheses but further 
evidence of an interaction effect, in line with “the gun and the olive branch” 
moderation hypothesis. We expected that violence efficacy would overall 
positively predict support for violence. Surprisingly, we found no experimental 
support for this hypothesis in this study. This may be due to participants’ deeply-
held views about the (in)efficacy of violence, which may have constrained the 
strength of our manipulation. We also expected that nonviolence efficacy would 
overall negatively predict support for violence. We found no experimental 
support for this hypothesis either. Further, no significant interaction was found 
between nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy. Nevertheless, simple effect 
tests revealed that in line with the “nothing to lose” hypothesis, nonviolence 
efficacy negatively predicted violence support when violence efficacy was low. 
Although this simple effect was only significant using a one-tailed test, this test is 
justified by the directionality of our a priori hypothesis. Conversely, nonviolence 
efficacy did not predict violence support when violence efficacy was high. The 
pattern of results was thus line with “the gun and the olive branch” hypothesis 
and follows that found in Study 4: the greater the efficacy of violence, the less 
nonviolence efficacy has an effect on support for violence.  
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The internal analysis sheds more light on how participants’ own views of 
violence and nonviolence efficacy were linked with their support for violence. As 
predicted, the perceived efficacy of violence was, overall, a positive predictor of 
support for violence. The perceived efficacy of nonviolence, however, only 
showed a negative overall trend in predicting violence support. Importantly, these 
effects were qualified by a significant interaction, such that the greater the 
perceived efficacy of violence was, the less the perceived efficacy of nonviolence 
mattered in deciding whether or not to support violence. The pattern of this 
interaction is thus consistent with “the gun and the olive branch” hypothesis. It 
also follows the pattern of findings in the experimental analysis and the 
interaction found in Study 4. Further, in line with the “nothing to lose” 
hypothesis, when participants perceived violence to have low efficacy, they 
supported it to the extent that they viewed nonviolence to have low efficacy as 
well. 
One potential critique of Studies 4 and 5, however, is that they 
operationalise violent collective action in terms of attitudinal support for 
violence, rather than in terms of more behavioural measures such as violent 
action tendencies. Further, these studies examine violence support from the 
perspective of distant third-party sympathizers, rather than from the perspective 
of members of a disadvantaged group, who in this context would be Palestinians 
living under occupation. In fact, collective action has commonly been 
operationalised using attitudinal measures such as support for collective action 
(van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009), which, 
although being somewhat removed from actual participation in collective action, 
are important to study as they can potentially influence behaviour at a later stage 
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(van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). One might question, however, whether perceptions 
of violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy influence support for violent action 
similarly among disadvantaged group members and among third-party 
sympathizers. In fact, it has recently been argued that (support for) collective 
action is better conceptualized as the expression of opinion-based identities, 
rather than membership in social or demographic groups (McGarty et al., 2009; 
see also Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Montele, 2007). In that sense, Palestinians 
living under occupation and third-party sympathizers can be viewed as members 
of an opinion-based group calling for the end of Israeli occupation. Accordingly, 
support for violent action among disadvantaged group members and support for 
violent action among third-party sympathizers could be influenced by similar 
psychological factors, differing in degree rather than in kind (see Sweetman, 
Spears & Livingstone, 2011). Nevertheless, in Studies 6 and 7 we extended the 
focus of our enquiry by examining different forms of support for violent action 
and violent action tendencies, this time from a first-party perspective, among 
members of disadvantaged groups.  
Study 6 
This study was conducted online with university students in Britain in the 
context of the nationwide student protest movement against increases in 
university tuition fees and budget cuts to higher education, proposed by the 
coalition government (the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats) in the 
fall of 2010. Students took a number of nonviolent actions to oppose the 
proposal, such as signing petitions, participating in demonstrations, classroom 
walk outs and student occupations of university campus buildings. Some students 
also engaged in violent actions, such as the Millbank riot on November 12th, 
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which involved breaking into the headquarters of the Conservative party in 
London and damaging property as well as entering into violent clashes with the 
police. The present study was conducted in early December 2010, in the days 
prior to the parliamentary vote session on the proposed rise in tuition fees. 
Importantly, focusing on first parties allowed us to include a wider array 
of collective action measures. We thus examine how violence efficacy and 
nonviolence efficacy predict not only support for violent collective action but 
also violent action tendencies. Further, we explore whether support for violence 
mediates the effects of our predictors on violent action tendencies. To our 
knowledge, support for violent action has not been explored as a potential 
mediator of the effects of efficacy perceptions on violent action tendencies. 
However, support for collective action is considered the first step towards 
participation in collective action: becoming a supporter means becoming part of 
the mobilization potential (Klandermans, 1997; Stürmer & Simon, 2004). 
Accordingly, we predict that the effects of violence efficacy and nonviolence 
efficacy on violent action tendencies would be mediated by attitudinal support for 
violence.  
Method 
Participants and procedure.  The study was advertised through a British 
rewards-based online shopping network and targeted students in British 
universities. It was completed by 308 students of whom 41 were excluded for 
completing the survey within an unreasonable amount of time. The remaining 
sample consisted of 267 participants (161 women, 104 men, 2 unknown; age: M 
= 22.49 years, SD = 4.25). Upon completion, respondents were offered the 
opportunity to enter into a prize draw. 
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Measures. 
Perceived injustice.  Prior to administering the measures of interest in this 
paper, we measured perceived injustice of the proposed education cuts and 
increase in tuition fees, to ensure that our participants had a motive for supporting 
or engaging in collective action against it.  Perceived injustice was measured 
using four items (α = .82): “Education cuts and fees are justified” (reverse-
coded); “Education cuts and fees are unfair”; “Education cuts and fees are 
immoral“; “Education cuts and fees are legitimate” (reverse-coded). Participants 
indicated their agreement with these items using 7-point scales (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Perceived efficacy of nonviolent and violent collective action.  
Participants rated how effective they thought a list of four nonviolent and three 
violent actions would be at preventing a vote on December 9
th
 in favour of the 
planned education cuts and fees, using a ten-point scale (0 = not effective at all, 9 
= extremely effective). Nonviolent collective action was operationalised as 
signing petitions, peaceful demonstrations, classroom walkouts (strikes) and 
student occupations of university campus buildings. Violent collective action was 
operationalised as breaking forcefully into offices of political parties supporting 
education cuts and fees (e.g. like the occupation of the Millbank Tower), 
attacking offices of political parties or politicians supporting education cuts and 
fees, and throwing eggs or rotten fruit at politicians supporting education cuts and 
fees. All of these actions, except for throwing eggs or rotten fruit at politicians, 
had already occurred as part of the student protest activities at the time of the 
survey. 
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A principal components analysis using oblique rotation yielded two 
components with Eigenvalues greater than 1, which accounted for 82.07 % of the 
variance. Items on the perceived efficacy of nonviolent actions loaded primarily 
on one factor (loadings>.70) while items on the perceived efficacy of violent 
actions loaded on another factor (loadings>.90). The items were averaged to yield 
composites of the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action (α =.87) and 
the perceived efficacy of violent collective action (α =.95). 
Support for violent collective action.  Participants rated the extent to 
which they supported or opposed the use of three violent actions (same as above) 
against education cuts and fees before the vote on December 9
th
, on an 11-point 
scale (-5 = strongly oppose, 0 = neither support nor oppose, 5 = strongly support). 
The items were averaged to yield a composite score of support for violent 
collective action (α = .95). 
Violent collective action tendencies.  Participants rated the likelihood that 
they would participate in three violent actions (same as above) against education 
cuts and fees before the vote on December 9
th
, using a ten-point scale (0 = not 
likely at all, 9 = extremely likely). The items were averaged to yield a composite 
score of violent collective action tendencies (α = .98). 
Results and Discussion 
A one-sample t-test showed that participants scored significantly above 
the mid-point scale on the measure of perceived injustice of education cuts and 
fees (M = 4.82, SD = 1.41): t (266) = 9.62, p <.001. However, 25% of the sample 
(N = 58) scored lower than the mid-point of the Likert scale (<4), indicating they 
did not perceive the proposed budget cuts to education and rise in tuition fees to 
be unfair. Thus, unlike in our two previous studies where participants all viewed 
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the situation as unjust to a certain extent, in this study a good portion of them did 
not. Given that our focus in this paper is on how collective action support and 
action tendencies are influenced by efficacy concerns among those who already 
perceive a situation as unjust and who thus form part of the mobilization potential 
(Klandermans, 1984), we decided to exclude these 58 participants from our 
analyses. We reasoned that people who did not view the status quo as unjust 
would be unlikely to support or participate in collective action to change it, 
whether or not they thought it might be effective. While it is interesting to test for 
perceived injustice as a potential moderator of our effects, we were restricted by 
the relatively small proportion of students (N = 58) who did not view the situation 
as unfair. After this exclusion, the final sample thus consisted of 209 students 
(127 women, 80 men, 2 unknown; age: M = 22.38 years, SD = 4.20). Details of 
all variables of interest and a correlation matrix are reported in Table 7.  
Support for violent collective action.  We regressed support for violent 
collective action on the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action, the 
perceived efficacy of violent collective action, and their interaction, using OLS 
multiple regression. The regression model explained 67% of the variance in 
violence support (adjusted R-Square). As expected, violence efficacy emerged as 
a significant positive predictor of violence support, b = .92, SE = .05, t (205) 
= 17.60, p < .001. Nonviolence efficacy, on the other hand, did not 
significantly predict violence support, b = -.06, SE = .07, t(205) = -.82, p = 
.42, ns. However, again we found a significant interaction between the two 
predictors, b = .04, SE = .02, t (205) = 1.99, p = .048, which is plotted in 
Figure 8. Tests of the simple slopes of nonviolence efficacy at high and low 
levels of violence efficacy (±1 SD) showed, in line with the “nothing to 
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Table 7 
Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 6) 
 Scale M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Perceived Efficacy of Nonviolence 0 to 9 5.41 2.00 - .35*** .24*** .20** 
2. Perceived Efficacy of Violence 0 to 9 3.50 2.82  - .82*** .71*** 
3. Support for Violence -5 to 5 -1.17 3.23   - .73*** 
4. Violent Action Tendencies 0 to 9 2.40 2.85    - 
** p < .01; *** p < .001  
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lose” hypothesis, that when violence efficacy was low, support for violence was 
negatively predicted by nonviolence efficacy, b = -.18, SE = .08, t (205) = -2.12, 
p = .036. However, when violence efficacy was high, nonviolence efficacy did 
not significantly predict support for violence, b =.06, SE = .10, t (205) = .61, p = 
.55, ns. The interaction was thus in line with “the gun and the olive branch” 
hypothesis. Tests of the simple slopes of violence efficacy are reported in Table 
13 (p. 128-129). 
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Figure 8. Simple slopes of support for violent collective action regressed on the 
perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action at mean, low and high levels of 
the perceived efficacy of violent collective action (one standard deviation below 
and above the mean, respectively) (Study 6). The interaction is plotted using 
unstandardised coefficients. 
 
Violent collective action tendencies.  We regressed violent collective 
action tendencies on the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action, the 
perceived efficacy of violent collective action, and their interaction, using OLS 
multiple regression. The regression model explained 50.8% of the variance in 
violent action tendencies (adjusted R-Square). As expected, violence efficacy 
emerged as a significant positive predictor, b = .70, SE = .69, t (205) = 12.46, p < 
.001. Nonviolence efficacy, on the other hand, did not significantly predict 
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violent action tendencies, b = -.05, SE = .08, t (205) = -.68, p = .50, ns. However, 
we found an interaction between the two predictors approaching conventional 
levels of significance, b = .04, SE = .02, t (205) = 1.81, p = .07. We probed this 
interaction further and plotted it in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Simple slopes of violent collective action tendencies regressed on the 
perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action at low, mean and high levels of 
the perceived efficacy of violent collective action (one standard deviation below 
and above the mean, respectively) (Study 6). The interaction is plotted using 
unstandardised coefficients. 
 
Tests of the simple slopes of nonviolence efficacy at high and low levels 
of violence efficacy (±1 SD) showed, in line with the “nothing to lose” 
hypothesis, that when violence efficacy was low, violent action tendencies were 
negatively predicted by nonviolence efficacy, b = -.17, SE = .09, t (205) = -1.87, 
p = .03 (one-tailed). Conversely, when violence efficacy was high, nonviolence 
efficacy did not significantly predict violent action tendencies, b = .06, SE = .11, t 
(205) = .60, p = .55, ns. The results were thus, again, in line with the “gun and the 
olive branch” hypothesis. Tests of the simple slopes of violence efficacy are 
reported in Table 13 (p. 128-129). 
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Indirect effects of nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy on 
violent action tendencies.  We set out to investigate if violence efficacy and 
nonviolence efficacy had indirect effects on violent action tendencies through 
violence support. The significant interaction between violence efficacy and 
nonviolence efficacy in predicting violence support and the significant positive 
correlation between violence support and violent action tendencies (see Table 7) 
suggested a moderated mediation model, where the interaction between violence 
efficacy and nonviolence efficacy has an indirect effect on violent action 
tendencies through its effect on violence support (Model 2, Preacher & Hayes, 
2007). Evidence for this model emerged from the fact that the direct paths from 
violence efficacy and the interaction between nonviolence efficacy and violence 
efficacy to violent action tendencies were weakened by the inclusion of violence 
support as a predictor (Baron & Kenny, 1986) (see Table 8). 
To estimate the conditional indirect effects of our predictors, we used the 
bootstrapping approach recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2007) for 
moderated mediation and used their SPSS macro (“modmed”). This macro 
calculates the Sobel test for conditional indirect effects as well as bootstrap 
confidence intervals. We used 5000 bootstrap samples to generate 95% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence intervals to estimate our conditional indirect 
effects (see Efron, 1987, on the advantage of bias-corrected intervals). An effect 
is considered significant at p < .05 if the values of the estimated effect sizes 
within the 95% confidence interval do not include zero. 
The analyses revealed that the indirect effect of nonviolence efficacy on 
violent action tendencies via violence support did not differ significantly from  
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 Table 8 
Hierarchical Regression Model Predicting Violent Action Tendencies Before and After the Inclusion of Violence Support as a Predictor (Study 6). 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictors b(SE) t(205) b(SE) t(204) 
Perceived Efficacy of Nonviolence -.05 (.08) -.68 -.03 (.07) -.41 
Perceived Efficacy of Violence .70 (.06)*** 12.46 .34 (.08) 4.12 
Perceived Efficacy of Violence x Efficacy of Nonviolence .04 (.02)
+ 
1.81 .03 (.02) 1.16 
Support for Violence   .39 (.07)*** 5.54 
Note. All predictors except for violence support were centred. 
+ 
p < .10; *** p < .001
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zero when violence efficacy was low, point estimate = -.07, CI.95 =  -.21, .02, nor 
when violence efficacy was high, point estimate = .02, CI.95 = -.05, .14. Note, 
however, that these effects were still significantly different from each other, given 
that we had evidence of a moderated mediation model. Although inconclusive, 
the direction of the effects shows the indirect effect of nonviolence efficacy on 
violent action tendencies through violence support was more negative when 
violence efficacy was low than when violence efficacy was high, in line with our 
previous findings
7
.  
In sum, Study 6 extended some of our findings to a first-party perspective, 
using a different real-life context, namely British University students’ fight 
against increases in tuition fees and education budget cuts. As expected, the 
perceived efficacy of violence, overall, positively predicted both support for 
violent collective action and violent collective action tendencies. Contrary to 
expectations, however, nonviolence efficacy showed no relation, overall, with 
violence support nor with violent action tendencies. However, we found 
additional evidence of a significant interaction between the perceived efficacy of 
violence and the perceived efficacy of nonviolence in predicting violence support 
and violent action tendencies, although for the latter the interaction only 
approached conventional levels of statistical significance. Importantly, the pattern 
of this interaction was consistent with our two previous studies: the greater the 
perceived efficacy of violent actions was, the less the perceived efficacy of 
nonviolent actions mattered for deciding whether or not to support violent actions 
                                                 
7
 The analyses also revealed that violence efficacy had a significant positive indirect effect 
on violent action tendencies via violence support both when nonviolence efficacy was high, 
point estimate= .39, CI.95= .20, .59, and when it was low, point estimate= .33, CI.95= .19, 
.49. This indirect effect was somewhat less strong, however, when nonviolence efficacy 
was low. 
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or engage in them, in line with “the gun and the olive branch” moderation 
hypothesis. In fact, when violence efficacy was high, we found no link between 
the perceived efficacy of nonviolent collective action and violence support or 
violent action tendencies. Hence, participants who perceived violent collective 
action to have high efficacy supported these actions and reported tendencies to 
engage in them irrespective of the efficacy of nonviolent actions, which is 
consistent with the idea that violence and nonviolence are viewed as 
complementary strategies. Importantly, the results also support the “nothing to 
lose hypothesis”, since when violence efficacy was low, the perceived efficacy of 
nonviolent collective action negatively predicted violence support and violent 
action tendencies. Although the link with violent action tendencies was only 
significant using a one-tailed test, this is justified by the directionality of our a 
priori hypothesis. Hence, perceiving violent actions to have low efficacy did not 
prevent participants from supporting them or reporting tendencies to engage in 
them when nonviolent actions were perceived to have low efficacy.  
Study 6 also shed some light on the way violence efficacy and 
nonviolence efficacy may impact on violent action tendencies. Indeed we found 
evidence of a moderated mediation model where the indirect effect of 
nonviolence efficacy on violent action tendencies through violence support is 
moderated by violence efficacy. Although the simple indirect effects of 
nonviolence efficacy were not significantly different from zero, the pattern of 
findings was such that the indirect effect of nonviolence efficacy on violent 
action tendencies through violence support tended to be more negative when 
violence efficacy was low than when it was high, which is consistent with the 
pattern of interaction emerging across our studies.  
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Given that our findings were based on correlational data, however, no 
causality can be inferred and alternative explanations cannot be ruled out. To 
remedy this, in Study 7 we tested our hypotheses experimentally, while still using 
a first-party perspective. 
Study 7 
This study used a hypothetical scenario in a national liberation struggle 
context, where participants were instructed to imagine that they belong to a 
country under occupation, after which we manipulated the effectiveness of 
violent and nonviolent means of resistance against the occupation in a 2 x 2 
design (effective or ineffective). The advantage of using a hypothetical scenario 
paradigm is that it allows us to avoid the resistance we are likely to encounter in 
attempting to manipulate experimentally the perceived efficacy of violent and 
nonviolent collective action among group members involved in an actual 
intergroup conflict. Members of groups in conflict are indeed likely to hold well-
formed and deeply-ingrained views about the efficacy of the available means of 
action. Furthermore, the imaginary scenario paradigm allows us to have greater 
control over potential confounds involved in the use of existing conflict 
situations, such as the perceived availability and normativity of certain types of 
collective action and their perceived costs (see Mitchell & Tetlock, 2006 for a 
discussion of the advantages of using hypothetical society paradigms). Imagined 
situations have been shown to influence cognition, affect and behaviour in a 
manner similar to real-life situations (Greenwood, 1989). Examples include the 
creation of a bystander apathy effect through imagining other people (Garcia, 
Weaver, Moskowitz, & Darley, 2002) and improving intergroup attitudes through 
imagined intergroup contact (Crisp & Turner, 2009).  
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Importantly, as in Study 6, in this study we examined both support for 
violent collective action and violent action tendencies. We also extended the 
focus of our enquiry to assess not only attitudinal support for violence, but also 
financial support for violent action, operationalised as financial contributions 
participants would like to make to fund a violent form of collective action. 
Attitudinal and financial support for violent action are both important to examine, 
as providing a climate of acceptance and financial support or protection to groups 
that use violent collective action strategies helps to sustain these groups and their 
activities (Crenshaw, 1995; Gurr, 1998; Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post, & Victoroff, 
2008; Post, 2007; Victoroff, 2005). Further, Mascini (2006) found that 
sympathizers with violent Jihad can play an essential role as propagandists, 
sponsors and potential recruits. Accordingly, we predicted that attitudinal support 
for violence will mediate the effects of violence efficacy and nonviolence 
efficacy on both financial support for violent action and on violent collective 
action tendencies.  
Method 
Participants.  The study was conducted online and was completed by 222 
respondents (111 men, 111 women; age: M = 36.42 years, SD = 13.21). To 
provide an incentive for participation, we offered participants the opportunity to 
enter into a prize draw for Amazon vouchers when they completed the study.  
Design.  Participants read an imaginary scenario where they belonged to a 
fictional country under occupation. They were informed that both violent and 
nonviolent resistance were being used in their country to fight against the 
occupation. The effectiveness of each type of resistance was manipulated using a 
2 (effective/ineffective nonviolence) x 2 (effective/ineffective violence) between-
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subjects factorial design. The experiment consisted of two parts. First, 
participants were informed that nonviolent resistance against the occupation was 
used alone. Its effectiveness was manipulated such that it was either effective or 
ineffective. Measures of support for violence and violent action tendencies were 
then taken. These results, however, are not reported as they are not the focus of 
the present paper. Second, participants were informed that nonviolence continued 
to be used and that it either remained effective or it remained ineffective. Further, 
violence was now also being used, and it was proving to be either effective or 
ineffective. Measures of support for violence and violent collective action 
tendencies were then taken again, and the results are reported in the present 
paper. Hence, nonviolence effectiveness was manipulated twice and we report the 
results of the second manipulation, which was actually stronger, since 
nonviolence was proving to be effective or ineffective for the second time around. 
Further, participants knew that nonviolence had been tried alone at first and had 
yielded the same results. The reason we initially used this design was because we 
were attempting to mimic the manner in which conflicts typically escalate, 
starting with the exclusive or predominant use of nonviolent methods, and 
developing with the use of violence (consistent with the “primacy of 
nonviolence” reasoning). 
Procedure.  The study was advertised on American and British websites 
posting online psychological experiments, as well as through a British rewards-
based online shopping network. It was also advertised through Facebook, 
targeting users aged 18 years or older, living in the United Kingdom, the United 
States of America, Canada or Australia. The study was introduced as a 
social/political psychology study titled “living under occupation”. When clicking 
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on the link, respondents were informed that they would be reading an imaginary 
scenario where they belonged to a country under occupation, and that we were 
interested in how they thought they would act under such circumstances.  
After completing socio-demographic measures, participants started 
reading the scenario. They were asked to imagine that they belonged to an 
underdeveloped nation called Zed, which had come under foreign military 
occupation by a powerful and developed neighbouring democratic country called 
Alpha. Zed had not been able to fight the occupation using its army because it 
was militarily much weaker than Alpha. To ensure that participants had a motive 
to support or engage in collective action, we measured the perceived illegitimacy 
of the occupation.  
The scenario read on that a resistance movement developed among the 
Zed people, whose aim was to achieve liberation by undermining public opinion 
support for the occupation among the Alpha people, as the occupation could not 
be sustained without such support. After completing the first part of the 
experiment which involved the use of nonviolent resistance alone, participants 
read that some time had passed by during which both violence and nonviolence 
had actually been used. They were informed that violence was proving to be 
either effective or ineffective and that nonviolence remained effective or 
remained ineffective. This was followed by manipulation checks. Participants 
subsequently read that several meetings were taking place between Zed’s 
different resistance groups to evaluate the situation and decide on how best to 
continue resisting, and that we would like to get their opinion as Zed citizens on 
this issue. We then measured our dependent variables. 
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As in Study 5, nonviolent collective action was operationalised as 
nonviolent campaigns that included mass protests and mass civil disobedience 
activities, such as general strikes, resisting taxes, boycotting Alpha’s products 
and blocking roads with sit-ins. Violent collective action was operationalised as 
guerrilla resistance, involving attacks against military targets, namely Alpha 
soldiers. The effectiveness of each type of action was manipulated by providing 
participants with feedback about whether nonviolent campaigns or guerrilla 
attacks against Alpha soldiers were proving to be effective or ineffective at 
reducing public opinion support for the occupation among the Alpha people, 
according to independent media analyses and public opinion surveys among the 
Alpha population 
To ensure that the costs involved in the use of a particular type of 
resistance were the same whether it was effective or not, we provided participants 
with feedback about the losses incurred each time one type of resistance was 
used: during nonviolent campaigns some Zed people were beaten, arrested or 
imprisoned. Conversely, some guerrilla members were killed, others were 
captured, tortured, and imprisoned. We also mentioned that several Alpha 
soldiers were killed during Zed guerrilla operations. The costs of violent 
resistance were kept greater than those of nonviolent resistance in order to make 
the scenario more realistic. 
Measures. 
Manipulation and control checks. We used a categorical manipulation 
check. Participants were asked to indicate whether nonviolent campaigns were 
proving to be effective or ineffective at reducing public opinion support for the 
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occupation among the Alpha people. The same manipulation check was used for 
guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers. 
To check the perceived injustice of the occupation, we asked participants 
the extent to which they viewed the occupation as unfair, legitimate (reverse-
coded) and morally wrong, using a nine-point scale numbered from 1 (“not at 
all”) to 9 (“extremely”). The items were averaged to yield an index of perceived 
injustice of the occupation (α = .51).  
Attitudinal support for violent collective action. Participants rated the 
extent to which they supported or opposed the use of guerrilla attacks against 
Alpha soldiers in order to achieve liberation, using an eleven-point scale 
numbered from -5 (“completely oppose”) to +5 (“completely support”), with 0 
labelled “neither support nor oppose”. 
Financial support for violent collective action. Participants were asked to 
assume they had 100 Zed pounds to spare at the end of each month (specified as 
equal to 100 GBP) and that violent and nonviolent resistance operations required 
equal amounts of funding to be carried out. Participants were then asked to 
indicate the amount of money they would like to save for themselves and their 
families, and the amount of money they wished to contribute to help fund a) 
nonviolent campaigns and b) guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers. Note that 
although we refer to this variable as financial support, it is obviously the financial 
contribution participants desire to make to fund each type of collective action. 
Violent collective action tendencies. Participants rated the likelihood that 
they would join a Zed resistance group that engaged in a Zed guerrilla group that 
engaged in attacks against Alpha soldiers, using nine-point scales numbered from 
1 (“not likely at all”) to 9 (“very likely”). 
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Results and Discussion 
Of the initial sample, 24 did not answer the manipulation checks 
correctly, and 12 participants had more than 10% of their data missing, while 
another two participants were outliers in terms of the duration of study 
completion. Their data were thus excluded from the analyses. The final sample 
consisted of 184 participants (89 women, 95 men; age: M = 36.55 years, SD = 
13.04) of various nationalities. English was the native language for 81.5% of our 
participants. For the remaining participants, level of English was intermediate or 
above. 
Missing value analysis.  There were some missing values (< 5% per 
variable) in our dataset. These were imputed using the expectation maximization 
method (EM) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Any imputed values out of the scales’ 
range were adjusted to the nearest score within the scales’ range. 
Manipulation checks.  All participants retained in the final sample 
answered the manipulation checks correctly.  
Perceived injustice. Participants scored significantly higher than the mid-
point scale on the perceived injustice of the occupation (M = 7.8, SD = 1.44; 
minimum score = 3), as indicated by a one-sample t-test, t (183) = 31.27, p < 
.001.  
Experimental analysis.  In the following section we examine the effects 
of the manipulations of nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy on our 
dependent variables, namely attitudinal as well as financial support for violent 
collective action, and violent collective action tendencies. Means and standard 
deviations of attitudinal and financial support for violent action as well as violent 
collective action tendencies, as a function of violence and nonviolence 
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effectiveness are reported in Table 9. Details of these variables across groups and 
a correlation matrix are reported in Table 10. 
Attitudinal Violence support. We conducted a 2 x 2 factorial ANOVA on 
attitudinal violence support, with violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy as 
factors. As expected, we found a significant main effect of violence efficacy, F 
(1, 180) = 19.03; p < .001, η2 = .10, such that participants were more supportive 
of violence when it was effective than when it was ineffective. We also found the 
predicted main effect of nonviolence efficacy, F (1, 180) = 4.32;   p = .04, η2 = 
.02, such that participants were more supportive of violence when nonviolence 
was ineffective than when it was effective. However, unlike in our previous 
studies and consistent with the “independent effects” hypothesis, no interaction 
was found between the two factors, F (1, 180) < 1, ns. 
Financial support for violent collective action. Data screening revealed 
this variable had substantial positive skewness and outliers. A square root 
transformation improved its distribution and successfully reduced the influence of 
outliers. The analyses we report refer to the transformed variable. We conducted 
a 2 x 2 factorial ANOVA on financial support for violence, with violence efficacy 
and nonviolence efficacy as factors. As expected, we found a significant main 
effect of violence efficacy, F (1, 180) = 14.11; p < .001, η2 = .07, such that 
participants were willing to give a greater financial contribution to violent action 
when violence was effective than when it was ineffective. We also found the 
predicted main effect of nonviolence efficacy, F (1, 180) = 4.55; p = .03, η2 = .03, 
such that participants were willing to give a greater financial contribution to 
violent action when nonviolence was ineffective than when it was not. Again, 
however, consistent with the “independent effects” hypothesis, no interaction was
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Table 9  
Violent Collective Action Measures as a Function of Violence Efficacy and Nonviolence Efficacy (Study 7). 
  Low Nonviolence Efficacy High Nonviolence Efficacy 
DV Scale Low Violence 
Efficacy 
High Violence 
Efficacy 
Low Violence 
Efficacy 
High Violence 
Efficacy 
Attitudinal Violence Support -5 to 5 -.67 1.15 -2.04 .46 
  (3.55) (3.33) (2.99) (3.53) 
Financial Violence Support
a 
0 to 100 9.61 23.00  7.83 15.98 
  (15.23) (26.31) (18.67) (20.57) 
Violent Action Tendencies 1 to 9 2.85 4.11 2.24 3.93 
  (2.51) (2.99) (2.10) (3.12) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means.
 
 
a 
Before square root transformation 
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Table 10 
Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Criterion Variables (Study 7) 
 Scale M SD 1 2 3 
1. Attitudinal Support for Violence -5 to 5 -.28 3.54 - .81*** .78*** 
2. Financial Support for Violence
a 
0 to 100 14.10 21.28  - .80*** 
3. Violent Action Tendencies 1 to 9 3.28 2.80   - 
a
 Correlations based on transformed variable  
*** p < .001
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found between the two factors, F (1, 180) < 1, ns. 
Violent collective action tendencies. We conducted a 2 x 2 factorial 
ANOVA on violent action tendencies, with violence efficacy and nonviolence 
efficacy as factors. As expected, we found a significant main effect of violence 
efficacy on violent action tendencies, F (1, 180) = 13.67; p < .001, η2 = .07, with 
participants reporting stronger violent action tendencies when violence was 
effective than when it was ineffective. However, we found no main effect of 
nonviolence efficacy: F (1, 180) < 1; ns. Further, the interaction between the two 
factors was, again, not significant: F (1, 180) < 1, ns.  
Results of all main effects, and simple effect tests or simple slope tests in 
Studies 4-7 are summarized in Table 13 (p. 128-129). 
Mediation and indirect effects analyses.  Next, we investigated whether 
attitudinal support for violence mediates the effects of violence efficacy and 
nonviolence efficacy on financial support for violence and on violent action 
tendencies. To estimate these indirect effects, as in Study 6, we relied on the 
bootstrapping approach recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2008). We used 
their SPSS macro (“indirect”) to produce 5000 random samples in order to 
generate 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals of the estimates of these 
indirect effects. For all mediation analyses, we recoded violence efficacy and 
nonviolence efficacy using effects coding (-1 for ineffective and 1 for effective) 
then regressed the dependent variable of interest on the predictors of interest. 
Indirect effects of nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy on financial 
support for violence. Given that violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy had 
significant effects on attitudinal violence support, and that attitudinal violence 
support was positively correlated with financial violence support (see Table 10), 
we were able to test for mediation. Evidence for mediation emerged from the fact 
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that the effects of nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy on financial 
violence support were weakened by the inclusion of attitudinal violence support 
as a predictor (Baron & Kenny, 1986) (see Table 11). 
We first estimated the indirect effect of nonviolence efficacy, while 
controlling for violence efficacy and the interaction between the two predictors. 
The analysis revealed that nonviolence efficacy had a significant negative indirect 
effect on financial support for violence via attitudinal support for violence, point 
estimate = -.33, CI.95 = -.63, -.02. We then estimated the indirect effect of 
violence efficacy on financial violence support through attitudinal violence 
support, while controlling for nonviolence efficacy and the interaction between 
nonviolence and violence efficacy. This analysis revealed that violence efficacy 
had a significant positive indirect effect on financial support for violence via 
attitudinal violence support, point estimate = .70, CI.95 = .39, 1.03.  
Indirect effects of nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy on violent action 
tendencies. Given that violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy had significant 
effects on attitudinal violence support, and that attitudinal violence support was 
positively correlated with violent action tendencies (see Table 10), we were able 
to test for mediation and indirect effects.  The effect of violence efficacy on 
violent action tendencies was weakened by the inclusion of attitudinal violence 
support as a predictor, which provided evidence of mediation (Baron & Kenny, 
1986) (see Table 12). 
We first estimated the indirect effect of nonviolence efficacy, while 
controlling for violence efficacy and the interaction between the two predictors. 
This analysis revealed that nonviolence efficacy had a significant indirect effect 
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Table 11 
Hierarchical Regression Model Predicting Financial Violence Support Before and After the Inclusion of Attitudinal Violence Support as a Predictor 
(Study 7). 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictors b (SE) t(181) b(SE) t(180) 
Effectiveness of Nonviolence -.43 (.20)* -2.13 -.10 (.12) -.78 
Effectiveness of Violence .75 (.20)*** 3.76 .06 (.13) .46 
Effectiveness of Violence x Effectiveness of Nonviolence -.09 (.20) -.43 -.20 (.13) -1.59 
Attitudinal Support for Violence   .64 (.04)*** 17.46 
*
p < .05; *** p < .001
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on violent action tendencies through attitudinal violence support, point estimate = 
-.32, CI.95 = -.60, -.02. We then estimated the indirect effect of violence efficacy 
on violent action tendencies through attitudinal violence support, while 
controlling for nonviolence efficacy and the interaction between nonviolence and 
violence efficacy. This analysis revealed that violence efficacy had a significant 
positive indirect effect on violent action tendencies via attitudinal violence 
support, point estimate = .66, CI.95 = .35, .97.  
To summarize, Study 7 provided experimental evidence in support of our 
main effects hypotheses in the context of an imaginary national liberation 
struggle from a first-party perspective, but no evidence of an interaction effect. 
Violence efficacy had the predicted main effect on both attitudinal and financial 
support for violence, which were both greater when violence was effective than 
when it was ineffective. The efficacy of nonviolent collective action also had the 
predicted main effect on both attitudinal and financial support for violent 
collective action, which were greater when nonviolence was ineffective than 
when it was effective. However, contrary to our previous studies, we found no 
evidence of an interaction between nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy in 
predicting attitudinal or financial support for violence. The results were thus in 
line with the “independent effects” hypothesis.  
We found mixed results for violent action tendencies. While we found the 
predicted main effect of violence efficacy, with participants showing greater 
tendencies to engage in violent action when violence was effective, there was 
unexpectedly no main effect of nonviolence efficacy, nor was there evidence of 
an interaction effect between nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy.
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Table 12 
Hierarchical Regression Model Predicting Violent Action Tendencies Before and After the Inclusion of Attitudinal Violence Support as a Predictor 
(Study 7). 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Predictors b (SE) t(181) b(SE) t(180) 
Effectiveness of Nonviolence -.20 (.20) -.98 .12 (.13) .91 
Effectiveness of Violence .74 (.20)*** 3.70 .08 (.14) .57 
Effectiveness of Violence x Effectiveness of Nonviolence .11 (.20) .54 .01 (.13) 1.16 
Attitudinal Support for Violence   .61 (.04)*** 15.56 
*** p < .001
  128 
Table 13 
Summary Table of Results (Studies 4-7) 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 
  
Experimental 
Analysis 
Internal 
Analysis 
  
 
Violence 
Support
a 
Violence 
Support 
Violence 
Support
a 
Violence 
Support
a 
Violent Action 
Tendencies
a 
Attitudinal 
Violence 
Support 
Financial 
Violence 
Support 
Violent 
Action 
Tendencies 
Main Effect: 
Violence 
Efficacy 
 
.77 (.06), 
t(206)=12.39, 
.62*** 
F (1,116)<1 
.46 (.11), 
t(116)=4.07, 
.35*** 
.92 (.05) 
t(205)=17.60, 
.80*** 
.70  (.69), 
t(205)=12.46, 
.69*** 
F (1,180) 
=19.03*** 
F (1,180) 
=14.11*** 
F (1,180) 
=13.67*** 
Main effect: 
Nonviolence 
Efficacy 
 
-.31 (.06), 
t(206)=-4.98, 
-.25*** 
F 
(1,116)=1.32 
-.21 (.13),
 
t(116)=-1.65, 
-.14
++ 
-.06 (.07), 
t(205)<1, 
-.04 
-.05 (.08), 
t(205)<1, 
-.04 
F (1,180) 
= 4.32* 
F (1,180) 
= 4.55* 
F (1,180) 
<1 
Interaction  
.11 (.04), 
t(206)=3.04, 
.13** 
F 
(1,116)=1.80 
.15 (.23), 
t(116)=2.67, 
.22** 
.04 (.02), 
t(205)=1.99, 
.07* 
.04 (.02),
 
t(205)=1.81, 
.08
+ 
F (1,180) 
<1 
F (1,180) 
<1 
F (1,180) 
<1 
Simple 
Effects: 
Nonviolence 
Efficacy 
Low 
Violence 
Efficacy 
-.47 (.09), 
t(206)=-5.4, 
-.38*** 
F (1,116) 
=3.11
++
 
-.53 (.16), 
t(116)=-3.41, 
-.36*** 
-.18 (.08), 
t(205)=-2.12, 
-.11* 
-.17 (.09),
 
t(205)=-1.87, 
-.12
+++ 
   
High 
Violence 
Efficacy 
-.14 (.08),
 
t(206)=-1.83, 
-.11
+ 
F (1,116)<1 
.11 (.19), 
t(116)<1, 
.08 
.06 (.10), 
t(205)<1, 
.04 
.06 (.11), 
t(205)<1, 
.05 
   
a
 For correlational analyses, we report unstandardised regression weights first, followed by standard errors in parentheses, t-values, and standardized regression weights. 
+ 
p < .10, two-tailed; * p< .05, two-tailed; ** p< .01, two-tailed; *** p < .001, two-tailed; 
++ 
p < .10, one-tailed; 
+++
p < .05, one-tailed.
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Table 13 Continued 
Summary Table of Results (Studies 4-7) 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 
  
Experimental 
Analysis 
Internal 
Analysis 
  
 
Violence 
Support
a 
Violence 
Support 
Violence 
Support
a 
Violence 
Support
a 
Violent Action 
Tendencies
a 
Attitudinal 
Violence 
Support 
Financial 
Violence 
Support 
Violent 
Action 
Tendencies 
Simple 
Effects: 
Violence 
Efficacy 
Low 
Nonviolence 
Efficacy 
.60 (.49), 
t(206)=6.65, 
.49*** 
F (1,116)<1 
.17 (.17), 
t(116)=1.00, 
.13 
.84 (.08), 
t(205)=10.73, 
.73*** 
.62 (.08), 
t(205)=7.38, 
.61*** 
   
High 
Nonviolence 
Efficacy 
.93 (.07), 
t(206)=12.78, 
.76*** 
F 
(1,116)=2.38 
.76 (.14), 
t(116)=5.35, 
.57*** 
1.00 (.05), 
t(205)=18.55, 
.88*** 
 
.78 (.06), 
t(205)=13.44, 
.78*** 
   
a
 For correlational analyses, we report unstandardised regression weights first, followed by standard errors in parentheses, t-values, and standardized regression weights. 
+ 
p < .10, two-tailed; * p< .05, two-tailed; ** p< .01, two-tailed; *** p < .001, two-tailed; 
++ 
p < .10, one-tailed; 
+++
p < .05, one-tailed.
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Importantly, however, we found evidence of an indirect effect of nonviolence 
efficacy on violent action tendencies through attitudinal support for violence. 
That is, lower efficacy of nonviolence increased support for violence which, in 
turn, increased violent action tendencies. 
Although we found no interaction between nonviolence efficacy and 
violence efficacy in predicting violent collective action measures in this study, 
the main effect of nonviolence efficacy can be generalized to the case where 
violence efficacy is low. Hence, as expected and consistent with the “nothing to 
lose” hypothesis, when violence efficacy was low, nonviolence efficacy did 
negatively predict attitudinal and financial support for violence and, indirectly, 
violent action tendencies. Importantly, nonviolence efficacy had the same effect 
when violence efficacy was high, in line with the idea that there is less value in 
using violence when nonviolence efficacy is high. Nevertheless, nonviolence 
efficacy did not wipe out the main effect of violence efficacy. Hence, violence 
efficacy still increased attitudinal and financial support for violence and violent 
action tendencies, when nonviolence efficacy was high, suggesting that violence 
and nonviolence were viewed as complementary strategies. 
Study 7, like Study 6, highlighted the importance of attitudinal support for 
violence in mediating the process through which violence efficacy and 
nonviolence efficacy impact more behavioural measures of violent action. Indeed, 
the effects of both violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy on financial 
support for violence and on violent action tendencies were mediated by 
attitudinal support for violence. 
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General Discussion 
The aim of the present research was to examine how violent forms of 
collective action are predicted by their perceived efficacy, as well as by the 
perceived (in)efficacy of nonviolent forms of collective action, and the potential 
interaction between the two. We presented the results of four studies that 
examined these relations in different contexts using experimental and 
correlational designs. In the following sections we assess our findings in relation 
to our predictions and suggest directions for future research. We then discuss 
some limitations in our research, after which we turn to the theoretical 
contributions and practical implications of our findings. 
Main Effect of Violence Efficacy on Violent Action 
Based on the expectancy-value theory of behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975) and the well-established finding that nonviolent forms of collective action 
are positively predicted by their perceived efficacy (e.g. van Zomeren, Postmes, 
& Spears, 2008), we expected that the perceived efficacy of violent actions at 
redressing perceived injustices would overall positively predict support for 
violent forms of collective action and violent action tendencies. We found both 
correlational and experimental evidence in support of this hypothesis. 
Specifically, violence efficacy positively predicted violent action in the context of 
third-party support for violent Palestinian resistance among international activists 
(Study 4), in the context of British university students’ fight against planned 
increases in tuition fees (Study 6), and in the context of resistance against an 
imagined foreign occupation of one’s country (Study 7). However, we found 
mixed support for this hypothesis in Study 5, which examined support for armed 
Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation among non-activist third parties 
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after manipulating the efficacy of violent and nonviolent resistance. The main 
effect of violence efficacy on support for violence was not significant in this 
study. This might be due to participants’ own deeply-held views about the 
(in)efficacy of violence, which may have constrained the strength of our 
manipulation. An internal analysis revealed, however, that the perceived efficacy 
of violent collective action was overall positively related with support for 
violence, consistent with our hypothesis.  
Main Effect of Nonviolence Efficacy on Violent Action 
Based on the idea that people are more likely to resort to political violence 
when nonviolent forms of action fail to achieve desired group goals (e.g. Pruitt & 
Gahagan, 1974), and in view of initial empirical support for this idea (Louis et al., 
2011), we expected the perceived efficacy of nonviolent forms of collective 
action to be overall negatively predictive of support for violent action and violent 
action tendencies. We found mixed evidence for our hypothesis. A significant 
negative overall relation between nonviolence efficacy and support for violent 
action emerged in the context of third-party support for violent Palestinian 
resistance among international activists (Study 4). We also found a significant 
main effect of nonviolence efficacy on both attitudinal and financial support for 
violence in the context of resistance against an imagined foreign occupation, as 
well as a significant indirect main effect on violent action tendencies, via 
attitudinal support for violence (Study 7). By contrast, in Study 5, nonviolence 
efficacy had no main effect on support for violent Palestinian resistance among 
non-activist third-parties, while the internal analysis revealed a non-significant 
negative overall trend between the perceived efficacy of nonviolent action and 
support for violent Palestinian resistance. In Study 6, however, no overall 
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relationship was found between nonviolence efficacy and support for violent 
action or violent action tendencies in the context of British University students’ 
fight against increased tuition fees. Hence, we did not find consistent support for 
a negative overall relation between nonviolence efficacy and violence. However, 
as will become clearer in the next section, when no overall relation was found 
between nonviolence efficacy and violent action, we still found an interaction 
between nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy. 
Violence Efficacy as a Moderator of the Link between Nonviolence Efficacy 
and Violence 
A key question in our research was whether the perceived efficacy of 
violent collective action interacts with the perceived efficacy of nonviolent forms 
of collective action in predicting support for violence and violent action 
tendencies. We considered two competing moderation hypotheses. Based on the 
idea that violence is used as a last resort (Pruitt & Gahagan, 1974; Louis et al., 
2011), one possibility was that the greater the perceived efficacy of violence, the 
more impact the efficacy of nonviolence would have on whether or not to pursue 
violent action. We termed this the “primacy of nonviolence” moderation 
hypothesis. On the other hand, based on the idea that violent and nonviolent 
actions need not be mutually exclusive strategies (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008), 
another possibility was that the greater the perceived efficacy of violence, the less 
impact the efficacy of nonviolence would have on whether or not to pursue 
violent action. We termed this “the gun and the olive branch” moderation 
hypothesis. We also considered a third hypothesis, where violence efficacy and 
nonviolence efficacy have independent effects on violent action: the “independent 
effects” hypothesis. 
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We found an interaction between nonviolence efficacy and violence 
efficacy in predicting violence support and violent action tendencies in three 
studies. Consistent with “the gun and the olive branch” hypothesis, nonviolence 
efficacy negatively predicted violence support and violent action tendencies when 
violence efficacy was low, but when violence efficacy was high, nonviolence 
efficacy was not significantly related to violence support and violent action 
tendencies (Studies 4-6). Hence, contrary to the prevalent idea that people give 
primacy to nonviolent means of change, these studies suggest that if violence 
promises to be an effective way of achieving a desired social change goal, people 
would support violent actions and be willing to engage in them even when 
nonviolence is potentially effective. It is important to stress, however, that this 
does not mean that people would only pursue violent action. Instead, it is likely 
that people in this case regard violent and nonviolent actions as complementary 
strategies to be used alongside each other, as a way to maximize the chances of 
achieving the desired social change goal or to achieve it more efficiently.  
The results in Study 7, however, were not consistent with “the gun and the 
olive branch” hypothesis. In line with the “independent effects” hypothesis, 
nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy had significant main effects on 
violence support and on violent action tendencies (although nonviolence efficacy 
had only an indirect effect on the latter), but the two predictors did not interact. 
Hence, greater nonviolence efficacy decreased support for violent action and 
(indirectly) violent action tendencies, even when violence efficacy was high. At 
the same time, however, it should be noted that violence efficacy remained a 
positive predictor of support for violence and (indirectly) of violent action 
tendencies, even when nonviolence efficacy was high. Hence, people were 
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relatively still ready to pursue violent action when it had high efficacy, despite 
the high efficacy of nonviolent action. Importantly, no support for the “primacy 
of nonviolence” hypothesis was found in this study or the others.  
The mixed support for “the gun and the olive branch” hypothesis indicates 
that future research should determine the conditions under which violence 
efficacy and nonviolence efficacy have independent effects on violent collective 
action (as in Study 7), and the conditions under which they interact in “the gun 
and the olive branch” pattern (Studies 4-6). This essentially entails investigating 
why nonviolence efficacy is sometimes equally predictive of violent action 
whether violence efficacy is high or low (Study 7), while at other times it is less 
predictive of violent action when violence efficacy is high (Studies 4-6). What 
distinguishes Study 7 is that participants judged a context where nonviolence had 
first been used alone and proved to be effective or ineffective, then it was used 
alongside violence, and continued to be effective or ineffective, whereas in 
Studies 4-6, participants judged a context where both violent and nonviolent 
forms of action were being pursued in parallel. The presence or absence of a 
history of using nonviolent collective action on its own, or the repeated success or 
failure of nonviolent collective action in Study 7 might have thus yielded 
different results. Future research should investigate this further. 
The lack of support for the “primacy of nonviolence” hypothesis may 
seem intriguing, in light of the widespread norm of using violence as a last resort. 
It is important, however, to point out that our results do not necessarily indicate 
that in response to social or political grievances, people would initiate both 
violent and nonviolent collective action in parallel if they believe both are 
promising, rather than try nonviolent action first and turn to violent action at a 
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second stage, if nonviolence proves to be insufficient (in line with the idea of 
using violence as a last resort). Our findings were indeed all based on contexts 
where both violent and nonviolent collective action had already been initiated. 
Therefore participants who perceived both violent and nonviolent collective 
action as promising strategies had to judge whether or not they would favour the 
continuation of violent collective action. Our research thus helps explain the 
perpetuation of violent action. It is not clear if the same results would be obtained 
for the initiation of violence. Importantly, we found no evidence for the “primacy 
of nonviolence” hypothesis, which assumes that those who view both violent and 
nonviolent action as promising strategies would favour the pursuit of nonviolence 
alone. Instead, our results supported “the gun and the olive branch” hypothesis 
and the “independent effects” hypothesis, indicating that where both violent and 
nonviolent action are in use, people are relatively reluctant to abandon violent 
action if it seems to be effective, even if nonviolent action seems effective as 
well. In order to do a more extensive evaluation of the “primacy of nonviolence” 
hypothesis, however, it is imperative that future research tests whether people 
would be willing to initiate both violent and nonviolent collective action in 
parallel if they viewed both as effective. It may well be that they would opt for 
the use of nonviolent action alone at first before resorting to violence. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that while those who believe that 
nonviolence has high efficacy may not initiate violence even if they think it 
might be effective, there is a chance that others will view nonviolence as 
ineffective and thus initiate violence. Should violence prove to be effective, our 
results suggest that even those who believe that nonviolence is effective may 
then, in relative terms, support violent action and be willing to engage in it 
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(probably alongside nonviolence). In order to map the initiation and development 
of violent action as a function of perceptions of violence and nonviolence 
efficacy, however, it is essential that future research uses longitudinal designs. 
The “Nothing to Lose” Hypothesis 
Importantly, contrary to the idea that people refrain from collective action 
when there is a low chance of improving the status quo (Bandura, 1997; Smith & 
Kessler, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; 
Wright, 2001), we predicted that at low levels of violence efficacy, violent action 
should be negatively predicted by the perceived efficacy of nonviolent actions, 
because when neither violent nor nonviolent actions seem promising, people may 
reason that they have nothing to lose through violent action or hope that violence 
might still help the group in some way by unsettling the status quo (e.g. 
Scheepers et al., 2006; Spears et al., 2011; Tausch et al., 2011). We termed this 
the “nothing to lose” hypothesis. In line with our prediction, consistently across 
all four studies, we found that when the perceived efficacy of violence was low, 
the perceived efficacy of nonviolent forms of collective action negatively 
predicted attitudinal support for violent collective action, but also financial 
support for violence (Study 7). Importantly, these results extended to violent 
action tendencies. In Study 6, nonviolence efficacy negatively and directly 
predicted violence support as well as violent action tendencies (though weakly) 
when violence efficacy was low. Note that the weakness of this effect is not 
surprising or problematic. According to classic attitude-behaviour models in 
psychology (e.g. Ajzen, 1977; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974), intentions are more 
proximal predictors of action than attitudes. Attitudes are indeed considered 
relatively idealistic whereas intentions take more account of practical constraints. 
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For example, in a recent meta-analysis, van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 
(2008) found the relations between the classical antecedents of collective action 
(injustice, identification and efficacy) and nonviolent forms of collective action to 
be strongest for attitudinal measures of collective action and weaker for 
intentions to engage in collective action and behavioural measures. Study 6 also 
found that the effect of nonviolence efficacy on violent action tendencies through 
violence support was moderated by violence efficacy. Although the simple 
indirect effects of nonviolence efficacy on violent action tendencies through 
violence support were not significantly different from zero, there was still a 
negative trend when violence efficacy was low. Furthermore, nonviolence 
efficacy had a significant main effect on violent action tendencies in Study 7, 
independently of violence efficacy, although this effect was indirect via 
attitudinal support for violence. In sum, our studies indicate that the inefficacy of 
nonviolence is linked with stronger violent action tendencies when violence 
efficacy is low, though it is not clear whether this effect is direct or indirect (via 
attitudinal violence support). Future research should thus examine mediators that 
could affect violent action tendencies in ways that cancel out the effect of 
attitudinal support for violence, which may explain the null direct effect of 
nonviolence efficacy in Study 7 (see Hayes, 2009). 
The finding that nonviolence efficacy negatively predicts violent action 
when violence has low efficacy (the “nothing to lose” hypothesis) is important as 
it questions the basis of the traditional view in the literature on efficacy (and 
stability) that collective action would be least likely to occur when the scope for 
change is most restricted (Bandura, 1997; Smith & Kessler, 2004; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). If this view is valid, 
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violent collective action should be least appealing among those who believe that 
both violent and nonviolent strategies have low efficacy. Instead, our results 
show that violence support and violent action tendencies are not at their lowest 
here, but are at their lowest among those who believe violence has low efficacy 
and nonviolence has high efficacy. Our findings are consistent with an emerging 
body of research that suggests greater aggressive or violent group action in 
situations characterized by restricted scope for change (Scheepers et al., 2006; 
Spears, et al., 2011; Tausch, et al., 2011). However, unlike this other research 
which has only considered the effects of the perceived changeability of the status 
quo in general, the present work is the first to consider the independent 
contributions of violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy and their interaction.  
As previously mentioned, however, our results were all based on contexts 
where violent and nonviolent collective actions were already being pursued. One 
could therefore argue that they cannot necessarily be interpreted as evidence that 
people who perceive both violent and nonviolent collective action to have low 
efficacy will necessarily initiate violent action in response to grievances. It may 
be the case that, in line with the traditional view in the literature, people who 
view both violent and nonviolent action to have low efficacy (and thus experience 
the situation as highly stable) would be unlikely to initiate any form of collective 
action. Wright (2001), for example, argues that when disadvantaged group 
members consider their disadvantage to be illegitimate but believe intergroup 
relations to be unchangeable, they are unlikely to take strategic collective action, 
not because they accept the situation, but because they angrily admit that it 
cannot be changed. In his view, the apparent inaction of disadvantaged group 
members results in pluralistic ignorance regarding the extent of opposition to the 
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status quo, which perpetuates inaction despite potentially high private support for 
it. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that at any one point there is likely to 
be variability among group members in their perceptions of the efficacy of 
violent and nonviolent action. Hence, members of a disadvantaged group who 
perceive both violent and nonviolent action to have low efficacy may not initiate 
any collective action, but there may be others who will view violent or nonviolent 
action as effective and will therefore initiate such actions. Importantly, our results 
suggest that if violent and nonviolent action are initiated, those who believe that 
both strategies have low chances of success will then show relative support for 
violence and some willingness to engage in violent action. In order to conduct a 
more extensive evaluation of the “nothing to lose” hypothesis, however, it is 
imperative that future research tests if those who view violent and nonviolent 
action to have low efficacy would initiate violent (or nonviolent) collective 
action. Again, a potentially fruitful direction for future research is to use 
longitudinal designs to map the initiation and development of support for violent 
action and violent action tendencies. 
An important question raised by this finding is whether violent collective 
action in conditions offering little hope for change is strategic. Is it intended to 
improve the circumstance of the group on behalf of whom it is undertaken, or is it 
a reactive outburst to severe frustration that lacks strategic intent (Wright, 2001)? 
Indeed why would there be increased support for violence and violent action 
tendencies in response to the low efficacy of nonviolence, despite the low 
efficacy of violence itself and especially considering the potential costs involved 
in the use of violence and the harm it may do to a group’s image (Scheepers et 
al., 2006)? Although violent action may at times seem to be reactive, it has been 
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argued elsewhere that it can be more strategic than it appears to be (see Reicher, 
Spears & Postmes, 1995; Wright, 2001). Building on Scheepers et al. (2006) and 
Spears et al.’s (2011) “nothing to lose” argument, as well as Masters’ (2004) line 
of reasoning, we argue that violent action in conditions offering little hope for 
change may well be strategic (see also Tausch et al., 2011), because although it 
has low efficacy people may still consider it to be more promising than inaction, 
which would only preserve the status quo
8
. There are various reasons why people 
may think violent action would help, such as influencing wider public opinion, 
building a movement, and winning third parties for the cause (e.g., Hornsey et al., 
2006); perhaps by provoking an extreme counter-action by the opponent (see 
Sedgwick, 2004). Violent action might thus unsettle the status quo and facilitate 
the conditions that could lead to the desired social change in the long run (see 
also Louis & Taylor, 2002; Spears et al., 2011). It is also possible, however, that 
violent action in a situation offering little hope for change is driven by alternative 
motives such as punishment or revenge, where it is intended to inflict harm on the 
perceived perpetrator of the social injustice without necessarily helping to end the 
ongoing perceived injustice. That being said, revenge and punishment may still 
be part of an attempt to impose or restore justice to the moral order, and therefore 
have an (indirect) social change function (Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2010). In light 
of the growing evidence of increased tendencies for aggressive or violent group 
actions in situations offering little scope for change, as shown in our research and 
other studies (Tausch et al., 2011; Spears et al., 2011), it is important that future 
                                                 
8
 Note that this does not preclude the conjoint use of nonviolent action. We measured 
support for nonviolent actions and nonviolent action tendencies in both Studies 6 and 7. 
Levels of nonviolence support and nonviolent action tendencies generally exceeded levels 
of violence support and violent action tendencies, irrespective of the efficacy of each 
action. 
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research investigate the processes underlying this phenomenon (see Spears et al., 
2011, for initial evidence).  
Attitudinal Support for Violent Action as a Mediator 
Like most past research, we have focused on support for violent collective 
action and violent collective action tendencies as dependent measures. While it is 
important to assess actual participation in collective action, behavioural measures 
are rare in the literature given the difficulties of obtaining them (see van 
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), particularly when it comes to violent 
actions. Collective action intentions are, however, good predictors of actual 
participation in collective action (e.g., De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; 
Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Further, our results help shed light on the role 
of attitudinal support for violent action as a predictor of measures that are more 
proximal to actual violent behaviour, such as financial support for violence and 
violent action tendencies. To our knowledge, ours is the first research to explore 
support for violent action as a potential mediator of the effects of a classical 
antecedent of collective action (efficacy) on more behavioural measures of 
violent action. In Study 6 the link between nonviolence efficacy and violent 
action tendencies was mediated through attitudinal support for violence and 
moderated by violence efficacy. In Study 7, both violence efficacy and 
nonviolence efficacy predicted violent action tendencies and financial support for 
violence through attitudinal support for violence. Our findings are thus consistent 
with the view that attitudinal forms of collective action are important to measure 
as they may influence behaviour at a later stage (van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009).  
Support for collective action is indeed considered the first step towards 
participation in collective action: becoming a supporter means becoming part of 
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the mobilization potential (Klandermans, 1997; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; see 
Mascini, 2006). Further, our results underscore the importance of examining 
support for violent action in its own right even if it does not lead to direct 
participation in violent action, because attitudinal support can translate into 
material support for groups that use violent collective action strategies, which can 
help to sustain these groups and their activities (Crenshaw, 1995; Gurr, 1998; 
Kruglanski et al., 2008; Post, 2007; Victoroff, 2005). Nevertheless, it is important 
that future studies test our hypotheses using measures of actual participation in 
violent collective action. 
Limitations 
Like most past research, our research has not distinguished the reasons for 
which collective action might be perceived as potentially effective or ineffective. 
Violent or nonviolent action may be perceived as ineffective because the 
outgroup is seen as unlikely to respond (Bandura, 2000; Wright, 2001) or likely 
to be oppressive towards such action (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Reicher, 2004) or 
because there is a perceived lack of resources to produce action that would get the 
desired response from the outgroup (e.g. lack of social support, see van Zomeren 
et al., 2004). The effect of efficacy perceptions on collective action might differ 
depending on the reasons for efficacy or inefficacy. Future research could 
investigate these possibilities. 
Importantly, our research has also not examined the extent to which 
violent action is predicted by the perceived risk that violent or nonviolent action 
will bring the group further away from their goal. Indeed our studies have only 
measured or manipulated the perceived likelihood that violent or nonviolent 
action will help the group achieve their desired goal, but not the perceived 
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potential counter-productivity of such actions. This is particularly relevant in the 
case of violent collective action, which might antagonise the outgroup, reduce 
third-party support, or provoke violent retributions that weaken the resisting 
group. It is thus imperative that future research complete the picture by 
examining how the perceived counter-productivity of violent action fits in the 
picture. 
It should also be noted that our research has examined only specific 
forms of violent action, namely guerrilla resistance in the context of a 
foreign occupation of a nation as well as destruction of property and 
aggression directed at politicians in the context of student protests. To test 
the generalisability of our results, future research should explore other forms 
of violent action in different contexts, such as violence against civilians, 
especially in light of the current interest in research on terrorism. Further, 
while the current paper has focused exclusively on violent collective action, 
future research should also examine how violence efficacy and nonviolence 
efficacy influence support for and tendencies to engage in nonviolent 
collective action, in order to complete the picture. As established by 
previous research (van Zomeren, et al., 2008), support for and tendencies to 
engage in nonviolence should be positively predicted by nonviolence 
efficacy, but future research could explore the role of violence efficacy in  
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this equation
9
. 
Contributions and Implications of the Present Research 
Despite the limitations of the present research we believe it extends the 
literature on efficacy and collective action in several important ways. By 
investigating the role of efficacy in predicting violent forms of collective action, 
our research answers recent calls to move beyond the predominant focus on 
predictors of nonviolent collective action (Wright, 2009). To our knowledge, the 
present research is the first to examine how the perceived efficacy of violent 
forms of collective action relates to support for such actions and tendencies to 
engage in them. Given that political violence is the focal outcome of much 
theoretical and societal interest, it does seem important to take into account its 
perceived efficacy as a motivating factor. The present research also contributes 
some rare quantitative evidence to the much hypothesized link between the 
perceived efficacy of nonviolence and violent action. Moreover, it goes beyond 
existing data (e.g. Louis et al., 2011) by testing the interaction between violence 
efficacy and nonviolence efficacy.  
Based on the idea that violence is used a last resort, previous research 
showing a negative link between nonviolence efficacy and support for violence 
emphasizes the importance of increasing perceptions of the efficacy of nonviolent 
forms of collective action in order to minimize violent action (e.g. Louis et al., 
                                                 
9
 We measured support for nonviolent actions and nonviolent action tendencies in both 
Studies 6 and 7. As expected, nonviolence efficacy positively predicted support for 
nonviolent actions and nonviolent action tendencies in both studies. The results, however, 
were inconsistent with regard to the role of violence efficacy. In Study 7, we found no link 
between violence efficacy and attitudinal or financial support for nonviolent action or 
nonviolent action tendencies. In Study 6, however, we found a significant interaction 
between violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy in predicting nonviolence support, such 
that violence efficacy negatively predicted nonviolence support when nonviolence efficacy 
was low, but not when it was high. Conversely, violence efficacy positively predicted 
nonviolent action tendencies. No interaction between nonviolence efficacy and violence 
efficacy was found in predicting nonviolent action tendencies. 
    
 146 
2011). Our research shows, however, that in contexts where both violent and 
nonviolent action are in use, if people believe that violent action will contribute to 
redressing a perceived injustice, increasing the perceived efficacy of nonviolence 
may have little effect in reducing support for violence or tendencies to engage in 
it, or, at least it may not maximally reduce them. Instead, in circumstances where 
both violence and nonviolence are perceived to work, people seem to opt for “the 
gun and the olive branch” strategy, whereby violence is pursued alongside 
nonviolence. It is likely that conflicts where both armed and nonviolent resistance 
are used in parallel, such as in Burma, Chile, the Philippines and Nepal (Dudouet, 
2008), reflect underlying beliefs in the efficacy of both strategies. Such beliefs 
also seem to underlie the “ArmaLite and ballot box” strategy used by the Irish 
Republican Army (see Hayes & McAllister, 2005), exemplified by Sinn Fein’s 
organiser saying at the party’s conference in 1981: “Who here really believes we 
can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a 
ballot paper in this hand and an ArmaLite in the other, we take power in Ireland?” 
(cited in English, 2003; pp 224-225). 
It is important to emphasize, however, that our research does not imply 
that influencing perceptions of the efficacy of nonviolent forms of collective 
action has no effect on violence where both violent and nonviolent collective 
action are used. Our results clearly show that as long as people do not have high 
hopes that nonviolent strategies can help resolve an ongoing perceived social 
injustice, reducing the perceived efficacy of violence will not lead to maximal 
reduction in support for and willingness to engage in violence. Maximal 
reduction of violent forms of collective action is thus most likely to be achieved 
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by reducing the perceived efficacy of violent actions but also by increasing the 
perceived efficacy of nonviolent actions.  
Another important contribution of the present research is that it provides 
data on support for violent action from a third-party perspective. On one hand, 
the operationalisation of violent collective action in the first two studies as third-
party sympathizers’ support for violent collective action taken by a disadvantaged 
group might be viewed as a potential limitation. One might question the extent to 
which this is an adequate proxy for studying attitudinal support for violent action 
among disadvantaged group members themselves. However, we tested our 
hypotheses using both a third-party and a first-party perspective, and found 
relatively consistent results. This is in line with the idea that collective action can 
be better conceptualised as the expression of a group identity defined by a shared 
opinion on a particular issue, rather than identities based on objectively defined 
social categories (e.g. gender, national or religious categories) (McGarty et al., 
2009; see also Bliuc et al., 2007). It is also consistent with recent findings that 
classical predictors of (nonviolent) collective action differ among advantaged 
group members and disadvantaged group members in degree rather than in kind 
(Sweetman et al., 2011). Nevertheless, our research does not directly compare 
predictors of third-party and first-party support for violent action, and future 
research would do well to test this directly. Importantly,  the data we provide on 
third-party perspectives contributes novel and interesting insights to the 
burgeoning literature on the dynamics operating between groups involved in an 
intergroup conflict and the wider social context in which this conflict takes place 
(Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subasic et al., 2008). Understanding how third-
parties view the collective actions of other groups is particularly relevant in an era 
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characterized by an unprecedented level of interconnectedness among nations, 
where global networks of communication offer new opportunities for world 
opinion to influence intergroup struggles. Third-party support for violent forms of 
action by another group is also important to study in its own right because it can 
translate into behavioural support for violent action. In an analysis of global 
trends in international support for insurgent movements, Byman, Chalk, Hoffman 
et al. (2001) demonstrated the importance of various forms of material and non-
material support by international non-state actors in creating and sustaining 
guerrilla movements and terrorist groups. Our research thus helps shed light on 
the predictors of such support and points out ways in which groups engaged in 
violent resistance can frame the efficacy of different strategies in order to shape 
third-party support for their actions.  
Conclusion 
The present research examined the unexplored link between violent 
collective action and its perceived efficacy, as well as the much hypothesized link 
between violent action and the perceived (in)efficacy of nonviolent collective 
action, on which quantitative data is largely lacking. Importantly, it also explores 
how nonviolence efficacy may interact with violence efficacy in predicting 
violent collective action. Taken together, our results suggest that in order to exert 
a maximum influence on inclinations toward violent collective action, it is 
important to influence the perceived efficacy of both violent and nonviolent 
actions. 
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CHAPTER 4: General Discussion 
In the present chapter I review the main findings of my thesis, starting 
with solidarity-based action, moving on to violent forms of collective action. For 
each section, I summarize my findings, discuss their implications and suggest 
avenues for future research. Within each section, I also point out some ways in 
which the two separate lines of investigation I have followed in this thesis can be 
connected in future research. 
Solidarity-Based Collective Action 
Why do citizens around the world regularly take collective action to 
defend the rights of groups less fortunate than them, such as asylum seekers, 
immigrant workers, people involved in liberation struggles against ruthless 
dictatorships, or attacks from other countries? In this thesis I examined 
some of the predictors of tendencies to engage in solidarity-based collective 
action among bystander group members. My investigation aimed to expand 
the dual pathway model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2004), 
which looks at anger and perceived group efficacy as two distinct but 
complementary pathways to collective action. I reported the results of three 
surveys examining efficacy-based considerations and prosocial emotions as 
predictors of solidarity-based collective action tendencies. These looked 
specifically at intentions to demonstrate for the Palestinian cause among 
pro-Palestinian protesters in Britain (Study 1), and intentions to attend the 
June 4
th
 vigil in Hong Kong among a sample of pro-democracy protesters 
(Study 2) and a sample of internet users (Study 3) in Hong Kong itself. Next 
I review the main findings of this research. 
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Moral Outrage, Sympathy and Empathy.   
Previous research on intergroup helping has focused on the role of 
group-based sympathy in promoting solidarity-based action (e.g. Iyer & 
Ryan, 2009), rather than the role of empathy. Further, research that has 
explored empathy did not distinguish it from sympathy (e.g. Pagano & Huo, 
2007). Recent models on prosocial emotions and intergroup helping suggest, 
however, that the distinction between sympathy and empathy may be 
important. In particular, Thomas et al. (2009) propose that empathy should 
be more likely than sympathy to promote intergroup helping aimed at 
addressing the root cause of the disadvantage and thus achieving social 
change. These authors argue that this should occur because empathy 
involves feeling with the disadvantaged group, and thus entails a feeling of 
interchangeability between the empathizing group and the disadvantaged 
group, and plausibly a re-categorisation into a common superordinate 
category. Conversely, sympathy is an other-focused emotion which involves 
feeling sorry for the disadvantaged. It rests on a salient distinction between 
the disadvantaged group and the sympathizing group. As such, it should be 
more likely to prompt efforts to provide relief for the suffering of the victim 
(e.g. humanitarian assistance; see Pagano & Huo, 2007) but not necessarily 
efforts to achieve social change. 
To test these arguments, I expanded the emotion-based pathway of 
the dual pathway model of collective action, and tested the unique 
predictive powers of three prosocial emotions, namely sympathy and (felt) 
empathy, along with moral outrage (equivalent to anger), which has been 
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shown to be one of the most important predictors of intergroup helping 
aimed at social change (see Thomas et al., 2009, for a review).  
Across Studies 1-3, moral outrage in response to the perceived 
injustice of governmental policies toward a disadvantaged group emerged as 
a positive predictor of tendencies to engage in protests/rallies in solidarity 
with that group. This finding confirms the important role of moral outrage in 
intergroup helping, which has previously been shown (see Thomas et al., 
2009, for a review).  
The results of Studies 1-3 were, however, inconclusive regarding the 
role of sympathy. While sympathy emerged as a positive predictor in Study 
1, it was not a significant predictor in Studies 2 or 3. The unreliability of 
sympathy as an emotional predictor in the context of solidarity-based action 
mirrors previous findings, where sympathy was sometimes predictive (e.g. 
Thomas, 2005) and sometimes not (e.g. Montada & Schneider, 1989). 
Although this thesis does not provide a data-based explanation for this 
inconsistency, the results add weight to the empirical basis for questioning 
the power of sympathy to predict intergroup helping aimed at achieving 
social change (Pagano & Huo, 2007; Thomas et al., 2009). Importantly, 
Studies 2 and 3 revealed that empathy is a unique and positive predictor of 
solidarity-based action tendencies, supporting Thomas et al.’s (2009) 
argument. Studies 2 and 3 thus provide the first piece of evidence that 
empathy has a unique effect on intergroup helping intentions. Overall, these 
findings suggest that the distinction between sympathy and empathy is 
important and merits further investigation. 
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Efficacy-Based Considerations 
To explore the role of efficacy considerations in solidarity-based 
collective action, I proposed a novel organising framework for the different 
types of efficacy put forth by Hornsey et al. (2006), by distinguishing 
between perceptions of political efficacy and of identity consolidation 
efficacy. Political efficacy is defined as the perceived potential of collective 
action to achieve social change, which is the classical definition of efficacy 
in the literature (see Hornsey et al., 2006). Identity consolidation efficacy is 
defined as the potential of collective action to express, assert and strengthen 
the identity of a social movement (derived from work by Klein et al., 2007). 
It is operationalised as the efficacy of collective action at influencing public 
opinion, building an oppositional movement and expressing what the 
movement stands for. Studies 1-3 show that this distinction is empirically 
valid, and that these two types of efficacy are positively related.  
In line with the idea that identity consolidation provides the basis for 
social power (e.g. Klein et al., 2007), I expected identity consolidation 
efficacy to predict collective action tendencies positively and indirectly via 
political efficacy. Studies 1 and 3 supported this hypothesis. These studies 
thus help identify a novel predictor of political efficacy, namely identity 
consolidation efficacy. This is important given that (perceived) political 
efficacy has been shown to be a powerful antecedent of collective action 
(van Zomeren et al., 2008).  
Considering that identity consolidation can be a goal of social 
identity performance in its own right (Klein et al., 2007), I also expected 
identity consolidation efficacy to positively and directly predict collective 
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action. Studies 1-3 supported this hypothesis, although this link was only 
marginally significant in Studies 2 and 3. Taken together, these findings, 
which emerged in different contexts, suggest that there is value in 
distinguishing political efficacy from identity consolidation efficacy as the 
latter can be a unique motivator of collective action. 
Implications and Future Directions 
This thesis extends a recent integrative model of collective action 
(van Zomeren et al., 2004) and contributes to our understanding of an 
under-investigated area in collective action research, namely solidarity-
based collective action among bystander group members. The studies 
reported provide clues to some of the prosocial emotions implicated in 
solidarity-based collective action. The exploration of feelings of sympathy 
and empathy answers recent calls to investigate a wider array of emotional 
predictors of collective action (Wright, 2009). The studies reported also 
shed light on the role of different types of efficacy-based considerations in 
collective action, thus helping to broaden the repertoire of motives 
traditionally explored in collective action research (Wright, 2009).  
From an applied perspective, these findings may help inform 
attempts to promote collective action in solidarity with a disadvantaged 
group involved in a protracted struggle, such as the fight for democracy in 
China and the fight for Palestinian liberation. The results confirm the 
importance of eliciting moral outrage in relation to the disadvantage of a 
group, and suggest that eliciting empathy with that group would also be 
useful. Moreover, the results suggest that highlighting the role of collective 
action at affirming, expressing and building the identity of a movement can 
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be helpful. This could raise the perceived political efficacy of such action 
and thus make participation more appealing, but it may also motivate 
collective action independently. 
There are various potential avenues for future work to extend the 
present findings. Starting with the emotion-based pathway, given the 
inconsistent findings regarding the role of sympathy, it is imperative that 
future studies investigate potential moderators of the link between sympathy 
and solidarity-based action. One potential moderator is the type of 
solidarity-based action. Thomas et al. (2009) distinguish between actions 
aimed at producing social cohesion with the disadvantaged group, which, 
however, might ultimately preserve the status quo, and actions aimed at 
producing social change. Similarly, Pagano and Huo (2007) distinguish 
between actions aimed at providing comfort and help to relieve the suffering 
of the disadvantaged group, such as humanitarian assistance, and 
preventative actions aimed at preventing the injustice against the 
disadvantaged group from recurring, by targeting the offender group. 
Thomas et al. (2009) and Pagano and Huo (2007) argue that sympathy, with 
its focus on the disadvantaged group (rather than the offender group), 
should be more predictive of social cohesion-oriented actions or 
humanitarian assistance-type actions, rather than social change-oriented 
actions or preventative actions. Future research could thus test this idea by 
simultaneously examining sympathy’s link to these different types of 
actions. Researchers could also examine empathy’s link to these different 
actions. 
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It could be argued, however, that the type of solidarity-based action 
might not be the crucial moderator. After all, Studies 1-3 examined the link 
between sympathy and intentions to participate in solidarity-based actions 
which on the surface seem to be of the same type (rallies). Yet, no 
consistent link between sympathy and these actions emerged. This raises the 
possibility that it is participants’ own perceptions of the type of solidarity-
based action that might moderate the link between sympathy and solidarity-
based action tendencies. That is, sympathy might positively predict 
intentions to attend a solidarity-based action among those who perceive that 
action to be aimed at producing social cohesion or providing humanitarian 
assistance to the disadvantaged group, but not among those who perceive 
that action to be aimed at social change. This may be the case especially for 
actions which can potentially be classified into more than one type, that is, 
as social change-oriented action or as social cohesion-oriented action. 
Rallies such as those that we examined (protests, vigils) could, for example, 
be classified into either category.  
Hence, it is possible that sympathy positively predicted intentions to 
attend future protests for the Palestinian cause in Study 1 because most 
participants perceived such actions to be primarily targeted at showing 
support for the Palestinian population rather than ending the occupation, 
which classifies these protests as social cohesion-oriented actions. 
Conversely, it is possible that sympathy did not predict intentions to attend 
the June 4
th
 vigil in Studies 2 and 3 because the majority of participants 
perceived the vigil to be targeted primarily at the Chinese government rather 
than at the victims of the Tiananmen massacre, which classifies the vigil as 
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a social change-oriented action. Indeed the slogans used for the vigil that 
year focused mostly on reversing the Chinese government’s stance and 
democratizing China rather than showing support for the Tiananmen 
Mothers for example. Future work should thus assess perceptions of the 
type of solidarity-based action as a potential moderator of the link between 
sympathy and solidarity-based action. Note that empathy could relate to 
both social cohesion-oriented actions as well as social-change oriented 
actions, but researchers should test whether the perceived type of solidarity-
based action moderates the link between empathy and such action. 
Future work should also measure empathy more elaborately than 
was done in Studies 2 and 3. While I focused on the affective component of 
empathy, researchers could look at the cognitive component of empathy as 
well, that is, the extent to which participants can put themselves in the shoes 
of the disadvantaged group and understand their views of the situation. 
Experiments could manipulate perspective-taking (e.g. Batson, 1991), which 
is one of the cognitive components of empathy, and measure subsequent 
feelings of both sympathy and empathy and resulting tendencies to engage 
in different forms of solidarity-based action. Feelings of empathy could be 
measured by calculating the congruence between the emotions participants 
believe the disadvantaged group is experiencing in relation to their situation 
(e.g. anger, contempt, fear toward the perpetrator group) and participants’ 
own experience of such emotions (see Finlay & Stephan, 2000, for a similar 
measurement of feelings of empathy). This could help identify which 
empathic emotions predict which types of solidarity-based action.   
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With regard to the efficacy-based pathway, future research should 
extend our findings by experimentally testing the causal role of identity 
consolidation efficacy in predicting collective action tendencies, and the 
mediating role of political efficacy. It is also essential that future research 
investigates potential moderators of the paths from political efficacy and 
identity consolidation efficacy to collective action. Political efficacy indeed 
did not predict collective action in Study 2 and the direct path from identity 
consolidation efficacy to collective action tendencies was marginally 
significant in Studies 2 and 3. One obvious candidate for moderation is 
politicized identification (van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008), which has 
been found to weaken the link between group efficacy and collective action. 
Researchers can thus explore a model where politicized identification 
facilitates identity consolidation efficacy, and moderates the link between 
political efficacy and collective action. Since politicized identification is one 
of the three important classical antecedents of collective action, alongside 
efficacy and felt injustice, it is imperative that future work explores the role 
of politicized identification in our model in order to provide a more 
complete account of solidarity-based action. Relatedly, future research 
should integrate our model with the social identity predictors which Reicher 
et al. (2006) argue are involved in intergroup helping, such as the degree of 
inclusion of the disadvantaged group within a common ingroup identity, 
perceptions of intergroup helping as a norm of the ingroup, and perceiving 
intergroup helping to serve the interests of the ingroup. 
It should be noted that Studies 1-3 focused on the efficacy of 
collective action at consolidating the identity of the social movement as a 
    
 158 
whole. Wright (2009), however, remarks that collective action may be 
motivated by the desire to express personal values (van Stekelenburg et al., 
2009) or sacred group values (van Zomeren & Spears, 2009). Similarly, 
Klein et al. (2007) propose that social identity performance can serve to 
consolidate the identity of a group against other groups, but also the identity 
of an individual within a group. Future research should therefore consider 
the efficacy of collective action at consolidating individuals’ identities 
within the movement or in a larger social context. 
Further, although the distinction between identity consolidation 
efficacy and political efficacy is based on theoretical grounds and was 
empirically supported in this thesis, future research might explore a more 
complex factor structure, namely a hierarchical factor structure with identity 
consolidation efficacy and political efficacy as higher order factors, and 
efficacy at influencing public opinion, expressing views and building a 
movement as lower-order factors under identity consolidation efficacy. 
These lower-order factors might indeed relate differently to political 
efficacy and to collective action. 
The distinction between identity consolidation efficacy and political 
efficacy can be used to explore the perceived efficacy of a range of 
nonviolent and violent collective action tactics. This can potentially help 
explain preferences for one tactic over another. One could, in any particular 
intergroup conflict, generate a profile for each collective action form in 
terms of its perceived political efficacy but also in terms of its perceived 
identity consolidation efficacy, which could be further broken down into its 
perceived efficacy at influencing public opinion, building a mass movement 
    
 159 
and expressing a political or moral stance. Collective action tactics can then 
be compared based on these dimensions, and differences can be used to 
explain preferences for one tactic over another. 
Finally, the distinction between identity consolidation efficacy and 
political efficacy can also be used as an organizing framework for studying 
the actual efficacy of different forms of collective action rather than their 
perceived efficacy. Louis (2009a) has recently called on collective action 
researchers to examine the outcomes of collective action, not only for 
individual participants for also for the broader social system. Future work 
could thus study the actual political efficacy and identity consolidation 
efficacy of different collective action tactics, by studying, for example, how 
effective they really are at influencing outgroups and policy-makers, as well 
as how effective they are at influencing public opinion, communicating 
particular stances and building a mass movement. 
Violent Forms of Collective Action 
The second line of investigation in this thesis sought to shed light on some 
of the predictors of violent forms of collective action, which have been largely 
neglected in the collective action literature (Wright, 2009). Recent research 
(Tausch et al., 2011) has identified group efficacy as a negative predictor of 
violent collective action aimed at redressing perceived injustices, but has not 
distinguished the perceived (political) efficacy of violent and nonviolent actions. 
Further, research looking at the relation between the perceived efficacy of 
nonviolence and inclinations toward political violence has neglected the role of 
violence efficacy (Louis, 2011). Studies 4-7 thus tried to address this gap by 
examining how violent forms of collective action are predicted by their perceived 
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efficacy, as well as by the perceived (in)efficacy of nonviolent forms of collective 
action, and the potential interaction between the two. Note that efficacy here 
refers to political efficacy rather than identity consolidation efficacy.  
In Chapter 3, I reported the results of a survey (Study 4) and an 
experiment (Study 5) examining third-party support for violent (or armed) 
Palestinian resistance, another survey examining violence support and violent 
action tendencies in the context of British university students’ campaign against 
increased tuition fees (Study 6) and an experiment examining support for armed 
resistance and tendencies to engage in such resistance against an imaginary 
foreign occupation (Study 7). Both Studies 5 and 7 manipulated the efficacy of 
nonviolent and armed resistance. Next I review the main findings of this research. 
“The Gun and the Olive Branch” Moderation 
Overall, Studies 4-7 show that people are more inclined to pursue violent 
action the more effective they perceive it to be, after controlling for the perceived 
efficacy of nonviolence. Interestingly, however, the relationship between 
nonviolence efficacy and violent action is not consistently negative. Instead, in 
some contexts, as shown in Studies 4-6, this relationship is moderated by the 
perceived efficacy of violence. More specifically, perceptions of nonviolence 
efficacy tend to lose their tempering influence on violent action the more 
effective people perceive violence to be. I termed this “the gun and the olive 
branch” moderation, as it suggests that people are relatively reluctant to abandon 
violence if it seems effective, even if nonviolent action seems effective as well. 
Instead, they may be likely to pursue both violent and nonviolent strategies, 
hence the gun and the olive branch appellation. At other times, however, as 
shown in Study 7, nonviolence efficacy has a main effect on violent action that is 
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not moderated by violence efficacy (supporting what I termed the “independent 
effects” hypothesis). Nevertheless, the main effect of violence efficacy found in 
that context means that people were, to some degree, still more inclined to pursue 
violent action the more effective it was, even if nonviolence was proving to be 
effective as well.  Hence, these studies suggest that in a context where both 
violent and nonviolent means of action are in use, if people perceive violence to 
be a promising way to fight an injustice, they would be relatively inclined toward 
violent action even when nonviolence is potentially effective. Note that this does 
not preclude the simultaneous use of nonviolence. 
What is interesting and important about this finding is that it runs counter 
to the prevalent idea that people give primacy to nonviolent means and use 
violence only as a last resort. The results potentially suggest that where both 
violent and nonviolent action are effective, people may regard them as 
complementary strategies to be used alongside each other, probably as a way to 
maximize the chances of achieving the desired social change goal or to achieve it 
more efficiently. This may help explain why people sometimes pursue both 
violent and nonviolent strategies in some conflicts, such as in the South African 
struggle against apartheid. Naturally, further research is needed to investigate 
what moderates these effects. However, the results potentially imply that in 
contexts where both violent and nonviolent action are in use, increasing the 
perceived efficacy of nonviolence may have little effect in reducing support for 
violence or tendencies to engage in it if people believe that violent action will 
contribute to redressing the perceived injustice.  
It remains unclear, however, in what contexts the effect of nonviolence 
efficacy on violent action is moderated by violence efficacy (Studies 4-6) and in 
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what contexts nonviolence efficacy and violence efficacy have independent 
effects (Study 7). Future research should therefore seek to uncover potential 
moderators of this interaction. I have suggested that one possible avenue to 
pursue is to manipulate the presence or absence of a history of using nonviolent 
collective action on its own, or to change the efficacy of nonviolent collective 
action over time, as these seem to be the two main distinguishing factors between 
Study 7 on one hand and Studies 4-6 on the other. 
It is worth reiterating here a disclaimer I made in Chapter 3. My findings 
should not be interpreted as signifying that people would necessarily initiate both 
violent and nonviolent collective action in parallel if they believe both are 
promising, instead of trying nonviolent action first and then turning to violent 
action at a second stage, should nonviolence be deemed unsuccessful (following 
the primacy of nonviolence principle). All studies examining violent action in this 
thesis were based on contexts where both violent and nonviolent collective 
actions were in use. These studies therefore indicate that participants who 
perceived both violent and nonviolent collective action as promising strategies 
show relative support for the continuation of violent collective action. We cannot 
state with confidence whether these findings extend to the initiation of violent 
action as well, or only to its continuation. It is thus important that future research 
investigates how perceptions of violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy 
influence the initiation of violent collective action. This may be more easily 
achieved by studying a context where a disadvantage is freshly imposed and by 
using a longitudinal design to map out the initiation and perpetuation of violent 
action over time.  
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The “Nothing to Lose” Effect 
Of primary importance in this thesis is the finding, across Studies 4-7, that 
nonviolence efficacy negatively predicts violent support when violence has low 
efficacy. That is, the perceived inefficacy of nonviolence leads to greater 
attitudinal, as well as financial support for violent action even if violence itself is 
seen to have low efficacy. Studies 6 and 7 also showed that nonviolence efficacy 
negatively predicts violent action tendencies, when violence has low efficacy. 
This effect, however, was either weak (Study 6) or indirect (Studies 6 and 7) via 
attitudinal support for violence. Nevertheless, these results are consistent with 
what I termed the “nothing to lose” hypothesis (following Scheepers et al., 2006), 
which posits that people resort to aggressive forms of group action when there is 
little chance to improve the status quo (for instance when neither violence nor 
nonviolence seem promising). 
The significance of this finding is that it challenges the traditional view in 
the literature on efficacy (and stability) that people refrain from collective action 
when there is a low chance of improving the status quo (Bandura, 1997; Smith & 
Kessler, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van Zomeren, et al., 2008; Wright, 2001). 
If this were the case, we should have found violent collective action to be least 
attractive among those who believe that neither violent nor nonviolent strategies 
are likely to work. Instead, we find violence support and violent action tendencies 
to be at their lowest among those who believe violence has low efficacy and 
nonviolence has high efficacy. While there is a growing body of evidence 
suggesting that situations characterized by restricted scope for change lead to 
greater aggressive or violent group action (Scheepers et al., 2006; Spears, et al., 
2011; Tausch, et al., 2011), this work has so far only considered the association 
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between violent action and the general likelihood of achieving social change. 
This thesis presents the first evidence showing that violence can have relative 
appeal even when it has low efficacy, if nonviolence is also seen to have low 
efficacy.  
However, the same cautionary note made earlier applies here as well: the 
present work ultimately looks at the perpetuation rather than the initiation of 
violence. Again, future research would do well to investigate evidence for the 
“nothing to lose” hypothesis by examining violence initiation rather than merely 
violence maintenance. While further research is needed to investigate moderators 
of the “nothing to lose” effect, the results potentially imply that in contexts where 
both violent and nonviolent action are in use, rendering violent action ineffective 
will not eliminate violence, because as long as people do not have high hopes that 
nonviolent strategies can help resolve an ongoing perceived social injustice, they 
will pursue violence if it is possible to do so.  
Evidence in support of the “nothing to lose” hypothesis is important given 
the paucity of quantitative data on the relation between nonviolence efficacy and 
violent action. It has been proposed that people engage in violent acts such as 
terrorist attacks despite their seemingly low chance of working, because they 
have no other option, that is, because nonviolence has low efficacy. However, 
evidence in support of this hypothesis has been mostly qualitative (Masters, 2004; 
Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003; Soibelman, 2004; see Louis et al., 2011 for an 
exception). This thesis provides the first quantitative evidence for this proposition 
on a micro-level analysis, that is, by examining individual perceptions of violence 
and nonviolence efficacy and individual tendencies to support or engage in 
violence. While we only examined views of armed struggle and violent protests, 
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it is important for future research to explore whether our effects can be replicated 
using other forms of violence such as acts of terrorism targeting civilians. 
Following the principle of proportionality, it is unlikely that people would adopt 
extreme forms of violent action when less extreme ones are available and have 
not been tried. Future research could thus explore how the perceived (in)efficacy 
of nonviolent forms of action and the perceived (in)efficacy of moderately violent 
forms of action influence support for and tendencies to engage in more extreme 
forms of political violence. 
An important question left unaddressed in this thesis concerns the 
mechanism or reasoning underlying the “nothing to lose” effect: why do people 
show relative support for violent action when neither violent nor nonviolent 
action are likely to work? Future research should attempt to uncover the 
motivations for this behaviour. I have suggested that violent action in conditions 
offering little hope for change may well be serving strategic goals. For example, 
people may reason that taking action holds more promise for changing the status 
quo compared to doing nothing; there is thus “nothing to lose” by trying 
(Masters, 2004; Scheepers et al., 2006; Spears et al., 2011; Tausch et al., 2011). 
People may also pursue violent action in such desperate circumstances in the 
hope that it might attract attention, influence public opinion, win third parties to 
the cause, and as such, help consolidate the identity of the group or movement 
behind the struggle. Future research should therefore examine the role of the 
perceived identity consolidation efficacy of violent actions in attempting to 
understand the “nothing to lose” effect. 
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The Importance of Attitudinal Support for Violence 
Another noteworthy finding in this thesis is that attitudinal support for 
violent action was found to play the role of an intervening variable between 
violence efficacy and nonviolence efficacy on one hand, and more proximal 
measures of support for violent action and participation in violent action on the 
other hand, namely financial support for violence and violent action tendencies. 
This adds some empirical weight to the view that there is value in studying 
attitudinal forms of collective action because they may influence behavioural 
tendencies and ultimately behaviour, at a later stage (van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009), 
be it in terms of offering material support for collective action or actually 
participating in it. That being said, it is important that future research looks at 
actual violence support and actual participation in violence where possible, 
although this may be a challenging task due to ethical concerns and given the 
typically clandestine nature of violent actions. 
Third Party Support for Armed Resistance 
The findings in this thesis also help shed light on the determinants of third 
parties’ views of violent forms of collective action (Studies 4-5). For groups 
involved in asymmetrical power struggles, the ability to gain and maintain 
support from third parties for their resistance is of paramount importance for the 
achievement of their goals precisely because of the severe power asymmetry 
inherent in such conflicts (Simon & Stürmer, 2001). Although the use of armed 
resistance is arguably more likely to attract third parties’ attention to the plight of 
the disadvantaged, recent research suggests that gaining the sympathy of third 
parties is more difficult when a disadvantaged group uses violent resistance 
compared to when they use nonviolent resistance (Vandello, Michniewicz, & 
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Goldschmied, 2011). Assuming, however, that a disadvantaged group does 
decide to use violent forms of resistance, what factors might influence third-party 
support for such resistance? Looking at international support for armed 
Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation, Studies 4 and 5 present evidence 
in support of “the gun and the olive branch” hypothesis and the “nothing to lose” 
hypothesis among third parties. Third party opinion is thus shaped similarly to 
first party attitudes and action tendencies, although more evidence based on 
comparative studies between third parties and first parties is needed to support 
this claim. 
Implications and Future Directions 
To conclude, Studies 4-7 contribute to the collective action literature by 
providing quantitative data on predictors of violent forms of collective action 
using both survey and experimental methodologies, in an area where the ratio of 
theorizing to data is quite high, and where generated data is drawn mostly from 
interviews and case studies (see Louis, 2009b). By focusing on the role of 
efficacy perceptions in predicting violent forms of action, this thesis puts to the 
test the common assumption among lay people and sometimes amongst scholars, 
that violence is devoid of any rational considerations and is a product of an 
emotional reactive backlash. Admittedly, my studies do not look at the role of 
emotions in predicting violent forms of action and future research should 
investigate emotional processes. That being said, in contemporary theoretical 
accounts of emotions (e.g. Lazarus, 1991; Mackie et al., 2000), emotions are 
viewed as functional responses to individuals’ social and physical environment. 
What my findings do show, however, is that violence is subject to considerations 
regarding its efficacy and the efficacy of alternative means of action. Taken 
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together, the findings of Studies 4-7 suggest that interventions aimed at 
influencing inclinations toward violent forms of collective action in contexts 
similar to those studied here (e.g. armed struggle in a national liberation context, 
students’ fight against increased tuition fees) would benefit from targeting 
perceptions of the efficacy of both violent and nonviolent forms of action. 
While one may be convinced by the findings in this thesis that the choice 
of violence is reasonable considering actors or supporters’ perceptions of the 
world, they may still question the rationality of violence by arguing that 
perceptions regarding the efficacy of violent and nonviolent forms of action may 
nevertheless be distorted and may not fully map unto reality. Judging the 
objective efficacy of collective action at achieving intended or non-intended goals 
is a difficult task and one that social psychology is beginning to examine (see 
Louis, 2009a). However, in light of the role that efficacy perceptions seem to play 
with regard to violent action as shown in Studies 4-7, it seems essential that 
future research looks at the determinants of the perceptions of violence 
(in)efficacy and nonviolence (in)efficacy. Based on Studies 1-3 in this thesis, 
examining the perceived identity consolidation efficacy of violent and nonviolent 
action strategies seems to be a potentially promising way forward. It would also 
be useful to look at the role of perceptions of the morality of violence and 
nonviolence and how they influence perceptions of action efficacy or how they 
interact with them. Another way forward is to look at how the determinants of 
collective efficacy as theorized by Bandura (1997) would predict perceptions of 
the efficacy of violent and nonviolent strategies (e.g. past experiences, modelling 
of similar groups, and encouragement by other groups). In a similar vein, it would 
be interesting to study how perceptions of violence efficacy and nonviolence 
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efficacy relate to perceived group efficacy, which has also been shown to be 
implicated in violent forms of collective action (Tausch et al., 2011). Finally, 
future work should also examine how perceptions of violence efficacy and 
nonviolence efficacy impact on each other. I have treated these as independent 
factors in this thesis, but it is conceivable that they may influence each other. 
Conclusion 
This thesis fills an important gap in the collective action literature by 
investigating social psychological predictors of solidarity-based action among 
bystander groups, as well as predictors of violent forms of collective action. The 
studies examining solidarity-based action show that moral outrage and feelings of 
empathy with a disadvantaged group play an important role in predicting 
tendencies to engage in such action. Another significant predictor appears to be 
the perceived efficacy of collective action at consolidating the identity of the 
protesting movement, which can influence collective action directly but also 
indirectly by feeding into perceptions of the action’s political efficacy. The 
studies examining violent forms of collective action indicate that the pursuit of 
violent action is subject to considerations regarding the efficacy of both violent 
and nonviolent forms of action, and sometimes the interaction between these two. 
It appears that in some contexts people are more supportive of violent action the 
more efficacious it seems, even if nonviolent action is also a promising strategy. 
Further, when violent action seems to show little promise of success, people may 
still support its pursuit if they deem nonviolence to have low efficacy as well. 
These findings make a valuable contribution to current scholarly efforts at 
identifying novel predictors of collective action as well as predictors of different 
types of collective action. I hope this work will stimulate future social 
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psychological research on collective action and facilitate theoretical development 
in the field. 
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APPENDIX 
STUDY 1 
 
The following questions concern your views on the roles some parties 
play in the Palestinian issue: 
 
• To what extent do you think the following parties’ approach to the 
Palestinian issue is unjust? 
- Israel’s approach to the Palestinian issue in general 
- Britain’s approach to the Palestinian issue in general 
 
  
not at all     
   unjust 
  
slightly 
    unjust 
 
somewhat  
    unjust 
 moderately  
    unjust 
  
very 
    unjust 
 extremely  
    unjust 
 
 
The following questions concern the different emotions you experience 
when thinking of the Palestinian issue: 
 
• When you think of Israel’s approach to the Palestinian issue in general, to 
what extent do you feel the following way? 
- Angry 
• When you think of Britain’s approach to the Palestinian issue in general, to 
what extent do you feel the following way? 
- Angry 
  
not at all 
  
slightly 
  
somewhat 
 moderately   
very much 
 extremely 
 
• When you think of the Palestinians’ suffering, to what extent do you feel 
the following way? 
- Sympathetic 
  
not at all 
  
slightly 
  
somewhat 
 moderately   
very much 
 extremely 
 
Following is a list of objectives related to this demonstration. Please 
rate how effective you think today’s demonstration will be in achieving 
these objectives: 
- helping to change the British government’s approach to the Palestinian 
issue  
- helping to change the Israeli government’s approach to the Palestinian 
issue 
- helping to achieve justice in Palestine 
- helping to end the siege on Gaza 
- increasing support in British public opinion for justice in Palestine 
- strengthening the solidarity among the supporters of justice in Palestine 
- helping to build a mass movement in Britain for justice in Palestine 
- showing resistance to the injustices committed against Palestinians 
- showing the Palestinians support amongst British people for their cause 
  
Not effective  
    at all 
  
slightly  
   effective 
 somewhat  
    effective 
 
moderately  
    effective 
  
very 
    effective 
 extremely  
    effective 
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- Of the next ten protests scheduled in support of justice in Palestine and 
accessible to you, how many would you be willing to attend? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9        10 
 
STUDY 2 
I think the Chinese government’s current position on the June 4th event 
is…: 
- Illegitimate  
- Unjust 
1= Strongly disagree; 7 Strongly agree 
 
When thinking about the stance of the Chinese Government on the 
June Fourth event, how strongly do you feel the following emotions? 
-Angry  
-Irritated 
1= Not strongly at all; 7 Very strongly 
 
When thinking about those affected by the June 4
th
 event, how strongly 
do you feel the following emotions? 
-Sympathetic 
-Empathic 
1= Not strongly at all; 7 Very strongly 
 
Below is a list of objectives related to the June Fourth Protest. Please 
rate how effective you think the annual June Fourth Candlelight vigil 
will be in achieving these objectives: 
-showing opposition to the Chinese government’s stance on the June Fourth 
event. 
-voicing public discontent with the Chinese government’s stance on the 
June Fourth event. 
-showing the Tiananmen Mothers support amongst the public for their 
cause. 
-increasing public opinion support for the “reverse the Chinese government 
stance on june 4
th” campaign. 
-strengthening the solidarity among the supporters of the “reverse the 
Chinese government stance on june 4
th” campaign.  
-helping to build a mass movement in support of the “reverse the Chinese 
government stance on june 4
th” campaign. 
-helping to change the Chinese government’s stance on the June Fourth 
event. 
-helping to lift the suppression imposed by the Chinese authorities on the 
Tiananmen Mothers.  
-helping to advance democracy in China  
1= Not effective at all; 7= Extremely effective 
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Using the scale provided, please tell us how willing you would be to 
engage in the following actions in order to support the “reverse the 
Chinese government stance on june 4th” campaign: 
- Join the annual June 4
th
 Candlelight vigil in the future 
1= very unwilling; 7 = very willing 
 
STUDY 3 
I think the Chinese government’s current position on the June 4th event 
is…: 
- Illegitimate  
- Unjust 
- Fair (-) 
- Moral (-) 
1= Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree 
 
When thinking about the stance of the Chinese Government on the 
June Fourth event, how strongly do you feel the following emotions? 
-Angry  
-Irritated 
-Furious 
1= Not strongly at all; 7 Very strongly 
 
When thinking about those affected by the June 4
th
 event, how strongly 
do you feel the following emotions? 
-Sympathetic 
-Compassionate 
-Empathic 
1= Not strongly at all; 7 Very strongly 
 
Below is a list of objectives related to the June Fourth Protest. Please 
rate how effective you think the annual June Fourth Candlelight vigil 
will be in achieving these objectives: 
-showing opposition to the Chinese government’s stance on the June Fourth 
event. 
-voicing public discontent with the Chinese government’s stance on the 
June Fourth event. 
-showing the Tiananmen Mothers support amongst the public for their 
cause. 
-showing sympathy for the Tiananmen Mothers. 
-raising public awareness about the June Fourth event, especially among 
younger generations.. 
-increasing public opinion support for the “reverse the Chinese government 
stance on june 4
th” campaign. 
-influencing other people to join the “reverse the Chinese government 
stance on june 4
th” campaign. 
-strengthening the solidarity among the supporters of the “reverse the 
Chinese government stance on june 4
th” campaign.  
-helping to build a mass movement in support of the “reverse the Chinese 
government stance on june 4
th” campaign. 
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-uniting supporters of the “reverse the Chinese government stance on june 
4
th” campaign. 
-helping to change the Chinese government’s stance on the June Fourth 
event. 
-helping to bring justice to the Tiananmen victims and their families.  
-helping to lift the suppression imposed by the Chinese authorities on the 
Tiananmen Mothers.  
-helping to advance democracy in China  
1= Not effective at all; 7= Extremely effective 
 
Please rate how likely or unlikely it is that you will take part in the 
upcoming June Fourth vigil: 
1= Not likely at all; 7= Very likely 
 
STUDY 4 
The following questions concern your views on the roles some parties 
play in the Palestinian issue: 
• To what extent do you think the following parties’ approach to the 
Palestinian issue is unjust? 
- Israel’s approach to the Palestinian issue in general 
- Britain’s approach to the Palestinian issue in general 
 
  
not at all     
   unjust 
  
slightly 
    unjust 
 
somewhat  
    unjust 
 moderately  
    unjust 
  
very 
    unjust 
 extremely  
    unjust 
 
 
The following questions concern your views on the effectiveness of the 
different means available to Palestinians to deal with their situation: 
- To what extent do you think Palestinians’ use of peaceful means with 
Israel will be effective at helping them achieve their aims? 
- To what extent do you think Palestinians’ use of violence against Israel 
will be effective at helping them achieve their aims? 
 
  
not at all 
  
slightly 
  
somewhat 
 moderately   
very much 
 extremely 
 
Please think about the reasons that some Palestinians have resorted to 
the use of violence in their struggle with Israel. Could you now please 
indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following 
statements: 
- In general, I support the decisions of Palestinians to use violence against 
Israel. 
 
strongly  
 disagree 
  
mostly   
disagree 
somewhat  
   disagree 
  
neither      
   agree nor   
  disagree 
 
somewhat  
    agree 
 
mostly  
  agree 
 
strongly  
    agree  
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STUDY 5 
Text in bold refers to parts that differed across the conditions. 
Fake documentary voice over 
Since the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands began in 1967, 
Palestinians have been united in their opposition to the occupation and its 
accompanying policies.  
The last two decades witnessed several negotiation rounds between 
Israelis and Palestinians in an attempt to bring peace to the region. Israeli 
proposals for resolving the conflict, however, have repeatedly failed to offer 
Palestinians a fully sovereign, independent and viable state of their own on 
the currently occupied territories, in accordance with international law and 
key UN resolutions. The collapse of peace talks in 2000 eventually led to a 
revival of Palestinian resistance in recent years.  
Resistance to any occupation or oppression by one people over 
another can take various forms. It can be violent or nonviolent; or a 
combination of both violence and nonviolence. There is currently no 
agreement among Palestinians on which of these resistance strategies should 
be adopted in order to end Israeli occupation. In fact, Palestinians have been 
developing resistance tactics in both violent and nonviolent directions. But 
what really are the prospects of violent resistance in ending Israeli 
occupation and what, on the other hand, are the prospects of nonviolent 
resistance in achieving the same goal? 
In recent years, several non-violent resistance groups have sprung up 
independently in many Palestinian towns and villages. These groups have 
been training people on the use of nonviolent resistance methods against 
Israeli occupation, such as engaging in mass demonstrations, boycotting all 
Israeli products, and using civil disobedience actions. Civil disobedience 
actions involve, for example, gathering large groups of people to physically 
block the demolition of homes or the construction of settlements. Non-
violent resistance in the Occupied Territories has been spreading and it is 
getting more organized. This has brought to the forefront questions about 
the potential effectiveness of a non-violent resistance strategy at helping 
Palestinians liberate their lands from Israeli occupation.  
Professor Gene Sharp, the world’s leading expert on the use of 
nonviolent strategies in international conflicts, has recently been 
interviewed regarding the prospects of success of nonviolent resistance in 
the Palestinian case. Professor Sharp heads the International Centre for 
NonViolent Conflict based at the University of Massachusetts in Dartmouth. 
Along with his academic colleagues, he has conducted large-scale research 
projects investigating the determinants of success of non-violent resistance 
campaigns worldwide. 
 
Nonviolent resistance high efficacy condition 
“In our research um we have examined all non-violent resistance 
campaigns that were waged worldwide in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. And uuuuh our research reliably shows that non-violent 
resistance is particularly likely to succeed against regimes with powerful 
militaries. Now this may seem counterintuitive at first, but there is a 
reasonable uuh explanation behind it. The fact is, that regimes with 
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powerful militaries typically respond to wide-scale nonviolent resistance 
using their military might, so using violence. And there is no reason to 
believe that Israel will be any different, especially if we look at Israel’s 
historical record, they are very likely to resort to military repression against 
a nonviolent Palestinian uprising. But this is exactly where things turn in 
Palestinians’ favour. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict already gets uuum 
huge attention and media coverage at the international level. The 
violent repression of people engaged in peaceful resistance is bound to 
elicit huge popular outrage and sympathy for Palestinians all over the 
globe. And this would inevitably lead the international community to 
exert an unprecedented level of pressure on Israel. Now Israel, with its 
political, economic and social configuration, is not a country that can 
sustain such high levels of international pressure for too long. 
Eventually, Israel will have to yield. It is exactly these kinds of dynamics 
that uh have allowed several oppressed populations all over the world to 
successfully gain their rights using nonviolent resistance. So what we 
know from research on conflicts similar to the Israeli-Palestinian one, leads 
us to believe that a non-violent resistance strategy is likely to be effective 
at helping Palestinians drive Israeli occupation to an end.”  
  
Nonviolent resistance low efficacy condition 
“In our research um we have examined all non-violent resistance 
campaigns that were waged worldwide in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. And uuuuh our research reliably shows that non-violent 
resistance is particularly unlikely to succeed against regimes with 
powerful militaries. And the reason behind this is actually uuh quite 
straightforward. The fact is, that regimes with powerful militaries typically 
respond to wide-scale nonviolent resistance using their military might, so 
using violence. And there is no reason to believe that Israel will be any 
different, especially if we look at Israel’s historical record, they are very 
likely to resort to military repression against a nonviolent Palestinian 
uprising. They will do everything they can in order to crush it, and that 
includes resorting to violent repression against people engaged in 
peaceful resistance. And what can we expect a nonviolent movement to 
achieve under such circumstances? Realistically, very little. Because 
nonviolence functions best against a regime that can exercise a certain 
degree of restraint and proportionality in their response to acts that 
challenge their authority. But nonviolence is simply not sustainable 
against ruthless opponents, against regimes that typically adopt 
extreme responses. And this is what the Israeli regime is like. It is 
exactly these kinds of responses, uh, these extreme repressive measures that 
have made nonviolent resistance an ineffective tool in the hands of several 
oppressed populations seeking self-determination across the globe. So what 
we know from research on conflicts similar to the Israeli-Palestinian one, 
leads us to believe that a non-violent resistance strategy is unlikely to be 
effective at helping Palestinians drive Israeli occupation to an end.”  
 
Voice over continues 
Armed Palestinian militants have recently been developing new 
guerrilla resistance tactics against Israeli occupation. This has posed new 
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questions about the potential effectiveness of pursuing a violent resistance 
strategy in the Palestinian case.  
In conflicts pitting opponents with drastic differences in military power, 
groups that choose armed resistance against their more powerful opponent 
typically resort to the use of guerrilla tactics, rather than conventional 
warfare. Guerrilla tactics involve armed resistance groups that conduct 
clandestine and surprise attacks on the adversary. The aim is to raise the 
costs of occupation to a degree that the opponent is no longer willing to 
sustain. As such, it can sometimes take several years for this type of 
resistance to achieve its aims. Guerrilla operations in the Palestinian case 
can include armed attacks on any Israeli military targets, as well as armed 
attacks on Israeli settlers, that is, Israelis living in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories.  
Armed attacks against military targets can, for example, involve killing 
Israeli soldiers through suicide bombing attacks. Such operations could 
sometimes lead to Israeli civilian casualties. As for armed attacks on Israeli 
settlers, they can involve firing rockets on the settlement areas, for example, 
or conducting armed attacks inside the settlements themselves.  
But could the use of violent resistance be effective in the Palestinian 
struggle for liberation?  
We are now joined by Eric Margolis, member of the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) which is based in London. Thanks for 
joining us Professor Margolis. The IISS is one of the world’s leading 
authorities on political-military conflict, and has recently issued a report on 
armed Palestinian militant groups, showing that they are increasingly 
becoming paramilitary guerrilla organizations; and that there has been an 
impressive improvement in the last two years in their fighting capabilities in 
terms of discipline, organisation, weapons and equipment. Professor 
Margolis, could you perhaps tell us what this recent development means in 
terms of the chances of success of an armed Palestinian resistance strategy?  
 
Armed resistance high efficacy condition: 
 “Well um actually the improvement in Palestinian guerrilla tactics is 
likely to make a significant difference on the ground, because Israel is 
having lots of difficulties developing successful counter-guerrilla strategies. 
For example uh, in the Israeli war on Gaza last December, Israel was not 
able to defeat Hamas, which is the main armed resistance group in the 
Gaza Strip. And our assessment of Israel’s military arsenal and training 
shows that Israel is extremely well-equipped to engage in conventional 
warfare, but not guerrilla warfare.  
Now of course we also know that in order to fight Palestinian 
resistance groups, Israel will most likely resort to violent military repression 
against any Palestinian civilians who provide assistance to Palestinian 
militants. But even then, Palestinian guerrilla groups will constitute a great 
challenge for the Israeli military. And one of the main reasons for this is 
actually the geography of Palestinian lands: as you know, a large portion 
of the Palestinian terrain in rural areas is not flat, it is hilly and 
mountainous, which is greatly advantageous for Palestinian guerrilla 
groups because it helps them conduct the surprise and clandestine 
operations typically required in guerrilla warfare. But even in urban areas 
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uh, Palestinian guerrilla groups would have little trouble conducting 
operations against Israeli soldiers, because in an urban setting both sides 
have to fight each other within close proximity. In a context like that, 
Israelis cannot make use of their long-range high-tech weapons, which 
essentially means that the Israeli military will lose much of their 
technological advantages over Palestinian militants. So to answer your 
question, um, yes, the current development in Palestinian guerrilla groups 
gives us good reason to believe that the use of armed struggle, the use of a 
violent resistance strategy, is likely to be an effective way for 
Palestinians to end the Israeli occupation of their lands.” 
 
Armed resistance low efficacy condition: 
 “Well um actually the improvement in Palestinian guerrilla tactics is 
unlikely to make a significant difference on the ground, because Israel is 
having no difficulties developing successful counter-guerrilla strategies. 
For example, in the Israeli war on Gaza last December, Israel dealt a 
serious blow to Hamas, which is the main armed resistance group in the 
Gaza Strip. And our assessment of Israel’s military arsenal and training 
shows that Israel is extremely well-equipped to engage not only in 
conventional warfare, but also in guerrilla warfare. Of course we also 
know that in order to fight Palestinian resistance groups, Israel will most 
likely resort to violent military repression against any Palestinian civilians 
who provide assistance to Palestinian militants. So Palestinian guerrilla 
groups will really not constitute much of a challenge for the Israeli 
military.   
Another reason why guerrilla resistance would not be effective is 
actually the geography of Palestinian lands: as you know, a large portion 
of the Palestinian terrain in rural areas is neither hilly nor 
mountainous, but flat, which does not help Palestinian guerrilla groups at 
all to conduct the surprise and clandestine operations typically required in 
guerrilla warfare. Even in urban areas uh, Palestinian guerrilla groups would 
have great trouble conducting operations against Israeli soldiers, because 
in an urban setting both sides have to fight each other within close 
proximity.  In a context like that, Israelis can really make use of their 
short-range high-tech weapons, which essentially means that the Israeli 
military will have many technological advantages over Palestinian 
militants. So to answer your question, um, no, despite the current 
development in Palestinian guerrilla groups, we have good reason to believe 
that the use of armed struggle, the use of a violent resistance strategy, is 
unlikely to be an effective way for Palestinians to end the Israeli 
occupation of their lands.” 
 
• Please rate how you view the Israeli occupation using the following 
dimensions. Circle the line that is closest to your views. Here’s an 
example for you: 
 
I THINK THE ISARELI OCCUPATION IS…: 
-Morally wrong 
-Illegitimate 
-Fair (-) 
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-Justified (-) 
 
              
              
  Not at all            Extremely 
                   
• In your opinion, how effective might the following actions be at 
helping Palestinians end the Israeli occupation of their lands? 
-Mass demonstrations: 
-Boycott of Israeli products: 
-Civil disobedience actions: 
-Armed attacks on Israeli soldiers: 
0 = Not effective at all; 9 = Extremely effective 
 
• How strongly would you support or oppose Palestinians using the 
following actions as means of resistance against Israeli occupation?  
- Armed attacks on Israeli soldiers: 
-5 = Strongly oppose; 5 = Strongly support 
 
STUDY 6 
The following questions concern your views on the planned education 
cuts and rise in tuition fees:  
-Education cuts and fees are justified. (-) 
-Education cuts and fees are unfair. 
-Education cuts and fees are immoral. 
-Education cuts and fees are legitimate. (-) 
 
Strongy 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Slighty 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
How EFFECTIVE do you think the following actions will be at 
preventing a vote on December 9th in favour of the planned education 
cuts and fees? 
-Signing petitions  
-Peaceful demonstrations  
-Classroom walkouts (strikes) 
-Student occupations of university campus buildings  
-Breaking forcefully into offices of political parties supporting education 
cuts and fees (e.g. like the occupation of the Millbank Tower) 
-Attacking offices of political parties or politicians supporting education 
cuts and fees 
-Throwing eggs or rotten fruit at politicians supporting education cuts and 
fees 
 
0= Not effective at all; 9=Extremely effective. 
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To what extent do you support or oppose the use of the following 
actions against education cuts and fees before the vote on December 
9th? 
-Signing petitions  
-Peaceful demonstrations  
-Classroom walkouts (strikes) 
-Student occupations of university campus buildings  
-Breaking forcefully into offices of political parties supporting education 
cuts and fees (e.g. like the occupation of the Millbank Tower) 
-Attacking offices of political parties or politicians supporting education 
cuts and fees 
-Throwing eggs or rotten fruits at politicians supporting education cuts and 
fees 
 
-5 = Strongly oppose; 0 = Neither support nor oppose; 5= Strongly oppose 
 
How likely is it that you will participate in the following actions against 
education cuts and fees before the vote on December 9th? 
-Signing petitions  
-Peaceful demonstrations  
-Classroom walkouts (strikes) 
-Student occupations of university campus buildings  
-Breaking forcefully into offices of political parties supporting education 
cuts and fees (e.g. like the occupation of the Millbank Tower) 
-Attacking offices of political parties or politicians supporting education 
cuts and fees 
-Throwing eggs or rotten fruits at politicians supporting education cuts and 
fees 
0 = Not likely at all; 9 = Extremely likely 
 
STUDY 7 
Throughout this study, we ask you to imagine that you live in a nation called 
ZED which is under occupation. There will be a description of the political 
situation of Zed and how it is developing with time. Please read the text 
very carefully. At various stages, we will stop to ask you questions 
regarding your thoughts, feelings and opinions on the situation. As you read 
through, please try to picture yourself in the described situation as vividly as 
you can.  
Imagine that... 
...You belong to a small and underdeveloped nation called Zed. Zed’s 
neighbouring nation, Alpha, is a powerful and developed country that has 
managed to occupy and control all of Zed’s territory and is exploiting its 
resources and people. Alpha is a democracy and there is a great deal of 
support among the Alpha population for the occupation. Zed is militarily 
much weaker than Alpha and has thus not been able to prevent and fight the 
occupation using its army. As a citizen of Zed, you now live under foreign 
occupation. Your territory is full of Alpha soldiers. 
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As a citizen of Zed, please indicate what you think of Alpha occupying 
your country: 
-This occupation is unfair  
-This occupation is legitimate (-) 
-This occupation is morally wrong 
0 = Not at all; 9 = Extremely 
 
A resistance movement has developed among the Zed people. They 
know that the occupation cannot be sustained without public opinion 
support for the occupation among Alpha’s own population. Hence, to 
achieve liberation they must undermine public support for the occupation 
among Alpha’s own people. The movement has decided to launch 
nonviolent resistance campaigns involving mass protests and mass civil 
disobedience activities such as general strikes, resisting taxes, boycotting 
Alpha’s products and blocking roads with sit-ins and so on.  
 
Nonviolent resistance efficacy manipulation Time 1: 
The low efficacy condition is marked in bold gray and the high efficacy 
condition is marked in bold black. 
 
...Some time later... 
Numerous nonviolent campaigns have already taken place. 
Nonviolent resistance has now been going on for a while. Many Zed people 
have been beaten, arrested or imprisoned by Alpha authorities for engaging 
in nonviolent resistance.  
The effectiveness of resistance campaigns against Alpha’s 
occupation can be judged by their effect on public opinion support for the 
occupation among Alpha’s own population. Independent media analyses 
and public opinion surveys have been conducted on the Alpha people since 
the start of nonviolent resistance campaigns. They indicate that nonviolent 
campaigns are having no effect / are reducing public opinion support for 
the occupation among the Alpha people. The nonviolent resistance 
campaigns that have been pursued so far are thus not helping / helping the 
Zed people in their fight for liberation. 
….At this point some members of Zed’s resistance movement 
suggest that using guerrilla resistance operations may increase Zed people’s 
chances of achieving liberation. Guerrilla resistance would involve armed 
resistance groups that operate secretively and conduct clandestine and 
surprise attacks against military targets only, namely Alpha soldiers. There 
are now discussions among members of Zed’s resistance movement on how 
best to continue resisting, whether or not to continue using nonviolent 
resistance, and whether or not to start using guerrilla attacks against Alpha 
soldiers... 
What do you think? In the next section, we would like to get your 
opinion as a Zed citizen on this issue. 
 
Time 1 dependent variables (not reported in this thesis) 
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Nonviolent and armed resistance efficacy manipulations Time 2: 
The low efficacy conditions are marked in bold gray and the high efficacy 
conditions are marked in bold black 
 
...Some time later... 
Some more time has passed, during which both nonviolent 
campaigns as well as guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers have been used 
in the fight against Alpha occupation.  
During nonviolent campaigns, again some Zed people have been beaten, 
arrested or imprisoned by Alpha authorities for engaging in these 
campaigns. 
As for Zed people engaged in guerrilla resistance, some guerrilla 
members have been killed during counter-guerrilla attacks by Alpha 
soldiers, others have been captured, tortured, and imprisoned, while other 
members continue to operate. Several Alpha soldiers have also been killed 
during Zed guerrilla operations.  
As previously mentioned, the effectiveness of resistance campaigns 
against Alpha’s occupation can be judged by their effect on public opinion 
support for the occupation among Alpha’s own population. Since nonviolent 
campaigns and guerrilla operations have both started to be used, there have 
been new independent media analyses and public opinion surveys of 
Alpha’s population. These indicate that nonviolent resistance campaigns are 
still having no effect on / are still reducing public opinion support for the 
occupation among the Alpha people. By contrast / Furthermore, guerrilla 
attacks against Alpha soldiers are having no effect on / are reducing 
public opinion support for the occupation among the Alpha people. Thus, 
nonviolent resistance campaigns are not helping / helping the Zed people in 
their fight for liberation, whereas guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers are 
not helping/ helping them.  
...Several meetings are now taking place between members of Zed's 
different resistance groups to evaluate the current situation and to see how 
best to continue resisting Alpha’s occupation... What do you think? In the 
next section, we would like to get your opinion as a Zed citizen on this 
issue. 
 
This section is about your position on the use of nonviolent campaigns 
and the use of guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers in view of the 
present situation: 
In the present circumstances, to what extent would you support or 
oppose the use of the following activities in order to achieve liberation?  
-Nonviolent campaigns  
-Guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers  
 
-5 = Completely oppose; 0 = Neither support nor oppose; 5 = Completely 
support. 
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In the fight against Alpha’s occupation, nonviolent campaigns and 
guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers still require equal amounts of 
funding to be carried out. As a Zed citizen living under Alpha's 
occupation, suppose you have 100 Zed pounds (equivalent to 100 GBP) 
to spare at the end of each month. You can spend this money as you 
wish: you can save some or all of it for yourself and your family, or you 
can donate some or all of it to help fund nonviolent campaigns, or 
donate some or all of it to help fund guerrilla operations.  
Please indicate how you would spend these 100 pounds each month by 
entering the desired number of pounds you wish to allocate to each 
category. Remember the total must be 100 Zed pounds:  
 
-For yourself and your family:   
-For nonviolent campaigns:   
-For guerrilla attacks against Alpha soldiers:   
 
In the present circumstances, how likely is it that you would join (or 
remain part of a Zed resistance group that engages in nonviolent 
campaigns?  
 
1 = Not likely at all; 9 = Very likely 
 
In the present circumstances, how likely is it that you would join (or 
remain part of a Zed guerrilla group that engages in attacks against 
Alpha soldiers? 
 
1 = Not likely at all; 9 = Very likely 
 
